After the US publicly called for a ceasefire on April 7, 1971, military ruler Gen AM Yahya Khan decided to speed up the transfer of power to a provincial government in East Pakistan and speculated that the change would take place within the next few months.
The same day, Pakistan Ambassador to the US Agha Hilaly said the Martial Law Administration, led by Lt Gen Tikka Khan, would be willing to concede on the Awami League's six-point agenda, with minor adjustments.
During a conversation with US Assistant Secretary Joseph Jo Sisco, Hilaly offered a hopeful prognosis for political developments in East Pakistan and said he did not feel that the arrest of Prime Minister-elect Sheikh Mujibur Rahman or the outlawing of the Awami League would significantly affect the political outcome in East Pakistan.
The following day, US Ambassador to Pakistan Joseph S Farland said Gen Yahya might concede much of the six points in the eventual constitutional arrangement, “although we [are] highly skeptical Bengalis will gain substance of genuine economic autonomy which has heart of six points.”
Liberation War Museum Photo Archive In a telegram to the State Department on April 8, Farland said: “Under any constitutional arrangement which MLA likely grant, central government will retain control on all aspects of foreign affairs, including aid and trade, and will have ability to provide adequate financing for defense forces.
“West Pak establishment is now not about to give up voluntarily what it has engaged to protect by the bayonet.”
The envoy added that the Pakistan military had control of major cities in the East, but Bengalis still held major areas, especially in the countryside. If resistance continued into June when the monsoon begins, the army would face major logistical and operational difficulties.
“However, if resistance crumbles in the next two months, the military should be able [to] assert control of province, at least for short and possibly medium term.”
Liberation War Museum Photo Archive But over the long run, Farland said, the military would be unable to maintain its hold over East Pakistan. In time, renewed resistance was likely to emerge.
The breach between the two wings was too deep to permit reconciliation “although we expect MLA will make try, possibly along the lines Hilaly suggests.” Farland said Hilaly's prognosis was overly optimistic, reflecting the official government line rather than the current unclear situation on the ground.
“Army controls Dacca (Dhaka) and Chittagong and [a] number of towns, but even though Sheikh Mujib is reportedly in prison at Attock Fort in West Pakistan, his supporters still hold major parts of East Pak countryside,” Farland said.
Disaffected elements of the East Bengal Regiment (EBR), East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and police -- presumably 15,000 or much lower -- provided the freedom fighters with limited military capability. “Bengalis reportedly sabotaged road and rail links and also destroyed some ferries” to restrict the mobility of the military and to isolate outlying garrisons like troops at Jessore which reportedly cut off except for air re-supply.
Liberation War Museum Photo Archive He anticipated that if the army failed to destroy the Bengali insurgency capability before June, they would shortly face major problems. “Once monsoon begins, much of East Pakistan will be under water. Land communication will become increasingly difficult. Long and virtually wide-open border with India will offer insurgents both source for supplies and safehaven.”
The envoy said that the Indians already providing covert help and flow of supplies could be expected to increase once the Indians build up a pipeline.
At the same time, the Pakistani military would have major logistical difficulties not only in moving around East Pakistan but in maintaining the flow of supplies from the West. “Loss of air landing rights in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) or Indian interference with sea traffic could rupture supply lines and render military position for extended operation untenable,” Farland said in the telegram.
If the army succeeded in crushing organized resistance, it should be able to establish a semblance of control over the East for the short and possibly medium term. The MLA could be expected to try to rally "loyalist" East Pakistanis using alleged "Indian interference" as a means to evoke support.
The military might also try to cut the ground out from under the Awami League by launching a major effort to alleviate Bengali economic grievances. A 10-men team had just departed for the East to assess the economic situation, Farland added.
Liberation War Museum Photo Archive “Our prognosis regarding West Pakistan's prospects for holding East remains unchanged from views expressed previously,” the envoy said, adding that even if the army was able to crush the current resistance, the military could not maintain control over the long term.
“Regardless of short-term developments, in time West Pak military likely become bogged down in [a] hopeless morass. Yahya's military intervention [on] March 26, however, justified from his standpoint, probably ensures very thing which move [sic] designed to prevent-disintergration of Pakistan.”
Farland said Gen Yahya faced a decision of how and when to replace the current MLA set-up which clearly was not satisfactory in the long-term governmental arrangement. If the army gained sufficient control, it might wish to appoint some civilian "advisers" although it was probably more likely that martial law administration will continue for an extended period.
“On balance, we think Yahya will take some steps to set up semblance of civilian government,” both to defuse the potentially troublesome situation in the West and might try to undercut foreign criticism of his action against the Awami League, he added.
However, any arrangement likely be much less democratic than the prospect Gen Yahya had offered the people of Pakistan in 1970.
“Yahya may, as Hilaly has speculated, form [a] new central cabinet with [a] number [of] tame Bengali ministers, including possible prime minister, such as Nurul Amin whom MLA sources told us last summer would make ‘good' PM. Emphasis [on] such [an] approach would be on return to normalcy and effort to spur reconciliation between East and West,” the US envoy said.
