The failure of Iraq, breakdown of Syria, and changes in Turkey have created opportunities for Kurds in all three countries. They are not quite the regional kingmakers that some Kurds have boasted they might become, but Kurdish political and military power is now a growing factor in Middle East geopolitics. This has produced not only unique challenges, but also new possibilities for US policy in the region. As US President Donald Trump shapes his administration and officials look at the Middle East beyond the battles against the so-called Islamic State in Mosul and Raqqa, they will have to come to terms with the Kurds, some of whom are intent on using their new clout and political developments around them to push for a sovereign Kurdistan.
It is unlikely that Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) or its fighting force, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), or Turkey’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) will realise their objectives of statehood, but Iraq’s Kurds may be in a far more advantageous position to press for independence. Significant obstacles remain for Iraqi Kurds, but the combination of regional instability, the coming liberation of Mosul, and the state of Iraqi politics may help advance the historic goals of Kurdish leaders.
The Kurds of Iraq
In the two-and-a-half years since the IS overran Mosul, Iraqi Kurdish leaders, especially the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Masoud Barzani, have spoken openly about “Iraq’s failure” and signalled their intention to move forward with independence for their three provinces, which would be governed from the KRG’s capital, Erbil. In February 2016 Barzani declared, “The existence of the Kurdish people in the Middle East is a reality and the Kurds can, like all other nations, achieve their rights and benefit from them. These are natural and God-given rights and can under no excuse be denied.” Of course, the referendum on independence that Kurdish leaders have promised has never materialized. And although Barzani’s statements often seem forthright, they are often full of caveats and short on details. This suggests that he and his advisors may be more interested in brandishing independence to advance other interests.
Foremost among them is placing rivals to Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on the defensive. The two other main political movements within Iraq’s predominantly Kurdish region, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, or the Movement for Change party, are longtime rivals that cooperate with one another, albeit often uneasily, to administer the KRG. Gorran, an offshoot of the PUK, emerged out of frustration over alleged corruption in the KRG and the dominance of the two better-established parties. All three have been locked in a confrontation over Barzani’s extended presidential term and unfulfilled promises of political reform. When Barzani calls for independence, he is goading other Kurdish politicians to oppose him, a stand that would cost them politically. Neither the PUK nor Gorran are against independence, but the PUK in particular differs with the KDP over the conditions of the Kurdish region’s independence. This is because the PUK’s leaders do not want Barzani and his party to dominate a new Kurdish state.
The Kurds have also raised independence to gain leverage with Iraq’s central government on a variety of issues, including oil exports and the KRG’s share of Iraq’s revenues. Iraqi leaders have long resisted Kurdish independence, especially since the Kurds want the oil-rich region of Kirkuk to be incorporated into their state. Baghdad has also opposed Kurdish independence on principle, regarding it as an affront to Iraqi and Arab nationalism.
Beyond Mosul
After the IS is wrested from Mosul, however, the Kurds may have less reason to remain within Iraq. Kurdish officials maintain that Iraq’s political system will continue to be dysfunctional, and thus incapable of ensuring Kurdish rights. Still, the Kurds have shifted their position on how the KRG should secede from Iraq. Rather than pressing for the unilateral approach implicit in Barzani’s declarations during the summer of 2014 and spring of 2015, Kurdish officials now indicate that they prefer a negotiated exit, reasoning that good relations with Baghdad will be critical to securing a prosperous and stable independent Kurdistan.
A negotiated route to Kurdish independence does not seem as unlikely as it once might have been. Voices within Iraq’s governing bloc have indicated that they might prefer allowing the Kurds to go their own way, which would allow Baghdad to keep the 17% of the central government’s budget that would otherwise be sent to Erbil (the KRG has never received the full amount). This is not the official position of the government of Iraq, but it nevertheless would be a new and potentially fruitful means of addressing the Kurds’ long-term desire for independence. If this were to become Iraqi policy, Kurdish independence would likely not be as destabilising as is often feared. Still, negotiations would likely be difficult given Kurdish insistence on holding on to Kirkuk and other contested territories the KRG has acquired since the summer of 2014, when Iraq’s security forces collapsed upon encountering IS fighters.
Turkey’s take
In the three years after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Turkey became, after Iran, the outside power most likely to intervene in Iraqi affairs to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state. Since 2007, however, Ankara has developed strong political, diplomatic, and economic ties with the KRG. Turkey’s dominant Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the KDP have also cultivated ties. Because Turkey is the largest investor in the KRG, the region’s largest trading partner, and a beneficiary of Kurdish oil exports, it no longer defines its relationship with Iraqi Kurds solely in terms of potential threats. It has signalled, albeit implicitly, its willingness to accept Kurdish independence from Iraq.
Ankara sees Iraq’s Kurds as a buffer against the instability spinning out of Iraq. Also, Barzani and the KDP have a testy relationship with the PKK, which Turkey regards as a terrorist group, as well as its Syrian affiliates, the PYD and YPG. The PKK, meanwhile, has enjoyed support from the PUK. Because of these dynamics, Turkey’s leadership has invested significant political capital in the KRG and Barzani. For Turkey, the KRG’s independence would pose far less a threat than the terrorism of the PKK and the territorial ambitions of the PYD and YPG.
The complicated relationships between Iraqi Kurds and the governments of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, as well as their ties with Kurdish groups in all those countries, are on one level significantly destabilising. And while Kurdish independence from Iraq remains fraught with risk for the United States, on another level an independent KRG would present opportunities for Washington in a dramatically changed Middle East. At the very least, it would provide Washington with an alternative partner to Baghdad and Ankara, both of which have proven to be reluctant or uneven allies in the conflict with the Islamic State.
The doomsday scenarios that have often been conjured by opponents of Iraqi Kurdish independence are no longer as likely as they once were. Kurdish independence from Iraq was not the United States’ intention during the 2003 invasion, but more than a decade later it may prove to be an opportunity for US policymakers to secure American interests in a turbulent region.
[This an excerpt of a Council on Foreign Relations article]
