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India’s self-destructive war on the roots of the Mughal Empire

The Mughal influence in India cannot be denied or ignored. This is the first of a two-part series 

Update : 13 Aug 2025, 12:52 AM

“As is true of autocracies everywhere”, wrote David Remnick last April, “this Administration demands a mystical view of an imagined past.” Although Remnick was referring to Trump’s America, something of the same sort could be said of India today. 

Informed by Hindutva (Hindu-centric) ideals, the country’s governing Bharatiya Janata Party imagines a Hindu “golden age” abruptly cut short when Muslim outsiders invaded and occupied an imagined sacred realm, opening a long and dreary “dark age” of anti-Hindu violence and tyranny.

In 2014, India’s prime minister declared that India had experienced 1,200 years of ‘slavery’ (ghulami), referring to 10 centuries of Muslim rule and two of the British Raj.

But whereas the British, in this view, had the good sense to go home, Muslims never left the land they had presumably violated and plundered. To say the least, India’s history has become a political minefield.

Between the early 16th and the mid-18th century, towards the end of those 12 centuries of alleged “slavery”, most of South Asia was dominated by the Mughal Empire, a dazzling polity that, governed by a dynasty of Muslims, was for a while the world’s richest and most powerful state.

Although it declined precipitously during the century before its liquidation by Queen Victoria in 1858, today’s India would be unrecognizable without the imprint the Mughals had made, and continue to make, on its society and culture. 

It was they who, for the first time, unified most of South Asia politically.

On every August 15 since 1947, India’s Independence Day, the country’s prime minister unintentionally acknowledges the Mughals’ political legacy by delivering a nationwide address from the parapets of the mightiest symbol of Mughal power -- Delhi’s massive Red Fort, built in 1648. 

Much of modern India’s administrative and legal infrastructure was inherited from Mughal practices and procedures. The basis of India’s currency system today, the rupee, was standardized by the Mughals. Indian dress, architecture, languages, art, and speech are all permeated by Mughal practices and sensibilities.

It’s hard to imagine Indian music without the sitar, the tabla, or the sarod. Almost any Indian restaurant, whether in India or beyond, will have its tandoori chicken, kebab, biryani, or shahi paneer. One can hardly utter a sentence in a North Indian language without using words borrowed from Persian, the Mughals’ official language. 

India now 

India’s most popular entertainment medium -- Bollywood cinema --  is saturated with dialogue and songs delivered in Urdu, a language that, rooted in the vernacular tongue of the Mughal court, diffused throughout India thanks to its association with imperial patronage and the prestige of the dynasty’s principal capital, Delhi.

Yet, despite all this, and notwithstanding the prime minister’s national address at Delhi’s Red Fort, India’s government is engaged in a determined drive to erase the Mughals from public consciousness, to the extent possible. 

In recent years, it has severely curtailed or even abolished the teaching of Mughal history in all schools that follow the national curriculum.

Coverage of the Mughals has been eliminated in Class VII (for students about 12 years old), a little of it appears in Class VIII, none at all in Classes IX to XI, and a shortened version survives in Class XII. 

In 2017, a government tourism brochure omitted any mention of the Taj Mahal, the acme of Mughal architecture and one of the world’s most glorious treasures, completed in 1653. Lawyers in Agra, the monument’s site, have even petitioned the courts to have it declared a Hindu temple.

Although such radical measures have failed to gain traction, the national government has made more subtle efforts to dissociate the monument from the Mughals and identify it with Hindu sensibilities. For example, authorities have eliminated the initial “a” from the name of one of its surrounding gardens, so that what had been Aram Bagh, the “Garden of Tranquility”, is now Ram Bagh, the “Garden of Ram”, the popular Hindu deity. 

This is the same deity to which India’s current government recently dedicated an extravagant temple complex on the site of the Babri Masjid, the mosque in eastern India that the Mughal Empire’s founder had built in 1528, but which a mob of Hindu activists tore down brick by brick in 1992.

All of this prompts two related questions: How did a rich, Persian-inflected Mughal culture sink such deep roots in today’s India in the first place? And why in recent years has the memory of that culture come under siege?

The advent of the Mughal-Rajput alliance 

Ever since the early 13th century, a series of dynastic houses, known collectively as the Delhi sultanate, had dominated the north Indian plain. The last of these houses, the ethnically Afghan Lodis, was dislodged by one of the most vivid figures in early modern history, Zahir al-Din Babur (1483-1530). In 1526, Babur led an army of mostly free-born Turkish retainers from his base in Kabul, down through the Khyber Pass and onto the wide Indo-Gangetic plain, thereby launching what would become the Mughal Empire.

As was true for the Delhi sultans, the new polity’s success lay in controlling access to ancient trade routes connecting Delhi and Lahore with Kabul, Balkh, and Central Asian markets, such as Samarkand and Bukhara. For centuries, cotton and other Indian goods moved northwards along this route, while horses --  more than a hundred thousand annually, by Babur’s day -- moved southwards to markets across South Asia. 

War horses had long formed the basis of power for Indian states, together with native war elephants. But the larger and stronger horses preferred by Indian rulers had to be continually imported from abroad, especially from Central Asia’s vast, long-feathered grasslands where native herds roamed freely.

Having established a fledgling kingdom centred on Delhi, Agra, and Lahore, Babur bequeathed to his descendants a durable connection to the cosmopolitan world of Timurid Central Asia, a refined aesthetic sensibility, a love of the natural world reflected in his delightful memoir, the Baburnama, and a passion for gardens. 

Aiming to recreate in India the refreshing paradisiac spaces that he knew from his Central Asian homeland, Babur built gardens across his realm, a practice his descendants would continue, culminating in the Taj Mahal.

Since he died only four years after reaching India, Babur’s new kingdom merely continued many institutions of the defeated Lodis, such as giving his most trusted retainers land assignments, from which they collected taxes and maintained specified numbers of cavalry for state use. 

It was Babur’s son Humayun (r 1530-40, 1555-56) who took the first steps to deepen the roots of Mughal legitimacy in Indian soil, as when he married the daughter of an Indian Muslim landholder rather than a Central Asian Turk, a practice he encouraged his nobles to follow.

More importantly, while seated in a raised pavilion (jharokha) that projected from his palace’s outer walls, he would greet the morning’s rising sun and show his face to the public, just as the sun showed itself to him. This followed an ancient practice of Indian rajas that subtly conflated the image of a seated monarch with the icon of a Brahmanical deity, before whom one pays respectful devotion through mutual eye contact (darshan).

The Mughals became further Indianised during the long reign of Humayun’s son Akbar (r 1556-1605). For three centuries, the Delhi sultans had struggled to defeat the Rajput warrior clans that dominated north India’s politics. Still, Akbar adopted the opposite policy of absorbing them into his empire as subordinate kings.

Nearly all Rajput kings accepted this arrangement, for by doing so they could retain rulership over their ancestral lands while simultaneously receiving high-ranking positions in Akbar’s newly created ruling class --  the imperial mansabdars. Their new status also allowed them to operate on an all-India political stage instead of remaining provincial notables.

Moreover, they were granted religious freedom, including the right to build and patronize Hindu temples. Over time, there emerged a warrior ethos common to both Mughals and Rajputs that superseded religious identities, allowing the latter to understand Muslim warriors as fellow Rajputs, and even to equate Akbar himself with the deity Rama. 

For their part, Akbar and his successors, as the Rajputs’ sovereign overlords, acquired regular tribute payments from subordinate dynastic houses, the service of north India’s finest cavalry, access to the sea through Rajasthani trade routes leading to Gujarat’s lucrative markets, and the incorporation of Rajput princesses in the imperial harem.

This last point proved especially consequential. As more Rajput states submitted to Mughal overlordship, the imperial court swelled into a huge, multi-ethnic and women-centred world in which the Rajput element steadily gained influence over other ethnicities. 

Moreover, since Rajput women could become legal wives of the emperor, from Akbar’s time onwards, an emperor’s child by a Rajput mother was eligible for the throne. 


Richard M Eaton is an American historian. A version of this article was previously published in Scroll.in and has been reprinted under special arrangement.

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