India is not geographically located nearby the South China Sea but lately it is increasingly being recognised as an actor in the balance of power in the region. Today, in the final part of the explainer, we focus how India is playing out it’s cards with crucial players over the disputed waters
India’s new posture on maritime security in the Asia–Pacific is perhaps a reflection of India’s willingness to set aside its rigid non-alignment policy when required. With the rise of China and its push into the Indian Ocean, India now may be realising the need to align with other key players in the region in molding the evolving security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. Yet as another rising Asian giant India will always walk a thin line with China in as far as its engagement with Asian strategic affairs goes. Modi’s pragmatic understanding of the challenges and benefits of India’s relationship with China mean that a cautious approach to China will likely continue.
Such caution is evident in New Delhi’s approach to increasing its security profile in the Asia–Pacific and Indian Ocean region. Soon after making some noise on the South China Sea affair, India softened its demeanor. New Delhi refrained from commenting on the dispute when the US flew a surveillance aircraft over China’s artificial islands and the international community joined Washington in condemning Chinese actions in the region.
India is now stepping forward by focusing on building and strengthening bilateral ties with the key regional actors like Asean. New Delhi has realised the need for multilateral engagement to balance the emerging security architecture and is focusing on building such models in the Indo–Pacific.
India’s ‘balancing’ In international relations terms, India is hedging towards China; simultaneously pursuing economic engagement together with military balancing. A further two-level analysis is in play whereby there is some global China-India political cooperation with regard to restraining US uni-polarity and replacing it with a more multi-polar system, and with regard to restructuring some international economic institutions. However, at the regional level security competition between India and China is far more apparent. The South China Sea is an acute example of this regional level friction now being seen between these two Asian giants (Baruah 2015). Indian unease with Chinese assertiveness in the South China is why India has started to raise the South China issue at various regional settings like the India-Asean Delhi Dialogue in 2014 and 2015, the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2014, and the East Asia Summit in 2013 and 2014. Chinese actions in the South China Sea continued to attract Indian criticism in 2015; especially China’s Great Wall of Sand atolls to islands reclamation-militarisation project (Chaudhury 2015a), and China’s rejection of the Philippines taking the South China Sea issue to the UNCLOS tribunal (Valente 2015). India’s balancing partly consists of internal balancing whereby India is building up its own military strength. This has been most effective in the maritime sphere with the creation of a blue water navy increasingly able to operate at a distance, beyond the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea.
India’s geopolitical interest Geopolitically, Vietnam serves as a barrier to Chinese domination of the South China Sea, from where Beijing would be able to project power up through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean. From India’s point of view, Vietnam can put pressure on China’s southern flanks, and give China a two-front challenge. India’s “Vietnam card” against China in the South China Sea serves as some counterpart to China’s “Pakistan Card” against India in the Indian Ocean.
India’s geoeconomic interest Geoeconomically, India seeks access to oil fields in Vietnamese-controlled waters. The problem has been that some of these exploration plots have been in waters claimed by China. India says it is not taking sides on sovereignty issues in the South China Sea, but yet its decision to sign deals with Vietnam in disputed waters thereby implicitly support Vietnam’s claimed position against China. India’s energy involvement, via Vietnam, in the South China Sea continues to rankle China (Parashar 2015b).
Bilateral security India has moved into closer bilateral security links with the US, Japan and Australia. Of particular significance is how the South China Sea was a feature of India-US defence discussions in June 2015, when the Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter visited India and further India-US defence agreements were initialled (Chaudhury 2015b). It is also significant that the US Pacific Command is now openly egging on India to maintain its presence in the South China Sea, “the South China seas are international waters and India should be able to operate freely wherever India wants to operate. If that means the South China Sea, then get in there and do that” (Harris cited in Som 2015). India has also embraced closer security links with Japan, including bilateral JIMEX Japan-India Maritime exercises in the Western Pacific (in 2012 and 2014) and in the Bay of Bengal (in 2013 and 2015). Finally, India has embraced closer security links with Australia, including naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal in September 2015.
Indo-Pacific trilaterals India has been moving into these Indo-Pacific trilaterals. The India-Japan-US (IJUS) trilateral was formally set up in December 2011, and has been “revitalised” (Kapil 2014) in the wake of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. That mechanism already involving India in trilateral exercises with the US and Japanese navies in the Western Pacific (2007, 2009, 2013) and Bay of Bengal (2007, 2015). As part of its wider activism, the Modi administration also complemented its IJUS involvement with the India-Japan-Australia (IJA) trilateral set up at Foreign Secretary level in June 2015.
References
Baruah, Darshana. (2015) ‘Asia’s Nightmare: Could India and China Clash over the South China Sea?’, National Interest, July 14, 2015. Chaudhury, Dipanjan. (2015a) ‘Chinese Military Bases in South China Sea Worries India,’ Economic Times (Mumbai), March 26, 2015. Chaudhury, Dipanjan. (2015b) ‘India, US discuss measures for South China Sea stability amid Chinese aggression’, Economic Times (Mumbai), June 4, 2015. Parashar, Sachin. (2015b) ‘No oil hunt in South China Sea without nod: Beijing to Delhi’, Times of India, May 31, 2015. Patil, Kapil. (2014) ‘India-Vietnam Axis: energy and geopolitical imperatives’, NAPSNet Policy Forum, December 8, 2014. Som, Vishnu. (2015) ‘In South China Sea row, top US Commander roots for India’, NDTV, March 4, 2015. Valente, Catherine. (2015) ‘India backs PH in China Sea row’, Manila Times, March 11, 2015.