While the Nixon-Kissinger administration continued supporting then Pakistani president AM Yahya Khan, who launched the ruthless “Operation Searchlight” to commit genocide on its eastern front in 1971, a diplomat in Dhaka asked the US government to express shock describing the atrocities in a telegram on March 27.
“Selective Genocide” was the title of the telegram sent by Archer K Blood, the then consul general at the US Consulate in Dhaka.
It pictured the massacre perpetrated by the Pakistani Army and the non-Bengali Muslims in Dhaka on the Awami League leaders and supporters, intelligentsia, students, and the Hindus.
Blood suggested that the US government express shock, “at least privately to GOP (Government of Pakistan), at this wave of terror directed against their own countrymen by Pakistan military.”
From left, Archer K Blood, Edward Kennedy, Frank Forrester Church and William Saxby CollectedThe government of Richard Nixon, advised by wicked Henry Kissinger, remained mum even on April 2, the day Soviet Union appealed to West Pakistan for a ceasefire, because the US needed Yahya's help to establish contact with the Chinese government.
April 6 was an eventful day: Pakistan dropped bombs in Chandpur in its first air attack in East Pakistan; Jamaat-e-Islami chief Ghulam Azam, and several other senior Islamist leaders met governor and marshal law administrator Lt General Tikka Khan lending their support towards the army; and Soviet President Podgorny requested General Yahya to stop bloodshed.
Behind the curtain occurred another incident on that day which had a huge impact on the US policy towards the Pakistan conflict – Archer K Blood sent a formal dissent cable to Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers with signatures of 20 other diplomats lamenting the silence of the US government over the genocide perpetrated in East Pakistan.
“Operation Searchlight” was set to be launched at 1pm on March 26, but Awami League supremo Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's proclamation of independence the previous night prompted the Pakistani military junta to start its well-designed massacre 13 hours ahead of the schedule so that the Bangalis could not put up a strong resistance.
According to a White Paper published on August 5, 1971 by the Pakistan government, the Awami League had a plan to stage an armed revolution early on March 26.
Bravery And Punishment
Blood deliberately gave a low classification to this telegram in order to encourage broad circulation in Washington, Kissinger said in his memoir.
The same day, seven specialists on South Asian affairs from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), one from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), and another from the AID/NESA (Near East South Asia Center) sent a letter to Secretary Rogers associating themselves with the views expressed in the Blood's telegram.
Ambassador Joseph Simpson Farland in Islamabad supported the principle that members of his mission had the right to express their views on the problems facing the United States in the crisis developing in Pakistan.
He noted that the embassy had also submitted a proposal to register serious concern about developments in East Pakistan, and he suggested that it was time to review the policy toward Pakistan which excluded interference in its domestic affairs.
The strong stance of the 30 US diplomats in Dhaka and one in Islamabad worked like a magic: the next day, April 7, the US government appealed to West Pakistan “publicly” for a ceasefire.
But Blood lost his job; he was swiftly transferred to Washington, to a position in human resources since his steps had infuriated Nixon and Kissinger.
Kissinger also took action against other officials taking the side of Bangladesh, terming them “sick bastards”.
“They are basically pro-Indian. They want to believe what the American press is writing. And the Indian press, of course, the American press is the same as the Indian press, follows everything they say,” he said at the July 28 meeting. About Blood, Nixon said: “He's bad, isn't he?”
The head of the USIS was also removed because he was “tendentious in his reporting.”
Then Kissinger targeted Eric Griffel, who was the head of AID (Griffel was the associate director in charge of AID operations in Dacca) and was set to be out in September.
On April 10, the dissenting members in Dhaka sent a follow-on telegram to the State Department in which they characterized the martial law regime in East Pakistan as being of “dubious legitimacy” and took further issue with the view that the “current situation should be viewed simply as constituted government using force against citizens flouting its authority.”
They concluded that it was “inconceivable that world can mount magnificent effort to save victims of last Novemberʼs cyclone disaster on one hand, and on other condone indiscriminate killing of same people by essentially alien army defending interests different from those of general populace.”
How Yahya Defended His Actions
In a letter to his friend US President Richard Nixon on March 30, General Yahya described the events of March – his efforts since general elections in December 1970 towards a restoration of democratic processes through elected representatives of the people.
Yahya said: “I had hoped that these discussions would lead to a broad political agreement regarding the convening of the National Assembly and framing of a constitution.
“Unfortunately, however, the political leadership in East Pakistan and especially Sheikh Mujibur Rahman took a progressively rigid stand which made such an agreement impossible. Meanwhile, murder, arson and widespread disorder in defiance of governmental authority were let loose in the province.”
The military ruler said that the Awami League had put forward final proposals, which virtually amounted to dismemberment of the country.
“Since they had no such mandate from the people and as unity of the country was at stake, firm action had to be taken to assert government's authority and to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan. There was no option but to take that decision (launching Operation Searchlight),” Yahya wrote.
Finally, he urged Nixon to consider the desirability of expressing his support for the "forces of peace and stability in this region and of impressing upon Indian leaders the paramount need for refraining from any action that might aggravate the situation and lead to irretrievable consequences.”
Senators: Friends Of Liberation War
On May 3, Senator Edward Kennedy demanded that the United Nations take necessary steps regarding the crisis in East Pakistan. He also asked the US government to send aid for the people who had taken refuge in India.
By May 6, India estimated that some 1.2 million people had fled from East Pakistan.
On June 9, Democrat Senator Frank Forrester Church and Republican Senator William Saxby placed a proposal seeking cancellation of the US financial and military support to Pakistan, and asking the US government to send aid to India for the refugees and also to take steps so that they could return to their country.
After three days, on June 9, the US government approved an aid of $15 million in excess for the refugees from Bangladesh in India.
On July 7, Senator Frank Church asked President Nixon to bring back the arms-loaded ship sent to Pakistan.
He made the call at a time when the Beatles stars and Indian sitar player Ravi Shankar were preparing for a mammoth event, titled “Concert for Bangladesh” at the Madison Square Garden in New York City, scheduled for August 1.
Senator Kennedy, who had visited the refugee camps along border, wrote a report that was part of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations testimony.
The report dated November 1 reads: "Hardest hit have been members of the Hindu community who have been robbed of their lands and shops, systematically slaughtered, and in some places, painted with yellow patches marked ‘H'. All of this has been officially sanctioned, ordered and implemented under martial law from Islamabad."
