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The bank board: Governance of the banking sector

This is part of a series that provides a retrospective look at Bangladesh's financial sector
Update : 14 Dec 2021, 08:59 PM

In the previous article on governance of the banking system the main structure of the operation of the bank was set out.

Properly implemented this would be an effective basis for governance.

However, the reality of the weak management of the recognition of non-performing loans and the ready forbearance permitted by Bangladesh Bank leave the banking system in a rather difficult condition.

In this article we examine the question of the ownership of the commercial banks and the implications for their governance.

Our focus here is on the private banks.

Governance of the state banks is largely political.

A few words on the state banks are of interest. (We discuss the commercial banks, not the specialized banks.)

When Bangladesh was established as a nation the commercial banks were largely privately owned.

There was no alternative to nationalization of the six commercial banks.

Ownership was largely in the hands of persons from West Pakistan.

What to do with these banks has been a matter for argument ever since.

Of the six, two (Uttara and Pubali) were privatized in the 1980s although without cleaning up the portfolio that contained many bad loans.

Government intended to work towards privatization of three of the remaining four, maintaining only Sonali Bank.

Rupali bank was turned into a limited company and shares were sold to the public although the government maintained a majority interest.

Efforts were made to complete the privatization of Rupali Bank but this effort failed in confusion and dubious bidding practices.

Two additional banks became state commercial banks.  (The specialized industrial bank and Basic bank established from the failure of a foreign bank).

The World Bank and the IMF have pushed for privatization of some of these six banks but there has never been any agreement to do so and it is unlikely that privatization would be achieved over the next decade.

The Perspective Plan 2021-2041 does not cover the evolution of the banking system.

Setting a few rules

For these six state banks there are few rules: bad debts are a large part of the portfolio, the banks are insolvent if their true bad debt is recognized.

We cannot expect Bangladesh Bank to supervise these six banks.

Effective governance must concentrate on the private banks. 

We focus in this article on the boards of the private banks and how the board functioning can be improved.

The first point is training, explaining how a commercial bank works.

Most directors do not have the technical backgrounds to do their job; it is imperative that they have an overall picture of how the bank operates and the role the board should take.

Too often the directors are focused on the following issues: 

1.      Getting particular loans approved.

2.      Getting certain persons appointed to the bank.

3.      Directing major procurements in a particular direction

The real key tasks of a director are too often of little interest to the board.

Key tasks of the board are to formulate the strategic plan for the bank: What sectors should the bank focus its lending? What new saving and deposit instruments should be tried?  What efforts for recovery of large outstanding loans should be made? What is a three year forecast of the bank’s financial position and capital adequacy? What dangers face the Bangladesh economy and what should the bank do to protect itself?

The directors should go through a series of training programs to study the issues, think about the problems, and master the regulations of the central bank.

These could be implemented by outside experts who would prepare and present the materials.

The bank’s owners are represented by the directors and it is imperative that the directors learn to work directly on the key problems, even though there is not going to be agreement.

The task of the director is to build an institution that will survive indefinitely and will provide a reasonable financial return. 

The directors should not be swapping loans with other banks to provide their own financing.  They must continuously pass the test of not having overdue loans.

Bangladesh Bank can regulate the swapping of loans by requiring a monthly report from every director of all loans they have or that companies of which they are a director have (including their families). 

The central bank can easily monitor this group of loans among directors and identify swapping of loans. 

Improving the banking system is not a matter of regulations being issued by Bangladesh Bank with only moderate compliance.

Success will come by the gradual improvement of the behavior and actions of the boards.

This improvement must be led by Bangladesh Bank.

A major training program for directors should be mandatory with participation and adequate performance.

Loan approval should be left to the bank staff except in very large or unusually risky loans.

Selection of staff should be the task of the HR department other than the top 3-4 staff.

Procurement should be left to the bank staff apart from major construction or large-scale computer systems.

A board audit committee should function independently to ensure a proper audit is conducted. 

A regulation committee should carry out the review and improvement of bank procedures calling on outside consultants for advice and review.

The tasks before the banking system are clear: Shift the Board’s functions to questions of strategy and planning; large scale regulatory reviews and changes; audits to ensure integrity of the bank’s financial reports; selection of the bank’s senior management. 

The directors should not be involved in procurement, loan approval, or personal matters.

The director should not see the bank as a personal ATM but as an institution towards which he has the responsibility to develop its strength and its functioning. 

Bank ownership

There is much discussion of the ownership of banks in Bangladesh.

There are rules that define the amount of the shares that can be owned by one family and the length of time that a director can remain in office.

Next there is the problem of direct government interference in the board of a bank.

Finally, there is the problem of being a director of more than one bank.

The participation of a director’s of a bank should be less regulated.

The issues are not continuity of ownership but diversity of the Board.

Bangladesh Bank should review the diversity of the Board every two years and determine if it meets the concept of diversity that is required.

Bangladesh Bank should give its formal conclusions to the Bank Board and request appropriate corrections.

Diversity should not be defined absolutely but relatively.

A chairman may normally be expected to serve for four years but may be asked to leave early or continue for an additional two years. There should be no limits on age so long as the director is in good physical and mental health. 

If the Bangladesh Bank has concerns with a board it should inform the board and the owners of the bank and suggest corrective action.

It is reasonable to require that a family have only one bank director.

The problem is that in many instances a director is a straw man for a person who is a director of another bank.

Bangladesh should investigate such cases and take appropriate actions.

These last comments argue for flexibility for the central bank rather than rigid rules. 

In summary, bank boards need to shift the focus of their activity to consideration of the strategic direction and performance of the bank.

Bangladesh Bank should not try to enforce rigid rules but monitor the actual performance of a bank and guide the bank boards appropriately.

Forrest Cookson is an economist who has served as the first president of AmCham and has been a consultant for the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

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