The November 1970 cyclone of East Pakistan, popularly known as the Bhola cyclone, was one of the deadliest cyclones ever recorded in human history. According to the Economic Times, the cyclone ranked as the fourth worst natural disaster in human history in the past 100 years that caused severe damage to the lives and properties of millions of East Pakistanis (present day Bangladeshis); but more importantly, it finally broke the trust of the Bengali population against their West Pakistani central authority. The cyclone is best known for acting as a trigger behind the political changes that finally gave birth to Bangladesh.
Even though it had destroyed the lives of more than 250,000 people living in the coastal regions of East Pakistan, the Pakistani military government failed to take proper steps to compensate the families and people who were still suffering. A week after the cyclone's arrival, President Yahya Khan confessed that his government had slips and mistakes in handling the relief efforts due to a lack of understanding of the magnitude of the disaster. He acknowledged that due to the lack of infrastructural facilities and logistic support, the post-disaster operation became challenging. Hence, millions of survivors became trapped and had to face the new challenges of cholera, typhoid, and other waterborne diseases along with starvation.
Ever since the emergence of the Bhola cyclone, the politics of East Pakistan had taken many new turns. Natural disasters, in general, may point at areas that are needed to change. When a disaster occurs, many pre-disaster factors such as standard practices, traditions, and institutions are challenged. The 1960s is known as the decade of disasters. Frequent tropical cyclones and floods caused great damage to East Pakistan's economy. Further, the Ayubian repressive regime has caused economic downfall of the Eastern wing. Due to this, the political tension between the East and West Pakistan had already been developed long before the cyclone.
The cyclone's development was first captured by the radar system on November 11, just one day before the event. However, the Indian Metrological Department warned the Pakistan counterpart that a tropical cyclone is headed towards East Pakistan and it could damage the Eastern coast. The provincial government of East Pakistan took the issue lightly and informed the central government that people had taken shelter on their own, and the local governments have adequate preparation to tackle the situation. Due to this, the central government did not issue any warning and broadcasted nothing until November 12, when the cyclone already reached our coastline.
Pakistan Press International (PPI) reported that because of the sudden termination of the traditional method of announcement of danger by the Pakistan Meteorological Department via Radio Pakistan, the people of coastal areas and coastal islands had no idea of the severity of the danger. The cyclone was forecasted to be of average intensity and that warnings of its danger came far too late. However, a barrier to this was that no one listened to these warnings back in those days.
According to the New York Times, Pakistan did have a storm warning system. Despite it not being cutting-edge, it was still not utilized properly. Had there been a proper warning via radio, tens of thousands would have been saved. However, the warning system as a whole was inadequate in East Pakistan. There were virtually no roads nor motorized transport. Furthermore, there were no urban centres which could've acted as a form of shelter. Whereas building embankments would perhaps not have much effect on this particular cyclone, but it would've lessened the damage and helped control less intense cyclones. Besides, the early warning was truly dependent on the top-down process. It usually took a long time to disseminate the information from the central government to the local government.
The Lowell Sun reported that there is documentary evidence of the negligence displayed by the Pakistan officials. First and foremost, despite having state-of-the-art weather forecast facilities built by America in the 60's, none of it was in use in the previous 10 years, even the government of Pakistan did not apply the recommendations set by the Americans to minimize the disaster damage. Whatever measures were taken were only taken on the night of the cyclone. No early warning system was in place. A report written by Dr Gordon E Dunn contains a comprehensive review of what Pakistan could have done to minimize the damage. As per Dr Dunn, 90% of the victims could have survived if the government had only built simple embankments in the most vulnerable places.
The leader of the National Awami Party Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani was amongst the carpers who vehemently criticized the government after the cyclone. On November 23, along with 10 other East Pakistani politicians, he accused the Pakistani government for showing "gross neglect, callous inattention, and utter indifference" to the cyclone victims. Furthermore, they sent a telegram to president Yahya Khan, accusing the government of silencing news coverage, not sending a single minister, and reminding him that he too was indifferent. He commented that the total responsibility for the loss of all these human lives fell on the government, who did not take necessary measures to save the people from the cyclone.
President of the Pakistan Democratic Party Nurul Amin stated that it was quite apparent that the government had failed to recognize the magnitude of the damage, and tried to downplay the casualties and the extent of the damage. Rather it was the foreign journalists who depicted the actual harrowing image of the situation of the survivors of the cyclone. He also expressed shock at the lack of urgency displayed by the government in the relief operations carried out by the government forces. He further criticized the lack of coordination, and claimed that work which could have been done effectively if done with urgency was not done properly, and was delayed.
On November 26, 1970, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman arranged a press conference at the Shahbag hotel where he heavily criticized the government for failing to provide proper warning and adequate aid to the survivors. In his words “the most unfortunate fact is that the government horribly failed to take up responsibility and act accordingly. He further added that if large-scale rescue missions and proper assistance were provided, thousands of people could have been saved -- people who weathered the storm but died due to a lack of care, housing, and medical treatment. If the Navy had acted instantaneously and headed to the flood-affected regions right away, thousands of people would not have drowned in the sea. The failure of this administration to provide assistance and conduct rescue missions is unforgivable.
The Pakistani government showed no concern for those who were affected by the cyclone, and it was only after intense criticism from international media did they actually start relief operations. Unfortunately, by the time they reached, it was too late as many who could have survived lost their lives due to the negligence and the delayed response.
International media also criticized the role of the government. On November 23, The New York Times reported that whereas the international agencies treated this crisis with the utmost urgency and importance, the Pakistani government was far more callous in comparison. When the Dhaka airport was filled to the brim with foreign relief, the Pakistani government was still allowing the commercial flights to operate from there, which eventually slowed down the aid operations.
This Bhola cyclone became an eye-opening event for the Bengalis and it legitimized the demand of Sheikh Mujib's Six Point program. This allowed the Awami League to highlight the military's massive disregard for East Pakistanis. Just three weeks after the cyclone, the first national election of Pakistan took place, where the Awami League took the fullest advantage of the momentum created by the post-cyclone crisis. The landslide victory of the Awami League, which assured it to form both the central and provincial governments, must have taken the blessing of the cyclone -- unfortunately, in history, it has never been acknowledged.
Muhammad Asiful Basar is Senior Lecturer, Department of History and Philosophy, North South University. He can be reached at [email protected].
