Michael Kugelman is the Director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, a prestigious think tank based in Washington, DC. He tracks issues in Bangladesh as an expert in security, geopolitics, and socioeconomics.
During the students protest, he told Dhaka Tribune on July 26 that "It's hard to overstate how profoundly this crisis has impacted the political landscape." Dhaka Tribune's Diplomatic Correspondent Nurul Islam Hasib interviewed him again following the political changes and the formation of the interim government after Sheikh Hasina resigned as prime minister on August 5.
What key challenges might the interim government face in maintaining order and credibility among the Bangladeshi populace?
When it comes to maintaining order, the big challenge will be curbing the politics of retribution in Bangladesh which sometimes play out violently, including in recent days. Another challenge will be handling the religious extremists that have exploited the chaos of recent weeks. With the police now back at work, the law-and-order situation should be easier to manage. But the political temperature remains high, and that, coupled with political uncertainty, ensures a continued volatile situation.
The credibility challenge is linked to that of order. If the interim government struggles to keep the security situation under control, that could impact its standing with the public. Economic stabilization is another challenge for the government. If it struggles to rein in economic stress, that could impact its credibility too. The longer it's in power, the greater the risk of losing credibility—especially as an unelected administration that lacks a public mandate—if violence and economic problems continue.
How could this change in government affect Bangladesh's relations with its immediate neighbors, particularly India and China?
Hasina's ouster delivers a major blow to India, because it had long viewed Hasina and her party as its best—and arguably only—political option in Bangladesh. India will now need to build up relations with parties and entities that it had invested in much less in the past. This will take time.
Still, India can't afford to lose Bangladesh as a partner. Its trade interests, border security needs, and great power competition compel it to have a workable relationship with Dhaka. And I'm fairly confident it can get there, though it will take time. Certainly, Hasina's presence in India complicates matters. The longer she stays there, the tougher it will be for New Delhi to build goodwill with those now in power in Bangladesh.
I don't see a major change for relations with Beijing. China has the luxury of knowing that there is multi-partisan support in Bangladesh (as there is in most countries in South Asia) for friendly ties with China. However, Beijing itself will proceed cautiously, and it will likely wait until it is confident about the security situation and a more stable political environment until it engages closely with the new government. But that engagement, when it comes, should be cordial. Additionally, the new government will not worry as much about upsetting India as the previous government did, which could provide more space for expanding relations—especially defense ties—with Beijing. Bangladesh's relations with China deepened in the Hasina era, but they could go even further now.
What stance do you anticipate the United States and other Western powers will take regarding the interim government? How are American people viewing the situation in Bangladesh, and how is US media reporting on it?
The US and the West will be comfortable with the interim government, especially with Muhammad Yunus leading it. The West, like much of the world, had been deeply concerned about the deadly unrest and the total political uncertainty that set in after Hasina's ouster. The interim government, by taking office quickly, has eased many of those concerns. The West will want to do its part to help Bangladesh, especially on the economic stabilization front, but that's easier to do when the security and law and order situations are in a better place. Additionally, I don't expect the West will push for quick elections; I imagine it recognizes that the interim government will want to take time to stabilize the country and initiate reforms meant to depoliticize and bring more accountability to institutions.
The main focus of the US media and the broader public in the US were the high levels of deadly violence, and just how quickly the situation escalated from peaceful protests to violent clashes, culminating in Hasina fleeing the country. It's a very busy news cycle these days, and in the US so many are focused on the election, so it took some time for Bangladesh to get on the radar. But because of the seriousness of Bangladesh's crisis, it eventually became a big story, at least for a brief period.
Could this political change in Bangladesh influence broader global geopolitical trends, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region?
I don't think it will have a major impact on geopolitics. The political change, dramatic though it was, came out of a crisis that remained an internal one. So, there weren't any direct impacts on Bangladesh's neighbors or countries further afield in the region.
The big geopolitical story in the Indo Pacific is great power competition. Bangladesh has been a battleground for that competition for several years. I don't think that will change. The new government's policy will be much like the previous government's: Balance relations with the US, India, China, and Russia, all of which are notable players in Bangladesh. We may see the new government push a bit closer to China, and pull back a bit from India. But those changes wouldn't be large enough to change the broader geopolitical calculus.
How might this political shift impact Bangladesh's economy, especially concerning foreign investment and economic growth?
I imagine that the formation of the interim government eased many investor concerns, as it represented the first step of a political transition, and thereby removed a bit of the uncertainty that worries business communities and investors.
The Hasina government actively sought investment, even though concerns about the investment climate contributed to strikingly low FDI figures in Bangladesh. The interim government, however, has an opportunity: Yunus is someone investors will be comfortable with, and an apolitical interim set up—one that includes several respected economists—will also be well received by investors. But this new government needs to ensure law and order to restore, and increase, investor confidence.
The interim government has given little indication of its plans for economic recovery. It will likely want to reform economic and financial institutions to make them more effective, but that will take a long time. This is why taking steps to restore law and order are critical in the immediate term—as that's a necessary first step to ensure that businesses stay open, that goods flow into and out of the country, and that potential investors aren't scared away.
What are the prospects for free and fair elections under the interim government?
I don't think it'll be in any rush for elections. Its messaging suggests it first wants to focus on reforms and stabilization. Also, one of the key newly influential political players--the student protest leaders--may want to have more time so that they can launch a new political party. I'm hearing from contacts in Bangladesh that it could be a year, perhaps even more, until there are elections.
This does create some challenges for the transition. The BNP appears to want elections sooner rather than later, presumably because it would have a good chance of winning. But most other political players and entities don't appear to be in any hurry. The question is how the BNP might react if it concludes those elections aren't coming any time soon: Will it accept that, or will it use pressure tactics to try to bring on early polls?
The other issue is the army. Because of the broader political vacuum in place, an institution that had been comfortable staying behind the barracks the last 15 years has now been thrust back into political prominence. And the longer the interim government remains in place without an election, the more likely the army is to take on a greater role—and especially given that no one in the interim government, including Yunus, has governing experience.
What advice would you offer to the interim government and Chief Adviser Prof Muhammad Yunus?
The three top priorities should be restoring law and order, stabilizing the economy, and developing a formal transition plan—with a timeframe for elections. It's also important to reach out to Bangladesh's key partners—and it has quite a few, thanks to its global economic influence—to reassure them it's committed to continue working with them despite the major political changes.
I'd also advise the government not to make the mistake of the previous government, that of completely cutting out its rivals. The government will only plant the seeds for future political turmoil by refusing to engage at all with the Awami League and its supporters. Breaking the vicious cycle of the politics of retribution is essential for Bangladesh to achieve sustained stability and to restore democracy. That can start with the new government—not necessarily today, but in the coming weeks—extending a hand to the previous ruling party and its allies.
