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OP-ED: Major challenges for the financial sector

The article discusses key aspects of the needed reform

Update : 26 Mar 2021, 12:02 AM

In an earlier article “Five Challenges for Bangladesh in 2021”, one of the challenges was reform of the financial sector.  

The article discusses key aspects of the needed reform.  

A rigorous reform of the financial sector took place between 1990 and 2000; the program implemented by Bangladesh Bank resulted in a stronger financial system able to support the rapid growth of the economy that has taken place since 1995.  

In my opinion there were three key measures that were responsible for the success of BB’s reform program.

  • The focus on development of private banks. Most of the growth of the financial system after the reforms took place through the expansion the size and number of private banks.   This resulted in a better quality of loans and in particular increased support for the RMG sector.
  • The recognition of the magnitude of bad loans and building the cost of these losses into loan pricing. Prior to the reforms the central bank allowed commercial banks to maintain unrealistic expectations about loan recovery. Poor quality loans resulted in poor projects and slow economic growth.  Once bad debt costs were recognized, the quality of lending improved and economic growth rose.
  • The shift to market determined interest rates enabling adjustments to changing deposit behavior, inflation rates and levels of non-performing loans.

These three factors were responsible for the emergence of a competitive banking system able to direct funds to high return projects and in particular support the needs of the RMG sector and its special financing problems.

The importance of the private banks to the growth of RMG exports cannot be overestimated.

Hundreds of new RMG factories were starting and all required some kind of bank support. The state banks could never have managed this demand for banking services.

Of course, there are many other aspects of the financial sector that need improvement.

Seminars and experts produce long lists of what needs to be done. Most of the time the recommended corrections are vague and provide little operational guidance e.g. “improve loan recovery”, “do not charge interest on interest”, and “privatise BASIC Bank”. Such suggestions are often very hard to do.  

In fact, BB has tried many different approaches and has found it difficult to obtain improved results.

The first point is to recognise that improvements are difficult. Almost every suggestion that is made has strong opposition somewhere.

Over the past thirty years these three successful reforms have been gradually undermined.

Unfortunately, the slow deterioration has not been overcome.  Now it is time to take action to reaffirm these key elements of the banking system.  

In this article we focus on the three points and examine what can be done.

Private banking

The private banking system has been harmed by a failure of Bangladesh Bank to enforce properly the basic rules: (1) no forbearance with respect to provisions, (2) strict following of the provisioning and rescheduling regulations; and (3) requirement of prompt correction of any short fall in capital adequacy.

Private banks that experience difficulty in maintaining the required capital levels have a number of ways to correct this, most of which the unsuccessful bankers do not want to try [bringing more capital into the bank; merging with another bank; closing the bank down.]

The original idea of the Bangladesh Bank reform team was that there should be lots of banks but that under competitive pressures some would fail and be merged with successful ones.

The outcome of possible failure was it thought sufficient to bring about reasonable behavior by the private bank Boards.  How naive we were!

Bank management was like a slippery eel that always found a way to escape the central bank’s grasp!  

Also, one must think beyond the average.  

The average capital adequacy ratio for private banks may be 13.5 per cent but that implies that there are banks at 15 per cent and other at 12 per cent.

At present there are several private banks that are on the edge of missing the required capital and so in a dangerous position; but these institutions are not taking the necessary actions to correct their situation.  

The Bangladesh economy does not really deal well with company failures.

Most of the time these failures are small enterprises that just fade away without any legal procedure to bring the company to a formal end.

For larger establishments, including financial institutions it is essentially impossible to close them down.

Financial enterprises that are effectively bankrupt can stay in business only if the central bank will continue to provide some support, and Bangladesh Bank is always there.

These financial zombie institutions are all too common around the world and have an adverse impact on economic growth as well as undermining healthier financial institutions.

Zombies must die one way or another.

A famous Bangladesh development expert told me the following: “Our development policy is very precise.   If something works, change it.  If something fails, leave it alone.”

Forcing reluctant banks to follow the three rules is the key task for BB; but they need the political authorities to avoid interfering and allow the Governor to do his job.  

Provision regulations

The requirement to make provisions and acknowledge failure to repay has been attacked in five ways:

  1. The BB rules are wrongly applied.
  2. The courts interfere to prevent a particular loan from receiving adverse CIB reports due to classification.  This may not change the classification for the bank but it nullifies the impact on the defaulting borrower.
  3. Loans are rescheduled but no significant change is made in the capacity of the borrower to repay.
  4. The impact of the classification on the cost to the bank is reduced by allowing lower provision requirements to be booked due to consideration of unrealistic valuation of loan collateral.
  5. Corruption in Bangladesh Bank.

The actions to overcome these erosions are clear.

Lack of understanding as to how to determine loan classification.  

Bangladesh Bank should improve the regulatory write-ups and provide more detailed examples.

BB inspectors should receive more training on how to assess the provisioning rules.

There can never be too much training.  

Audit requirements for banks should be sufficient to identify problems in loan classification.   BB and the SEC should be very specific about this.

The government should seek to work with the Chief Justice on management of cases where borrowers are trying to block classification or listing in the CIB.

This legal loophole needs to be closed by administrative action or legislation.

As part of this process, the provision classification and CIB notification should go ahead and adjusted only after the court is finished and finds in favor of plaintiff.

An additional requirement for rescheduling loans should be imposed.  

Every rescheduled loan over a certain size must contain a restructuring plan; a reporting schedule on the actions of this plan, and the names of a lending bank officer and a borrower representative responsible for implementation.

The relationship between provisions and collateral needs detailed review.  

In particular the assumptions underlying the provisioning that 50 per cent of land collateral can be used to cover part of the provisions.

The question is, what is the actual experience when a loan is bad/loss in recovery of collateral.  

A precise formulation is, Within a five-year period, after classification of a loan as bad/loss what percent of the loan amount due has actually been collected by selling the collateral?  The actual answer to this question should be the rule used in the classification system.

Although long suspected, evidence of corruption at high levels in Bangladesh Bank with respect to dealing with loan classification has emerged in connection with court cases dealing with scams.  

BB should respond to this with a very strong review of bank inspection activities.  Silence of BB senior officials is striking.  

Perhaps financial disclosure reports should be required annually from all engaged in bank inspection activities.  

The initial implementation of the classification regulations was a remarkable piece of administrative action.  

Perhaps another comprehensive through review is needed.  

Flexible interest rates

Market determined interest rates are characterised by banks setting lending rates at levels that will earn adequate returns for the owners.  

Deposit rates are set in a competitive market to attract the volume of deposits banks need.  In recent months the banks had plenty of liquidity and so lowered deposit rates to reduce the inflow of deposits.  

The lending rate will be determined by the cost of funds, the operating costs of the bank, the risk that the bank accepts by making a loan to a particular company and the return on equity.

As each bank has a slightly different cost of funds [depends on the mix of deposit types], operating costs, and risk assessment, the applicant for a loan in theory would face different interest rates offered from one bank to another.

In this manner, banks should develop different rates for different groups (tenure, size, sector, reputation).   

BB has long resisted this idea and policy has been to have few rates and those defined by production sector.  

If competition drives down the lending rates to levels that result in low earnings then this cannot be sustained without BB showing forbearance and allowing dividends even though there are no real profits.

If lending rates are flexible they will increase automatically as banks seek to earn reasonable profits.   

There is some evidence that in the past five years before the pandemic, the spread between the lending and deposits rates declined.  

At the same time the private banks NPL rose slightly during these years.  This suggests rising competition and falling returns to equity.   

The government establishment of a ceiling on lending rates actually occurred when market forces had pushed lending rates more or less to the 9 per cent cap.  

This accident has left a very dangerous situation.  The real bite of the 9 per cent ceiling has not yet occurred.

The variation in deposit and lending rates indicates the flexibility of interest rates was working successfully as the economy adjusted to the competition.

The reaction to administrative fixing the lending rate at a maximum of 9 per cent in a period of low demand for borrowing by both the government and the private sector will be downward pressure on the deposit rates and the lending rates.  

Interest rates on government securities have declined as financing requirements shrank.  

At the same time, illegal schemes and methods to reduce the effective costs of non-performing loans will rise.  

These conditions cannot last although they could last two years.

First, the government deficit will rise as the economy recovers.  

The actual deficit for July 2020 to January 2021 was 75 per cent of the deficit for the same period the previous financial year.  

The fall in the deficit was Tk 169 billion while revenues increased about Tk 42 billion.  Roughly government expenditures fell by Tk 127 billion.

This decline will be reversed during calendar 2021 and beyond.  

Second, private sector borrowing will pick up throughout calendar 2022.  

Private investment will increase slowly; there is no sign of any real interest by companies. The high level of liquidity will keep interest rates from increasing.

These factors will eventually drive up the cost of funds shrinking the return to bank owners.  If government does not lift the ceiling on lending rates the financial condition of the banks will deteriorate.

Of course, right now there is no shortage of funds for lending.

Bank owners will not sit still for this.  

They have a number of choices: Through quiet agreement keep deposit rates low.  

It is unlikely that such an agreement could be maintained as each individual bank will be trying to expand its portfolio.  

A second strategy is to continue to try to undermine the provision regulations to avoid having to recognise the costs of bad loans.

The consequence is to erode the bank’s capital by pretending the profits are real.

At present, real average deposit rates are negative.

The weighted deposit rate end December 2020 was 4.51 per cent.

A tax of 10 per cent and an inflation rate of 5 per cent gives a real rate of minus 1 per cent. This estimate uses a low inflation rate.

Depositors are losing 1-2 per cent of their money every year. Real lending rates are negative at 1 per cent allowing for the tax and inflation impact.  

Negative deposit and lending rates are bad policy, depressing saving and encouraging investment in almost anything, reducing the growth rate through poor loan quality.

Negative deposit rates discourage saving, lead to investment in stock market, land, informal money markets, moving money abroad, and commodity market speculation as savers seek alternatives offering higher returns.

At present land prices are rising and there may be some investments in rice stocks.

Negative lending rates result in no discrimination among borrowers.  

All projects appear acceptable to the bank.  

The role of the financial system in directing resources to high return projects is lost!  

This is the ultimate outcome of controlling interest rates.  

Saving is reduced or moved into speculative markets;  resources are directed at projects with lower returns so economic growth is repressed.

Conclusions

The private banking sector has done a wonderful job of supporting the growth of the economy.  

But there is evidence of potential instability as the banks adjust to the post-pandemic world.

In this article we have emphasised the need for enforcing the rules on taking full provisions and capital adequacy; more intensive implementation of provision rules and removing the cap on lending rates.

This is a very good time to remove restrictions on lending rates as there will be little change at the time as actual rates are probably close to the correct equilibrium rate.  

These are not simple tasks.

BB needs independence from the political pressures.  Rapid growth needs a strong financial system.  

That can only be achieved by a strong central bank able to take action on principle.

It is time to graduate to a disciplined financial system.  

One can have every confidence Bangladesh Bank can do the job.


Forrest Cookson is an economist who has served as the first president of AmCham and has been a consultant for the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

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