Recently, inside and outside the National Parliament, BNP leader Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir and Jamaat-e-Islami leader Mia Golam Parwar have been at odds over who played what role in the 1971 Liberation War.
“You have never apologized for your role in 1971,” Mirza Fakhrul said, targeting Jamaat while addressing Parliament on June 28. “If you had, many of the problems we have today would not exist. Had you done so, your leader Golam Azam would not have declared that they had done nothing wrong in 1971.”
Jamaat leader Parwar directly rejected Mirza Fakhrul’s claim, saying they had only opposed “Indian aggression.”
“We have not committed any crime. Why should we apologize?” Parwar said at a press conference at the National Press Club on July 1.
“During the Pakistan period, the leaders of that party explained to the nation the role that many political parties played in the political realities of that time in order to save the country from Indian aggression,” he said.
Listening to the top leaders of these two parties debate the Liberation War reminded me of an incident many years ago, the central theme of which was Jamaat’s role in 1971 and what the party should do about it.
The year was 2009, only a few weeks after the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina assumed office. During the December 30, 2008 election campaign, the Awami League had pledged to prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Liberation War.
The demand to prosecute war criminals had been raised since the early 1980s by families of martyrs and, primarily, left-wing political parties. Although the Awami League had lent moral support to the demand, the issue of war crimes had never truly dominated its political agenda.
That changed during the 2008 election. It can reasonably be argued that the experience of the BNP-Jamaat coalition government between 2001 and 2006 fundamentally altered the Awami League’s political thinking, making the trial of war criminals a central issue in its election campaign.
Abdur Razzak’s question
A few weeks after the Awami League came to power, Jamaat leader Barrister Abdur Razzak, a lawyer with extensive professional and personal contacts, wanted to meet me. The discussion centred on Jamaat’s image, the party’s future, and related issues.
He was seeking opinions from several people because he feared that, this time, the trial of Jamaat leaders for crimes committed during the Liberation War would actually begin. Yet the conversation itself was not about the trial. Razzak’s main concern was Jamaat’s public image.
I told him that Jamaat had a serious image problem, particularly regarding its acceptability among the middle class. It was not regarded as a “normal” political party because it carried an enormous burden on its shoulders. That burden was its role in the Liberation War of 1971.
He asked what Jamaat would have to do to become a “normal” political party.
I suggested two steps. First, Jamaat would have to acknowledge that it had made a mistake in 1971 and apologize to the nation. Second, those leaders who had been active in the party during 1971 would have to leave politics and be removed from the party.
Razzak asked, “Can’t we do just one of the two?”
I replied, “No. The burden of 1971 will remain on your shoulders. Unless you take both steps, that burden will not be lifted, and Jamaat will never be seen as a ‘normal’ political party.”
Looking at the contradictory statements made by Mirza Fakhrul and Golam Parwar over the past few days, it seems that even after almost 18 years since that conversation with Abdur Razzak, Jamaat remains firmly committed to its “what mistake, what forgiveness” policy regarding 1971.
The country and the world have changed dramatically during these 18 years. War criminals have been tried. Five top Jamaat leaders have been executed. Ghulam Azam and Delwar Hossain Sayedee died in prison.
Jamaat’s confidence
On the other hand, under a new generation of leadership, Jamaat played a significant role in the successful overthrow of the Awami League government, riding on the shoulders of the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus to return to the centre of political power.
It won 68 seats in the February election and emerged as the main opposition party in the National Parliament.
Yet the contradictory statements of the past few days demonstrate that Jamaat’s attitude towards the Liberation War of 1971 remains exactly what it was in 1971. There is no regret, no remorse.
Over the past two years, particularly after the fall of the Awami League government in 2024, Jamaat’s leaders have probably concluded that they were right not to acknowledge the mistakes of 1971. They believe the party has not only remained politically relevant but has gained greater public support than at any point in its history.
They may have looked at the success of Islami Chhatra Shibir in student union elections at five public universities and concluded that the Liberation War of 1971 is no longer an important issue for the current generation. Having secured 31% of the vote in the February election, they may even believe they now stand on the threshold of power.
So why revisit the Liberation War at all?
“We have not committed any crime. Why should we apologize?” has effectively become the party’s guiding principle.
Mia Golam Parwar’s remarks suggest that Jamaat continues to use the same language employed by the Pakistani military authorities in 1971 to justify their actions during the Liberation War. By hiding Jamaat’s role behind -- or blending it with --the actions of “many political parties,” he attempts to diminish the party’s responsibility.
In his remarks, Parwar described the Liberation War as “a settled issue of half a century ago” and complained that raising it again was creating “confusion” among the nation.
But is that really the case?
The ‘settlement’ of 1971
Jamaat-e-Islami wants people to believe that what happened in 1971 was merely “Indian aggression.” It wants people to believe that those individuals and groups who fought against the Liberation War and against an independent Bangladesh were simply resisting “Indian aggression” and defending the “integrity of Pakistan” under the command of the Pakistan Army. In doing so, they joined hands with the military. But that is precisely where the problem lies.
It goes without saying that no “settlement” was ever reached on the basis of this explanation. The issue of the Liberation War was indeed settled -- but not in the way Parwar suggests.
The Liberation War of Bangladesh was not the product of any foreign conspiracy. On the night of March 25, the Pakistan Army launched Operation Searchlight, marking the beginning of its planned genocide. Resistance spread across the country almost immediately. The grave of a united Pakistan was dug that very night, and Bangladesh was born the following day, March 26.
There was no foreign conspiracy behind the rapid emergence of that resistance. Throughout March, particularly after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic speech on March 7, the people had mentally prepared themselves for a war of independence. It was in that speech that they were instructed to turn “every house into a fortress” and “confront the enemy with whatever we have.”
The Liberation War was, in the truest sense, a struggle for the survival of the people of Bangladesh -- a fight to exist as Bengalis and as human beings. In that struggle, Jamaat-e-Islami did not merely side with the enemy; it actively participated in the genocide committed against the Bengali people.
In 1971, Jamaat sought to resurrect the corpse of East Pakistan. Its objective was to destroy the emerging independent Bengali nation founded on Bengali cultural values. The party did not merely make political mistakes, it committed crimes. That is the settled narrative of 1971.
Jamaat’s ongoing problem
The problem for Jamaat-e-Islami is that it has never acknowledged its crimes in 1971, nor does it show any sign of doing so. Without acknowledgement, where can remorse come from?
Jamaat is still prepared to carry the burden of those crimes, the same burden we discussed 18 years ago with Barrister Abdur Razzak at the restaurant of the then Sheraton Hotel in Dhaka. But every political decision carries a price. This one has had to be paid every day, every month and every year -- and it will continue to be.
Jamaat may dismiss Mirza Fakhrul’s remarks in Parliament as a cheap political jab. It may try to counter them with fiery rhetoric at a press conference. But that is hardly a prudent political strategy. The hole in which Jamaat already finds itself is only being dug deeper by Golam Parwar’s remarks.
If Jamaat, after securing 31% of the vote in an exceptionally favourable political environment without the Awami League in the electoral field, believes that the memory of 1971 has faded from the public consciousness and that it has become a “normal” political party without ever apologizing for its role, then that will be the party’s greatest mistake since 1971.
Sabir Mustafa is former head of BBC Bangla and is currently working as a freelance journalist and podcaster. Views expressed are the writer’s own.
