Some time ago, while on the last portion of a journey down the Ganges River across India and Bangladesh, I found myself on a 20-foot wooden fishing boat, riding the blunt chop and slashing cross-currents of the Ganges as it merged with its sister-rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna, and then poured into the Bay of Bengal. It was the height of the summer monsoon, and the rivers behaved like barely-strangled seas, casting smaller crafts high into the air as their two- and three-man crews (or two-and-three-boy crews) worked the sails and clung to the gunwales like skateboarders on a half-pipe.
Amid the rain and wind, it felt necessary to glance now and again to the shoreline and estimate what it might take to reach safety in the event we capsized. More often than not, however, there was no shore to be seen. On the deltaic islands that make up Bangladesh’s southern frontier, the line separating land and water is more than indistinct — it is often not there.
It is an article of faith in media and advocacy circles that Bangladesh is doomed, that rising sea levels will swallow as much as 20% of this nation, and send tens of millions of climate refugees hurling themselves across the barbed-wire border to India. The narrative pits carbon-belching giants in the West and China against a poor and helpless waterlogged state. But Bangladesh has been fighting back — literally holding back the sea — through a combination of foreign money, fertile mud and local democracy. How this has worked, and how it may still fail, says a lot about what can happen when governments and donor states make local people the agents of their own renewal.
More than 30 million people live in the low-lying coastal districts of southern Bangladesh. It is a region ruled by water — the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers spill an incredible 68 cubic miles of water, along with 525 million tons of eastern Himalayan silt, into the Bay of Bengal each year. As the rivers flow down, the tide comes up, twice each day, to press its enduring claim to Bangladesh’s barely-elevated nether-lands.
This claim went unopposed for thousands of years. The poor inhabitants of the lower Bengal delta lived just above sea level on slowly-accreted islands of alluvial muck, surviving through subsistence rice cultivation, fishing and luck. That their homes and fields would be flooded every morning and evening was as sure as the phases of the moon. That they would die in large numbers during tropical cyclones was more obvious still.
Records of these storms date at least to the 16th century, when Abu al-Fazl ibn Mubarak, vizier to the Mughal emperor Akbar, wrote of a 1582 cyclone: “It blew a hurricane with thunder and lightning for five hours, during which time the sea was greatly agitated. The houses and boats were swallowed up, nothing remaining but the Hindoo temple on the height. Near 200,000 living creatures perished in the calamity.”
The delta would be punished by giant storms and storm surges with a brutal regularity. A 1998 SAARC report counts 96 cyclones striking the coast of present-day Bangladesh between 1582 and 1996. As many as 100,000 drowned in Bakerganj (later Barisal) during a cyclone in 1876, and another 100,000 were killed by hunger in its aftermath. Nearly a century later, in 1970, a six-day cyclone, with surges as high as 33 feet, killed between 300,000 and half a million people. “Even from an airplane it was possible to smell death,” an Associated Press correspondent wrote after surveying the destruction.
Into this salinated breach stepped the United States. In the 1950s and 1960s, leaders in Dhaka complained that the majority of foreign aid to Pakistan unfairly favoured the West.
This is how the polders came to be built, first as an American project and, from 1972 until today, as a preoccupation of the Dutch. A polder is an enclosed system of dikes, canals and inlets first employed on the northern coast of Europe in the 1500s.
These coastal embankments keep the North Sea from swallowing much of Holland. A low-lying area (or very low-lying: 20% of the Netherlands is below sea level, and another 50% sits just one metre above) is surrounded by a dike to hold back the waters. Rainwater and excess ground water are either pumped out (that’s what all those windmills were about) or released through sluice gates during low tide.
More than 120 such polders were built in present-day Bangladesh between the 1960s and 1980s. Work stopped in the aftermath of the 1970 cyclone and during Bangladesh’s bloody liberation war the following year, but in time vulnerable southern islands were ringed by high earthen walls. The twice-daily inundation was halted, and coastal Bangladesh saw new roads, electricity, and more productive agriculture. The sea, meanwhile, was biding its time.
Nothing much happened from there. Maintenance of the polder areas was poor. Residents had little say in how and when their embankments were repaired, or when the sluices might be opened to release water from sodden fields. The embankments were seen as government property, and the government – centralised, corrupt and burdened with the administration of a very poor country – seldom showed up for work.
After winning independence in 1971, Bangladesh witnessed a long season of political assassinations and dictatorship that has been followed since 1991 by the wild and sometimes violent democracy we know today. As the economy grew, with a GDP that’s expanded by more than 5% a year since 2003, Bangladesh didn’t so much shed its image as a global charity case as see that image reborn through the lens of what will surely be the 21st century’s defining catastrophe: climate change.
News stories have focused on the plight of Bangladesh’s “climate change refugees,” despite the absence, according to a 2012 report by the United Nations Development Program, of any real evidence that such persons yet exist. Meanwhile, the country isn’t short on families who’ve lost their homes to the age-old calamities of riverbank erosion, seasonal flooding and cyclones. And indeed something is coming – the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts global sea levels will increase between 28 and 98 centimetres by the end of this century. But predictions of Bangladesh’s imminent submergence don’t account for the polders, which form a rickety palisade against the invading sea.
One evening in the summer of 2012, I took an overnight steamer down the winding Buriganga, Meghna and Lohalia rivers to Patuakhali district. I had heard of a development project taking place there that had revived and strengthened the coastal polders by that rarest of methods – participatory democracy and grass-roots mobilisation.
In the course of eight years, from 2004 to 2011, the programme, called IPSWAM, for Integrated Planning for Sustainable Water Management, funded by the Dutch and Bangladeshi governments, had changed the lives of an estimated 200,000 people in nine polder areas. According to a 2009 evaluation of two of these polder communities by outside experts, the programme, which cost EUR14.5mn, had reduced the number of people living in extreme poverty from 45% to 16% — a result that alone ought to have made it famous. Previously waterlogged land had been made available for farming, and acreage that had borne one crop a year now supported two or even three harvests. All at an annual cost of EUR9.06 per beneficiary.
This explosion of well-being had been achieved through a simple trick: paying residents, rather than outside contractors, to repair the embankments and to dredge by hand silt-filled irrigation canals. Everybody won – the labourers had more cash, which they spent on food and education, and landowners saw their harvests increase. In an attempt to make Bangladesh’s water development bureaucracy more responsive, the men and women formed local water management bodies to monitor the health of their embankments and canals. Local hands were paid for any task that could be performed by them, while contractors hired by the government for the bigger jobs weren’t paid until the community signed off.
This ethos of active participation in civic life was a novelty, one that took some getting used to. “In the beginning it was tough, people needed motivation,” Zakir Hossain, a 35-year-old farmer, told me. Residents had a profound incentive to maintain the dikes on which their lives depended, but decades on the margins had left them feeling both helpless and without a sense of responsibility for this critical infrastructure.
For the first time in these conservative districts, the labour pool included women, who were lured from their homes to work for wages at or above the prevailing rate. Getting women to participate took some time, Shorab Hossain, a senior economist with the project, told me. Elders said it would be impious, but the poorest families broke the boycott and others followed.
Even then, there were culture clashes. In the early phases of the project, Hossain noticed the women in the all-female work crews weren’t actually eating the beef and fish in their catered lunches; they were taking the meals home to their husbands. Hossain told them he would stop providing the protein if they didn’t consume it on the spot. “Community leaders complained we were giving them men’s food,” he said.
The last sign of opposition came several years ago when, Hossain recalled, he stepped out of a training session to see a grey-bearded man running down a muddy path just ahead of a mob of women workers. They’d had it with the old man’s harangues. “Our work is better than the men,” a 50-year-old labourer, Nur Bano, told me. “We are slower, but our work is of better quality.”
Quality counts.
In 2011 an embankment on Bhola Island was breached after its walls had been weakened by rat holes. That wouldn’t have happened if the locals there had been in charge of maintenance, workers in Patuakhali said. When cyclone Sidr struck in 2007, Patuakhali accounted for just over 10% of the more than 4,000 fatalities nationwide, a relatively low toll that residents attributed in part to the strength of their dikes.
This is how the polders will form Bangladesh’s front-line of defense against the rising seas. According to the World Bank, it would cost $2.5bn to raise and reinforce the 43 polders in the greatest danger of being overtopped during a severe cyclone, and thus at the greatest daily risk as sea levels increase over the coming decades.
As the experience of IPSWAM shows, however, that protection is contingent on residents having some form of direct responsibility over their infrastructure, with support from their government.
Over the two days that I motorbiked along Patuakhali’s embankments and mud pathways during my first visit there, residents were adamant that their lives had been transformed, yet complaints remained that important repairs were coming slowly or not at all. In a village called Panshtala, villagers had constructed a 20-foot-long mud patch after river currents claimed a section of the embankment (you can’t get more participatory than scores of barefoot men and women hauling baskets of mud on their heads to stanch the Bay of Bengal). At a different spot half a mile away, water was eroding the earth surrounding a large sluice gate. The government should have repaired the sluice two months earlier, a villager told me, “Now it can go any time.”
Of greater concern, however, was the future. IPSWAM had ended. Now villagers would have to contend with the very bureaucracy that had allowed their embankments to crumble in the first place. Without the support of outside engineers, economists and other specialists, how would they get by?
When I returned to Patuakhali 15 months later, in October 2013, it was clear these concerns had been justified. IPSWAM had closed shop, but the state hadn’t stepped in with its own technical oversight, and the dikes were deteriorating. With no money to pay for maintenance of the embankments and canals, residents had seen their incomes plummet and fields were again becoming waterlogged.
“There’s no government maintenance,” Mofizur Rahman, a 32-year-old village councilor, said. “We can do some of it ourselves, but for the bigger jobs, we need the government.”
In the village of Fedinagar, a farmer named Forhan Talukdar said he’d withdrawn his two daughters from school. “Fatima went to my parents crying,” he said of his 15-year-old. “I couldn’t tell her it was about money. I just said, ‘I can’t send you this year.’”
“I cannot overcome this problem,” Talukdar continued. “We need the government, or someone, to fix our embankment and our sluice gates. That’s all we ask.”
Rashida Begum, a 35-year-old labourer, said she and her husband, a rickshaw driver, had struggled to keep their children in a private school since the maintenance money dried up. Tuition for Suma, 15, was Tk1,200 a month, she said. For Russell, 11, it was Tk800. While there are no public secondary schools in Fedinagar for her daughter, I asked Rashida if there wasn’t a free government primary school to which she could at least send the boy. “The education is better at this [private] school,” she replied. “It is my dream that he will go higher than us.”
Here we see the unheralded changes taking place in Bangladesh, the broadening aspirations of its poorest citizens, and the limits clamped on those ambitions.
As the villagers told their stories, new investment was being readied. A $68mn Dutch-funded program, called Blue Gold Bangladesh, aims to expand IPSWAM’s participatory ethos to more than half a million people, while promoting local entrepreneurship and access to markets. Its goal is to create 26 self-sufficient polder communities that, within six years, will be able to adequately fund their own maintenance.
It could work. Who, in 2004, would have predicted that a relatively simple intervention could take a hammer to extreme poverty in some of Bangladesh’s poorest townships? Many thousands of children are healthier, better-fed and better educated as a result. Just as striking is the change in morale, the new sense of possibility that villagers have acquired. “In the heart, we are more respected,” Beauty Rani, a 35-year-old mother of two, and a member of her local water management group, told me. “You can feel it. There is a change. They see you as they didn’t before.”
But it may be that these coastal communities are still too marginalised to move themselves. Absent the power and attention that comes with outside funds and expertise, residents living on this silted frontier fear they will rise on a new tide of resources only to sink again into malaise, and find themselves once more vulnerable to rising seas and punishing storms.
This piece, which was funded in part by the Solutions Journalism Network, first appeared in Politico Magazine.



