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Premature call for SMP on tower industry can derail ‘Digital Bangladesh’

Update : 09 Dec 2021, 09:48 PM

The economy of Bangladesh has emerged on a large scale over the last few decades, and the ICT sector plays a vital role as a catalyst to achieve this success.

Realizing the potentials of this very promising sector, the government announced ‘Digital Bangladesh – Vision 2021’ and has been working in unison to achieve its economic goals.

The recent announcement that Teletalk has been granted 3.5 GHz spectrum by the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) and will launch 5G services before the end of 2021 - with other mobile operators following in 2022 - is just the start of the fast-paced transformation of the sector.

It will be excellent that Bangladesh, often lagging behind other countries in technology adoption, will soon have access to the latest 5G mobile technology, even before the two other major sub-continent markets, India, and Pakistan.

In 2018 BTRC issued and awarded TowerCo license to four companies, namely edotco Bangladesh, TASC Summit Tower, Kirtankhola Tower Bangladesh, and AB Hi-Tech Consortium, with a set of licensing regulations and guidelines and defining the course of actions moving forward after a comprehensive and translucent assessment, comprises imposing extensive rollout commitments, i.e., all upazilas must be covered by the end of year 5, and mandated mobile operators to roll back their towers to Towercos by 2023.

The regulation was designed to speed-up the execution of Digital Bangladesh -Vision 2021 and is working well with significant new investments, tower deployments and the adoption of new green technologies. 

Among other goals, the policy promoted infrastructure sharing, ensured optimized use of scarce land resources, and reduced electrical power demand.

At this nascent stage of the tower sharing industry, declaring an SMP will be counterproductive.

Analysys Mason; a world-renowned Management consultant and advisory firm on TMT (Technology, Media & Media) recently conducted a thorough research on SMP designation in the Tower Sharing industry in Bangladesh. From the report, a summary of key arguments are as follows:

Applicable global approaches

According to the ITU,[1] exemplar competition regulation has traditionally been based on a market analysis procedure such as:

·           The definition of markets. From a regulatory perspective, markets are defined based on demand and supply substitutability, with the boundaries of a market based on behavioural responses to a small but significant non-transitory increase in prices (SSNIP) by a hypothetical monopolist providing a single focal product in that market. Markets have by default generally been defined on a national level (occasionally with regional variants).

·           The assessment of dominance or significant market power (SMP). Although many economic factors are involved in creating or sustaining a dominant market position, much legislation and most regulatory practice has focused on an assessment of market share (usually revenue-based) as this is the most easily quantified and validated measure. Regulators sometimes assess a range of other relevant factors, such as market concentration, access to finance, economies of scope, technological advantage, and the prospect of countervailing buying power. 

It is important to highlight that globally tower markets are lightly regulated; for example, a towerco licence is not required in the United States and generally competition rules apply only to large telecommunications and mobile operators.  

However, wherever they are regulated, it is best practice that mobile operator-owned towers have been included in the definition of the relevant market for towers. 

Why are more onerous competition restrictions premature in Bangladesh?

Based on tower counts, the mobile operators still retain ownership of the largest number of telecom towers in the country with Grameenphone having 35% market share, edotco 32% and Banglalink 16% (see graphic).

No single company has a disproportionately large market share larger than 40%.

In October 2021, Banglalink announced that it would soon sell 5,500 towers of its 6,500 towers.

Concurrently, Robi, the second-largest operator in Bangladesh stated that it is selling all of its remaining 2,460 towers, having already sold 5,258 towers to edotco Bangladesh. 

The two operators are expected to earn about $500 million from the sales.

The market leader Grameenphone with 15,500 towers is also in the process of offloading its towers to Towercos.

These various deals as well as the growth in the number of new towers required will determine the future market shares and revenues.


As such, any assessment of dominance or SMP by the BTRC should be based on the market for all towers in Bangladesh including both mobile operator and towerco-owned towers.

Only looking at the number of towers/revenues of the tower sharing licensees is going to give an incomplete picture.

If a wider view of the market is not adopted there would be a high degree of regulatory uncertainty.

Notably, some regulators have acknowledged that market share in itself is not sufficient to determine SMP.

The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission highlighted in its Guideline on Dominant Position[2] that “the Commission recognizes that market share can be an imperfect indicator for dominance… a high market share will not, of itself, be considered by the Commission to be conclusive evidence that a licensee is in a dominant position.”

Myanmar’s Ministry of Communications and Information Technology also stated in its Competition Rules[3] that “in determining whether a Licensee is in a Dominant Position, the Department may consider a range of market circumstances or criteria.”


As such, besides the current proposed market share determinant, BTRC should also consider the barriers for tower deployment and price determination when assessing SMP.

Conditions to designate significant market power in the tower market are currently not present in Bangladesh – there is no need for ex-ante regulations

A review of the Bangladesh towerco shows no sign of systemic market failure or abuses of SMP/dominance which needs to be addressed by strict significant market power competition policy approaches.  In particular, the competition tests are not satisfied, namely:

·                    significant market power – no tower sharing licensee has significant market power where it need not take account of the behaviour of its competitors; and

·                    significant anti-market behaviour - the tower sharing licensees are having a positive impact on the Bangladeshi telecommunications market rather than negative.

Rather, there are already real commercial incentives for Bangladeshi Towercos to offer competitive access as they seek more customers. BTRC must consider the extent of market failure and associated risks if it was to decide to impose SMP remedies in the future.  Slowing network rollout is one of the key risks of these more intrusive remedies, additional consideration will need to be taken to balance the risks involved in the imposition of SMP remedies to ensure that the tower market remains competitive, and at the same time, not impeding the country’s Digital Bangladesh aspirations and 5G deployment.

BTRC must consider the extent of market failure and associated risks when imposing SMP remedies in the future

While there is no need for SMP designation and therefore ex-ante regulations to be imposed on players in the tower sharing market as the tower licence implementation is still in progress, SMP remedies may be appropriate to address future cases of market failure, especially after 2023 as the tower sharing market in Bangladesh matures.  

There are six types of SMP remedies that can be used to address specific market failures that may arise, but each comes with associated risks as shown in Figure 1.3.


Whether the competition enhancing effect of the SMP remedy outweighs potential risks is highly specific and depends on the extent and scope of the implementation of the SMP remedy.

In general, the more intrusive the SMP remedy, the higher the economic impact to the economy and end users.

As such, intrusive remedies such as price controls (both for price ceilings and floors) and caps on tower rollout should be used only when dealing with very severe market failures (e.g. near-monopolistic, or monopolistic situations).


With decreased network rollout one of the key risks of more intrusive remedies, additional consideration will need to be taken to balance the risks involved in the imposition of SMP remedies to ensure that the tower market remains competitive, and at the same time, not impeding Digital Bangladesh aspirations and 5G deployment.

An Illustrative example of impact of ex-ante regulations to prevent existing market players from participating in future tower divestments, MNOs will lose Tk10 B from tower sales which eventually have TK25 B impact on GDP. Assessment also suggested:

-          increase of discretionary relocation will increase Tk2/Month/mobile phone subscriber

-          Increase of revenue sharing rate will increase Tk2.8/ Month/mobile phone subscriber

-          Imposing roll out capping will increase Tk3.3/ Month/mobile phone subscriber

-          Imposing on price flooring will increase Tk5.5/Month/mobile phone subscriber

 

In addition to the adverse economic impacts, there may also be ripple effects on government’s revenue as well as employment.

BTRC will therefore need to exercise further discretion to use competition remedies and consider the full extent of market failure and the associated risks, in order to safeguard against potential negative outcomes.

Any asymmetric ex-ante regulation is therefore presumptive and unnecessary at this juncture.

BTRC always retains ex-post powers to review any M&A activities and that is the typical approach taken by regulators to address the actual competition problem identified at that point in time.

It is more in the public interest for the BTRC to focus on facilitating stronger Towercos and ensuring MNO tower rollbacks by 2023, to build a more competitive market.

On the whole, SMP can push back the vision of establishing Digital Bangladesh.

The tower industry holds an important place in establishing the present government’s Digital Bangladesh vision.

Therefore, BTRC should consider this issue before announcing SMP in the tower sharing sector.

 

The author is former senior secretary at the Bangladesh Parliament

 

[1] ITU, ICT Competition Policy, Regulation and Analysis in Digital Apps Environment in the Arab Africa region, 2021 forthcoming

[2]        https://www.mcmc.gov.my/skmmgovmy/media/General/pdf/Commission-Guideline-on-Dominance-in-a-Communications-Market-Final.pdf

[3]        https://mmcc.gov.mm/wp-content/uploads/pdf/legislation/Competition-Rules-for-the-Telecommunication-Sector_en.pdf

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