As electricity demand rises across Bangladesh every evening, a less visible reality unfolds in the country’s power sector. Some power plants operate at full capacity, others remain partially utilized, while several generate little—or no—electricity at all, yet continue to receive regular payments.
These payments, known as capacity payments, are made to power plants for remaining available to generate electricity when needed, regardless of actual production.
Originally introduced to prevent severe power shortages and ensure uninterrupted electricity supply, the mechanism is now drawing increasing scrutiny from economists, energy experts and policy analysts.
The key question being raised is simple yet politically sensitive: who benefits from the system, and who ultimately bears the cost?
Over the past decade and a half, Bangladesh has significantly expanded its installed electricity generation capacity to support industrialization, urbanization and economic growth. However, despite capacity rising well beyond peak demand requirements, actual electricity generation has not increased proportionately.
Energy sector insiders say part of the explanation lies in the contractual structure of the electricity market.
Many private power plants operate under long-term agreements that include guaranteed capacity payments for maintaining operational readiness, whether electricity is generated or not. Under this “capacity availability model,” the state shoulders two parallel costs—paying for electricity actually produced and maintaining idle or underutilized generation capacity.
This dual financial burden has intensified debate over whether Bangladesh’s energy planning has become supply-driven rather than demand-responsive.
Budget analyses and sectoral reviews suggest that a substantial share of capacity payments goes to privately operated power generation companies under long-term power purchase agreements.
Supporters of the system argue that such arrangements were necessary during Bangladesh’s years of acute power shortages, helping rapidly expand generation capacity and reduce load shedding.
Critics, however, contend that what began as an emergency stabilization tool has gradually evolved into a long-term fiscal burden.
Dr Iqbal Hasan, professor and energy systems specialist at Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), said the issue extends beyond overcapacity.
“Bangladesh’s current power structure reflects an overextension of installed capacity without proportional optimization of utilization efficiency,” he said.
According to him, the long-term challenge lies not only in expanding electricity generation, but in aligning procurement contracts with actual demand trajectories to reduce fiscal rigidity.
The pressure created by capacity payments is compounded by another structural challenge: Bangladesh’s growing dependence on imported energy.
A rising share of electricity generation now relies on imported LNG, coal and other fossil fuels, leaving the country increasingly vulnerable to international price volatility.
Whenever global fuel prices increase, subsidy obligations for the government rise almost immediately.
Policy analysts increasingly describe Bangladesh’s framework as an “import-dependent subsidy structure,” where energy affordability and security remain highly exposed to external market shocks.
The consequences are significant. A growing share of public spending is being directed toward fuel imports and energy subsidies, potentially reducing fiscal space for sectors such as healthcare, education and renewable energy development.
Bangladesh’s subsidy regime has long been defended as a tool to stabilize prices and shield consumers from inflationary pressure. In the short term, subsidized electricity and fuel help contain household expenses and industrial costs.
However, economists warn of a hidden trade-off.
Artificially controlled prices may distort market signals, discourage efficiency improvements and sustain structurally inefficient systems. Analysts often point to distorted energy pricing, inefficient generation structures and misallocation of investment as unintended consequences of prolonged subsidy dependence.
Yet energy subsidies in Bangladesh are not purely economic instruments—they are deeply political.
Policy experts argue that rapid electricity expansion became a national priority during Bangladesh’s high-growth years, with uninterrupted supply viewed as essential for industrialization and social stability. As a result, long-term cost optimization often took a back seat to immediate energy security concerns.
At the same time, reforms remain politically difficult. Reducing subsidies or revisiting existing power contracts risks increasing inflationary pressure, raising industrial costs and triggering public dissatisfaction.
Roufa Khanum, Assistant Director at the Center for Climate Change and Environmental Research (C3ER) at BRAC University, said Bangladesh’s subsidy debate must also be viewed through the lens of climate transition.
“Maintaining fossil fuel-centered subsidies over the long term risks delaying Bangladesh’s renewable energy transition and could substantially increase future transition costs,” she said.
Similarly, Md Shamsuddoha, chief executive of the Center for Participatory Research and Development (CPRD), stressed the need for a balanced approach.
“Energy subsidy reform must simultaneously address energy security, social protection and climate resilience; otherwise, reforms may prove economically ineffective and politically unsustainable,” he said.
As Bangladesh balances growth, fiscal pressure and energy security, the question of who ultimately pays for idle capacity remains unresolved.



