In protest against genocide by the Pakistani military in 1971, Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury resigned as the vice chancellor of Dhaka University while in Geneva, Switzerland. He then went to London to work as a special envoy of the Mujibnagar Government and achieved considerable success in mobilising world opinion in favour of Bangladesh's struggle for independence.
“Those who are murdering our women and children, do you think we can ever forgive them or forget their heinous crimes? Of course not. After this genocide, there is no way these two parts of the nation can co-exist anymore,” he said at a press conference in London on this day in 1971, as reported by the Associated Press.
Justice Sayeed added that the people of East Bengal “can now only accept one possible solution, and that is freeing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and other elected representatives by the West Pakistan authorities and allowing them to form a governing policy to establish an independent and sovereign Bangladesh.”
He was optimistic that Bangladesh would undoubtedly thrive as an independent nation and become a democratic country, “not one based on single religious beliefs like Pakistan. I believe, religion will be observed as a personal point of view and the government will be unbiased about religion.”
After independence, Justice Sayeed was made president of Bangladesh and he was again elected president in 1973.
Refugee situation
As of June 12, 1971, the number of refugees from Bangladesh who crossed the border to India reached 5,767,172, according to the Indian government data. After a week, the number rose to 5,923,439. Around 90% of the refugees were Hindus.
The exodus of refugees created much pressure on India – both economically and politically – triggering tension between the Pakistani military junta and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Pakistan President General AM Yahya made a statement on May 22 that refugees could come back, but in three weeks since then, an additional two million crossed into India.
On June 8, the US government granted aid of $15 million in excess for the refugees taking shelter in India in the face of oppression. It also asked India and Pakistan to practice restraint to pacify the war-like situation.
Of the amount, $10 million was devoted to satisfying about half of the estimated food needs for around 1.5 million refugees for about three months through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The relief work was administered through US voluntary agencies, international organizations, and Indian relief agencies, according to the State Department documents.
About $850,000 of this amount was set aside to finance the airlift of refugees from Tripura by four C-130s.
CollectedEarlier, of the initial $2.5 million in relief assistance to the refugees, $1.5 million was spent on feeding programs by US voluntary agencies and $500,000 contributed directly to the UNHCR to assist in meeting immediate needs for shelter, medical aid and other non-food supplies.
All this was against a background of the normal FY1971 AID program for India which had so far included $176 million in program and project loans and $150 million in PL-480 food aid.
As of June 14, other countries contributed about $32 million to the relief effort including about $12 million from the Soviets.
According to an estimate by the US National Security Council Staff on June 14, the total annual economic costs for supporting the refugees was upwards of $400 million – an amount beyond the Indian government's means. This includes not only direct costs for food, medicine and shelter but also significant indirect costs such as increased inflation, increased Indian unemployment, diversion of health, transport and other services, and the spread of cholera.
The estimation also said the US still needed $65.7-$70.7 million for an estimated four million refugees for an average of six months.
In a telegram sent to the State Department on June 11, the US embassy in India insisted that the US government bore a “very heavy responsibility for the continuing deterioration of the situation [in East Pakistan].” It said unless forceful and effective action was undertaken promptly to stem the refugee flow, the Indian government would be forced into an act of desperation.
Pointing to the rate of refugee flow, the cable said: “This should be evidence enough that no matter what noises President Yahya may make about restoration of normalcy, he has not yet done anything to effectively impede reign of terror and brutality of Pakistan army, the root cause of the refugee exodus.”
The embassy suggested that the US government increase food aid for the refugees and cut aid to Pakistan to divert the fund to India for East Pakistan refugees and those affected by the 1970 cyclone.
What Nixon said about food aid
When President Richard Nixon met with Ambassador to India Kenneth B Keating at the White House on June 15, the envoy suggested that Nixon could put pressure on Pakistan to stop “genocide in East Pakistan” by withholding economic assistance.
He said that the refugee problem was growing at a rate of 150,000 a day. The strain on India was tremendous, and Keating said that the situation was further inflamed by what he described as a deliberate policy by Pakistan to drive out or kill the Hindus in East Pakistan.
Keating also indicated that he was aware that Nixon had a "special relationship" with General Yahya, but he still wanted to endorse a recommendation that some of the scheduled economic assistance for Pakistan be diverted to help India deal with the refugee problem.
Nixon responded to Keating's assessment of the situation in South Asia by indicating that he wanted to maintain good relations with India: "We'll play a friendly game with the Indians." But he made it clear that "it would not be in our interest" to contribute to the collapse of Pakistan: a collapse, he noted, that might occur within the next six months.
"We do not want to do something that is an open breech [sic] with Yahya," he said, adding that he did not want to "allow the refugee problem to get us involved in the internal political problems" of the subcontinent.
However, Nixon agreed with Keating that it was important to try to prevent armed conflict between India and Pakistan.
After Keating left the Oval Office, Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger observed that Pakistan could be expected to react negatively if money was taken from its budget and given to India.
Nixon agreed, saying: "They must be out of their goddamn minds."
Kissinger added: "It would be considered such an insult to Yahya that the whole deal would be off." He was referring to Pakistan's role as an intermediary in the contacts that were developing with China.
"It just may be that the poor son of a bitch can't survive," Nixon said in his concluding reference to Gen Yahya.
