In a book published about four years ago, called Privilege-Resistant Policies in the Middle East and North Africa, my co-author Meriem Ait Ali Slimane and I wrote about the failure of many countries in the Middle East to create a competitive private sector that can generate the jobs required to employ the young population of the region.
At the root of this, we argued, was the fact that in most of these countries the private sector is dominated by companies that have grown large based on privileges rather than efficiencies.
As a result, the incentive and pressure to be competitive is weak.
A consequence of this is huge unemployment rates among young graduates.
Hiding behind the façade of oil riches, is a disturbing fact. About 15% to 25% of young Middle-Easterners do not have jobs.
In the Middle East, businesses with resources do not create many jobs.
The ones that could have created jobs do not get the resources to do so.
The Arab Spring, short-lived though it was, happened for a reason.
Having achieved a very respectable rate of economic growth in recent decades, Bangladesh has now set its eyes on becoming a middle-income country by 2031 and high-income country within two decades.
For this, we need to develop a truly competitive private sector.
Whether we can do so will depend a lot on our policy stance.
More specifically, it will depend on the balance between crony-friendly, business-friendly, and market-friendly policies.
In my last column, where I talked about the very large firms in Bangladesh - the ones earning average annual profits of Tk500 crore or more - I posed this question: how much of the profits and growth associated with such large firms are due to: a) productivity increases in a competitive market; b) output growth (not necessarily with productivity gains) in a protected market; and c) government largesse other than import protection (such as large contracts)?
In this article, I probe deeper into this question.
Crony-friendly regime
In a crony-friendly policy regime, a few firms obtain considerable privileges from the government by leveraging their political connections.
These include resources directly allocated by the state, such as public procurement contracts, public land, or subsidized credits.
Such privileged access to resources may also extend to areas influenced by the state such as the private banking sector.
But there are also other, more subtle, ways in which cronyism operates.
For example, politically-connected businesses may influence the regulatory framework in a way that creates barriers to entry for potential competitors, through both de jure provisions in written laws or regulations, and in their de facto application, such as complex procedural requirements that make entry costs prohibitively high for many firms.
Sometimes, the use or abuse of the regulatory apparatus may be more insidious in a crony-friendly policy environment.
Well-connected businesses may connive with regulatory officials to harass competitors.
Collusion and harassment are facilitated if regulatory compliance related to business operations, such as customs clearances, business inspections, and periodic renewal of operating licenses, is burdensome.
A vicious form of this is predatory business. For example, a powerful person may want to obtain shares in, or completely take over, a profitable business.
If the owner of the business rejects the overtures, the power of the government’s regulatory machine may be turned on to harass the business owner into submission.
There are some indications that this may be happening in Bangladesh.
A crony-friendly policy stance may be distinguished from a business-friendly policy stance.
Business-friendly regime
Under the latter, the government does not bestow favor on a few cronies but adopts policies that are good for businesses in general or for businesses belonging to specific categories, such as sectors, regions, or size.
Examples include the provision of cash subsidies to the garment industry in Bangladesh, import protection through high tariffs to firms selling in the domestic market, such as electronics, tax holidays for those setting up businesses in less-developed regions, or subsidized credit to small enterprises.
Development of economic zones, a major agenda in Bangladesh, is also an example of a business-friendly policy because it makes availability of land and infrastructural services easier for businesses.
It may be noted that while business-friendly policies are not aimed at a small number of favored companies, sometimes these may disproportionately benefit a few.
For example, if a tax benefit, cash subsidy or import tariff protection is given for an activity dominated by a few enterprises then de facto that policy ends up benefiting a few even if it appears to be designed for the many.
Business-friendly policies are better than crony-friendly policies.
Market-friendly policies
However, going forward, what Bangladesh needs the most are market-friendly policies.
Market-friendly policies are those that stimulate competition in the market.
For example, lowering tariffs is a market-friendly policy because it allows more competition in the market through increased imports.
FDI-friendly policies, if designed and implemented in a pro-competition way, also stimulate competition in addition to generating other benefits.
Effective implementation of competition policy will also help enhance competition.
Business-friendly policies often help increase profits of existing businesses but not necessarily make them face real competition.
Hence, these are politically attractive if such businesses have some connection with the political regime.
However, by not introducing the discipline of competition, such policies may dampen the incentive for firms to become more efficient.
In some cases, it may be possible to design business-friendly policies such that any provision of benefit through such policies is contingent on improved efficiency.
In such cases, the policies may acquire some character of market-friendly policies.
The time has come to take stock of the nature of the policy stance in Bangladesh.
There are several policies in place that are business-friendly, and these have paid rich dividends in terms of growth.
But we have lagged on productivity improvement and innovation, the key requirements for competitiveness.
We now need to move from business-friendly to market-friendly policies.
The concern is that we may be moving in the opposite direction and the balance may be shifting instead towards crony-friendly policies.
Bangladesh needs to create a market economy where resources are allocated to firms that make the most efficient use of these.
This will not happen if our policy and regulatory apparatus is vulnerable to capture or privilege seeking by influential businesses.
As the experience of the Middle East shows, in a privilege-ridden system, it is difficult to create the enabling conditions for a competitive economy.
We don’t want to fall in the Middle Eastern trap.
The author is an economist, previously with an international development agency



