Concerned by the deployment of the carrier task force in the Indian Ocean even as the Pakistani military was on the verge of collapse, foreign diplomats stationed in India warned the US envoy of the adverse impact of the decision.
“Up until the last few days, I have felt able to defend US policy on the basis of our overriding concern to bring a halt to hostilities. I am now troubled by fact [as] a number of my diplomatic colleagues view deployment of a carrier task force as military escalation by the US,” said a message sent from the US embassy in Delhi to the State Department on December 15, 1971.
“This was forcefully brought to my attention by Canadian High Commissioner [James] George who believes that our decision to deploy a carrier task force at this time has served as encouragement to President Yahya to continue Pak military effort.”
The Canadian envoy also viewed the deployment as a direct injection of superpower involvement, which was “bound to increase nervousness of both Soviets and Chinese and likely prompt or serve as a screen for their increased involvement”.
George stated that General AM Yahya Khan's changing stance on the UN resolution, seeking a ceasefire under a united Pakistan formula, was directly related to the word of the Seventh Fleet deployment.
“George has indicated that he is sending a strong message along these lines to his prime minister, recommending that Trudeau in turn contact [the US] president,” said Kenneth B Keating, then US ambassador to India.
Keating also said that he would be able to defend this development if given the fullest possible rationale to respond to the arguments advanced by his colleagues in Delhi.
US policies weaken ties with UK
On December 14, Sir Stanley Tomlinson, the deputy under secretary in the foreign office, summoned Walter Annenberg, the only US envoy knighted by Queen Elizabeth, to discuss US and UK policies on the India-Pakistan situation.
He said it had been a rewarding and satisfying experience to him personally that the two governments had been able to act in concert and share a high degree of mutual confidence on major issues over a long period.
But the situation in recent times caused disappointment and concern to British ministers and officials, he said, due to marked differences between US and UK policies on some important problems.
Sir Stanley said the India-Pakistan situation had raised questions within the UK government as to whether the two governments were proceeding on the basis of different intelligence information and political assessments.
Furthermore, the UK felt that it did not know the basis for US thinking and would like to indicate some specific aspects of US policy that were puzzling or disturbing to the UK.
Sir Stanley said it was regretful that the US government had to suspend economic aid to India. He gathered that the rationale behind the US action was that provision of economic aid, which might be used to sustain the war effort, was contrary to the principles of the aid program.
“While not wishing to argue the point, the UK had decided not to suspend its aid to India and had hoped that this aspect of the problem would not be carried further,” Annenberg said, quoting the UK official.
The UK was disappointed to learn that the US had used its influence to persuade some other governments, specifically Japan and Germany, to adopt similar positions on aid to India.
Sir Stanley said the UK officials were convinced that the Bangladesh leaders would not settle for anything less than complete independence.
He observed that the UK government was not itself advocating Bangladesh independence and that a confederal arrangement or any other solution which might be worked out between West and East Pakistan would be acceptable to the UK.
But stark reality led the UK to conclude that independence was inevitable. “If the US assessed the situation differently, the UK would like very much to know,” he said.
The UK official said his country would be grateful to learn of US thinking on withdrawing Indian forces from East Pakistan. “In UK view, main objective now is to prevent massacres of Pakistani forces and Biharis in the East, and the UK believes the only organized force in the East capable of preventing such horrors is the Indian army.
“The UK has sought and received assurances from Indian govt that indian forces would conduct themselves in a manner to minimize loss of life and ensure humane treatment. In the circumstances, the UK believes it would be serious mistake to insist that Indian forces withdraw immediately, even if that were a realistic possibility.”
Sir Stanley also shared the UK's assessment that India did not have any objective of territorial gains. He acknowledged that there had been some equivocation on Azad Kashmir but he believed that statements by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh could be taken at face value. “The UK wondered whether US assessment differed,” he quipped.
Sir Stanley concluded with hope and desire that the US and UK governments could find ways to share their thinking more fully and work in closer harmony.
