All this is not to suggest that this extraordinary metamorphosis of the movement from non-cooperation to people’s raj was not causing some problems.
The banking system began to acquire a lopsided appearance as local banks gained deposits at the expense of non-local banks. Their principals, in turn, in Karachi, seemed to be reluctant to respond to their local office’s calls for transfer of funds, so that the local State Bank was forced into the role of lender of the last resort to non-local banks to enable them to meet the run on their deposits.
The phenomenon was one of neurosis without any immediate foundation in fact, and corrective measures were being supplied through call lending by the local banks to those who were facing a run. Thus, the possibly inspired fear that non-local banks would close their doors did not have any real basis at all.
Once this awareness sinks in there is some prospect of a restoration of normalcy within the banking system notwithstanding motivated attempts to build up emotions in favour of local banks.
On the industrial front, however, uncertainties kept production low and lowered efficiency. This again reflected the contradictions between non-cooperation and people’s raj. Party exhortations to now resume work with redoubled vigour for the cause of Bangla Desh had as yet not got through to the work floor.
Apart from the absence of any operational machinery to translate party directives into specifics, workers are sceptical about a system where the prosperity of Bangla Desh is coterminous with the prosperity of their factory owner.
Whilst this unique situation continued to pose new problems every day, the one certainty remained the irrevocable break-down of Islamabad’s authority over the affairs of Bangla Desh.
With each day and directive, this authority has receded, and today any attempt to restore it will appear to the people as being little different from a British effort to reoccupy the sub-continent.
In this context, the sole power of the Islamabad regime appears to be its capacity to inflict death on the people and to attempt to precipitate economic chaos as is evident by the diversion of food ships from Chittagong to Karachi.
The question may therefore well be asked as to why they find themselves in this untenable position where their only option to coming to terms with Sheikh Mujib’s demands is to unleash genocide.
The answer, as with most wars of aggression, appears to lie in miscalculation. Those who initiated confrontation by the postponement of the Assembly session believed that the public response would be small and localised and would succumb to a swift and effective application of force.
Mr. Bhutto is reported to have told visitors that such a form reaction to the agitation would soon bring the Awami League to their senses. No one dreamt that within 7 days not only would the people vigorously resist attempts at mass murder but would bring central authority to a complete standstill.
Perhaps no one even within the Awami League could have believed that non-cooperation could be so total as to place them in command of Bangla Desh within a week of their call for action.
