The attack in November 2025 on the Red Fort in Delhi was officially attributed to Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), and there was some concern about “AQIS trying to exploit Bangladesh” to establish cells, said the biannual report from the UN Security Council’s monitoring team for sanctions on al-Qaeda and Islamic State.
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS, not listed) continued to evolve from a fragmented group into a regional terrorist entity; it established logistics and financial networks, working in decentralized small, scattered cells instead of large units.
Thirty-eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2734 (2024) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.
Regional tensions in South Asia remained high as cross-border attacks between Pakistan and Afghanistan continued, said the report.
“The threat level remained broadly unchanged. However, it intensified in the Sahel and South Asia. Al-Qaida senior leadership remained marginalized. Its capability and intent to conduct external operations remained unclear,” said the report in its summary.
The death of Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali Al-Mainuki was a blow to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, Q.115, hereinafter “ISIL (Da’esh)”), which may further affect its ability to communicate across its global network.
In the Sahel, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM, QDe.159) launched a surprise attack in conjunction with the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) against the Government of Mali and announced its intention to blockade Bamako.
There was a resurgence of violent rivalry between JNIM and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the latter receiving increased support from Islamic State West Africa Province; this was the most intense direct confrontation globally between an Al-Qaida branch and an ISIL (Da’esh) affiliate.
Al-Shabaab (SOe.001) appeared to shift towards more targeted and strategic operations, while ISIL in Somalia (not listed) remained under counter-terrorism pressure.
Cross-border attacks between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated, provoked by a high number of attacks by Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP, QDe.132) against Pakistan.
ISIL (Da’esh) tried to exploit the closure of detention camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP, QDe.129) took advantage of the security vacuum in southern Yemen in early 2026 to strengthen its capabilities.
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, CDe.001) operated at a heightened level of lethality, while simultaneously expanding their territorial reach, extending their presence as far north as Haut-Uélé Province. Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da’esh) continued to prioritize kidnapping for ransom to generate revenue and delegitimize local security forces.
The de facto authorities (Taliban) continued their support for the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which escalated attacks against Pakistan, provoking military exchanges.
The Taliban continued publicly to deny harbouring any terrorist groups. Member States expressed concern that the conflict could create opportunities for terrorist groups, generating additional security challenges for the region.
The terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan remained largely unchanged. The ability of numerous terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan constituted an enduring threat to neighbouring countries and the Central Asian region.
Despite efforts by the de facto authorities to combat Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Khorasan (ISIL-K, QDe.161) and contain other terrorist groups, the authorities were unable to suppress the terrorist problem.
