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Justice, remembrance and recognition

 In a post truth world of alternative facts are the unprecedented achievements of a nation at risk of being viewed as fable agreed upon by the victors?

Update : 16 Dec 2018, 02:27 AM

In two weeks, it will be ten years since the 9th National Parliamentary elections and in a few months, the 25th March 2019 will see the tenth anniversary of the 9th Parliament voting to try war criminals according to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. Law Commission opinion was sought and the said legislation was amended on 9th July 2009. The passing of this piece of legislation was a watershed moment. In the ensuing years we witnessed support and condemnation alike from the international community and other bodies for the trials, sentencing, protests, controversies and criticisms. As the first decade approaches, we are hearing the first rumblings of ‘what’s the end game?’ Is there one? Should there be one-yet? How will the historians record the trials? In a post truth world of alternative facts are the unprecedented achievements of a nation at risk of being viewed as fable agreed upon by the victors?

The objectives of international criminal justice range from: the retributive theories to the utilitarian theories of deterrence to the restorative models of rehabilitation to the modern theories of denunciation which serves an educative function. There are further, equally if not more important goals, such as providing ‘closure’ to the victims as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted in the Momir Nikolic case: “punishment must reflect both the calls for justice from the persons who have been directly or indirectly been victims of the crime”. The ICC statute by providing provisions for victim participation highlights the importance of this aim. This is one reason among others why war crimes trials of the past were televised or widely reported.

Another goal of a trial is the forensic scrutiny of evidence and the permanent record of it laid bare for perusal. In the cases heard, thousands of pages of judgments from the Bangladeshi tribunals detail the horrific crimes perpetrated on the victims. The worst political instincts once led to the rehabilitation of war criminals, the rise of right wing theocratic parties that seek to subjugate hard fought liberties and change the character of our constitution and the attempted re-writing of our history. The records of crimes in the judgments, at the very least, should give pause to any further nefarious political motivations.

Then there is the issue of reconciliation. Emerging stories of prosecutions of the perpetrators of international crimes in countries now able to confront their past, as in the case of Bangladesh and some South American countries, who have previously enjoyed de facto or de jure impunity, have led to a re-examination of past practices. There is growing evidence that the policies of amnesties in the 70’s have inspired later crimes. Successful prosecutions, at least in South America, have facilitated reconciliation. In other words, trials were a precondition for durable peace. 

The trials are themselves not a panacea for Bangladesh. Arguably, the trials have caused greater turbulence in the political scene. Yet, it is a good thing. No one wants to see war criminals enjoying impunity and ministerial privilege like Nizami or other Jamaat leaders in the past. An analogy would be the architects of holocaust running Germany post World War II. Yet, that was the spectre that befell the victims of genocide, war crimes, torture and crimes against humanity in Bangladesh. It is a solace to many victims that Jamaat is now a banned outfit. BNP itself has been tainted by its association with war criminals and its continued patronage of Jamaat candidates in the upcoming elections is abhorrent, regardless of electoral equations. Many of the rank and file of Jamaat have joined other Islamist parties, some that espouse even more alarming rhetoric. The political aim of some of these parties is the reorientation of our country according to Islamist principles. One only has to turn the pages of history to see how remarkably similar the rhetoric was from the Pakistani Junta and its supporters in 1971. 

It ill behoves the government to appease these political entities. If they are mobilising for a removal of a statue from court premises, soon the mobilisation will be about changing laws, banning an ethnic minority, erosion of progress made in gender equality, changing the secular nature of our constitution et al - as are their stated goals. In a still young democracy, the choice for the electorate remains largely binary in nature. The clash of progressive ideas and Islamist principles in our fractured society is only likely to deepen in the years to come.

This development in Bangladesh is not occurring in vacuum. The political tectonic plates in the world are shifting with the rise of populism and xenophobia in the West, the realignment of the global order with China becoming ever more dominant and with the old powers ceding its influence to newer regional powers. As Islamophobia and far-right rhetoric increases, so does the ratcheting up of radical Islamist views. It is a vicious cycle. It will take years for Bangladesh to find its place in the changing political landscape, to come to terms with its past and decide on its social make up and character. The eye witnesses to our bloody birth will not be there to guide the nation. The pages of tribunal judgments will bear testimony to what the nation survived in 1971 and will perhaps help to make the decision. Lasting peace and progress can only be achieved through remembrance of sacrifices made to achieve values upon which our constitution was formed.

The honest truth is that the justice process is not yet complete. A significant few have been prosecuted. There are others facing prosecutions who are alleged to have committed equally atrocious crimes. This year there has been six judgments from the tribunal, the last one on 5th November. However, the work of the tribunal does appear to be slowing down compared to the initial years. Since, 15th September 2015, only Tribunal 1 is functioning. The broader goals of criminal justice comes later, the victims are still awaiting justice. Presently, we owe it to them to continue with the process.

A line of argument that I have often encountered from predominantly Pakistani academics is the need for reconciliation for the so-called Muslim brethren in South Asia. They also critique the ‘lack’ of focus on abuses inflicted on the Bihari populace in 1971. I remind them, lest they forget, it was a Bengali, A K Fazlul Huq, Chief Minister of Bengal who proposed the Lahore Resolution calling for independent states for Muslims in 1940. However, successive regimes post 1947 viewed the Bengalis as racially and culturally inferior, as evidenced in Field Marshall Ayub Khan’s own words: they (East Bengalis) “have all the inhibitions of downtrodden races and they have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new born freedom”. I encourage them to read the reporting of Pakistani reporter Mascarenhas and his book The Rape of Bangladesh to understand the genocidal intent of the Pakistani Junta who found the Bengalis to be unreliable, in need of “Islamisation and who were ready to cleanse Hindus and use their properties to win over under-privileged Muslim middle class”. I implore them to read about the systematic killing and targeting of students and Awami League sympathizers reported in the foreign press , the destruction and massacres reported in the pages of the World Bank Report and the book   The Blood Telegram by Gary Bass to understand the cold war era politics, which succinctly explains the US need to support Pakistan since it was acting as a conduit in the back channel discussions with China. There is also Donald Beachler’s in depth scholarship on why the genocide in Bangladesh was largely ignored by academics: both the conservative right, which focused on the Khmer Rouge killings, and the activist left, for whom post 1971, Sheikh Mujib was not a compelling figure and his ‘ideological’ programme was less coherent than say the Marxist government of Salvador Allende of Chile.

Finally, I implore them to read our tribunal judgments - not some oral history but forensically scrutinised evidence - page after page of harrowing accounts brought into the light of day after four decades of denial. I remind them that Pakistan’s own attempt to facilitate investigation of international crimes came up short. S M Burke in The Postwar Diplomacy of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 cites a Pakistan government statement in the last week of April 1973. It rejects the right of the authorities in Dacca to try any among the prisoners of wars on criminal charges because the alleged criminal acts were committed in a part of Pakistan by citizens of Pakistan. Pakistan expressed its readiness to constitute a judicial tribunal of such character and composition as will inspire international confidence to try the persons charged with offences (also cited by G Mustafa, PhD scholar, Seoul Rep. Of Korea). The First Report of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission was never published. Is it not imperative of the Pakistani civil society to seek clarification? 

A nascent country was deprived of the opportunity to hold trials of the 195 senior army officers under immense diplomatic pressure as China exercised its first ever veto to block Bangladesh’s UN membership and with 400,000 Bengali origin people stranded in West Pakistan in fear of reprisals, with thousands in internment, who needed to be repatriated. Repatriation was completed on 24th March 1974. The US administration brought its considerable diplomatic might on an infant Bangladeshi administration to not hold trials. In 2005, declassified US State Department documents show a redacted transcript of an exchange between Secretary of State and Tajuddin Ahmed where the Secretary observed that the preventive effects of the war trials is questionable and noted that in the aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War, President Gowan held no trials despite evidence of widespread atrocities. Tajuddin Ahmed was at the time seeking 300,000 tons of wheat as food aid for a critical period of two months where Bangladesh had no assurance of food aid from any other country. An intelligent reader can easily discern the immense pressure Tajuddin must have felt to agree with the Secretary.

On the issue of reprisals on Bihari, one needs to provide a contextual element. In the theatre of war, reprisals against Biharis have indeed taken place sporadically, especially as the Mukti Bahini gained the upper hand in the latter stages of the war, as documented in the ICJ reports. It devotes an entire section in investigating and recording mob killings of Biharis. The report is relied upon by most Western academics and they do not shy away from the issue. Prior to and in the immediate aftermath of 25th March crackdown, Bihari mobs along with the military carried out pogroms. However, the retaliatory attacks by the Bengalis on Biharis pale into comparison to the victims, mainly of Bengali origin, of systematic and indiscriminate killings by the Pakistani military and its auxiliary forces. The issue here is the scale; it would be disproportionate and also lack appreciation of reality if anyone places Biharis and Bengalis on the same plane. While millions of Bengalis were displaced and killed, the numbers of Biharis killed was nowhere as widespread. Indeed Bangladeshi tribunals can exercise its jurisdiction over any atrocity within the territory of Bangladesh as it should and hold those liable for killings of innocent Biharis.

Setting aside the historical events, we witness continued Pakistani opposition to the trial process. Leaked confidential US cable dated 12th May 2009 from Dhaka, Bangladesh records the Pakistani High Commissioner Alamgir Babar telling the US Ambassador Moriarty that he questions the legitimacy of UNDP Representative’s interactions with the Government of Bangladesh regarding the issue of war crimes trials. This is in the aftermath of the government seeking UN involvement which the UNDP agreed under its Rule of Law Programme and as part of the transitional justice activity. High Commissioner Babar said that the government of Pakistan viewed the war crimes issue as political and feared it would open up other issues such as Genocide. The French Ambassador Charley Causeret, who was present in the meeting, said that the government of France is disinclined to do anything that would cause additional problems for Pakistan. The cable further speculates whether the government of Bangladesh was delaying the process so as not to antagonise Saudi Arabia and other international backers of Jamaat who in turn made it clear to its US contacts that any war crimes process should implicate Pakistani military personnel.

Another leaked cable dated 22nd May 2009 from UN New York, details Pakistani Mission’s opposition to UN involvement in the war crimes process. The cable reveals Pakistan’s attempt to include the UK, French and US Missions to demarche Bangladesh from seeking UN involvement in war crimes process. Pakistan rationalised that its military is involved in Swat and any movement that lent international credibility would demoralise the military at a time when it had much greater issues to confront. The UN Team Leader for South Asia Hitoki Den’s take on the matter is revealing, he suggested that the UN is caught in a dilemma - it is uncomfortable in declining the request of a  sovereign state (i.e. Bangladesh), yet it understood that inserting the UN into this potentially political process would lend it legitimacy and might have regional ramifications. Lawrence Lifschultz found the blocking of UN involvement a shameful exercise of cooperation between Pakistan, USA and France. Would a UN involvement have lent greater credibility? Perhaps, but even without it Bangladesh has managed to hold trials that conform to its international obligations.

Pakistan meanwhile, despite assuring UN missions (as seen in the leaked cables) that it is not telling Bangladesh to stop the trial process, went on pass multiple resolutions in its legislative assembly after Bangladeshi tribunals passed sentences. The Pakistani resolution wrongly claimed the execution of war criminals were contrary to the Tri Partite agreement of 1974. This is a wilful misrepresentation. The 1974 agreement in no way restricts Bangladesh from trying its own nationals. The clemency offered only extended to Pakistani military officers.

Acknowledgement of historical crimes is important. The UK belatedly acknowledged its colonial violence over the Mau Mau case (albeit while the rest of the former empire still waits). The Australian government’s website provides the government’s apology to its indigenous population. The Serbian President apologised for the Srebrenica massacre. Hutu rebel groups have apologised for the Rwandan genocide. By holding the trials of perpetrators of international crimes domestically, Bangladesh has fulfilled its obligations under the principle of complementarity. The Bangladesh Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution declaring 25th March as Bangladesh Genocide Memorial Day. In the 72nd UNGA, Bangladesh sought recognition for the 1971 Genocide. Is an apology and acknowledgement of historical crimes from Pakistan, with whom Bangladesh maintains bilateral relations, too much to ask? Recognition of the Rwandan genocide came after the establishment of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Bangladesh hopes the work of the tribunals will one day substantiate the case for recognising the 1971 genocide as well.


Bahzad H. Joarder is a postgraduate of the University of Birmingham. His research interest is International Criminal Law. He is indebted to Dr. M Sanjeeb Hossain of University of Warwick for his assistance. 

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