In June 2021, World Bank country director Mercy Tembon sent communications to then Minister of Finance AHM Mustafa Kamal requesting Bangladesh’s cooperation regarding the Bank’s Refugee Policy Reform Framework. The framework addressed refugee-hosting nations seeking the World Bank’s funds to support refugee populations within their borders. The Bank proposed certain provisions expected of the host nations, and notably, defined these as requisite procedure to support “refugee and people in “refugee-like” situations.” For the nation of Bangladesh, this constituted the million-plus Rohingya within their borders.
Among the requests outlined was that Bangladesh finally become party to international refugee law and convention and thereby adopt policy changes allowing refugees rights recognized by those standards. One such term emphasized in the 2021 correspondence, among other terms, was the request for refugee access to the host nation’s education system. The foreign ministry of Bangladesh, however, rejected the Bank’s proposal a month later. In their response to the World Bank, the government cited concerns that such provisions would attract more Rohingya to Bangladesh. At that time and the time of this writing, Bangladesh is still not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
In their designation of the Rohingya as displaced Myanmar nationals instead of refugees, Bangladesh has circumvented regulations by major international bodies and held the Rohingya at arms-length. This, nonetheless, is ultimately to the detriment of Bangladesh’s own goal of Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar.
When comparing the aspirations of Bangladesh, involved third-party nations, and the Rohingya themselves, it serves reiterating that the mutual objective is repatriation. The terms and pathway by which this is realized -- primarily safety for the Rohingya -- are those which remain elusive or disputed. Despite the Rohingya’s frequent declarations of desiring independence from aid and returning to Myanmar, host nations including Bangladesh and other ASEAN countries frequently undermine this assertion, suspect as they are that Rohingya refugees aim to illegally and permanently integrate within their nations.
If this logic sounds familiar, that’s because you’ve heard it before. This ideology is responsible for many policies playing out now in the Western theatre, policies which have already begun to weaken the democracies of cities and, ironically, run counter to certain domestic interests.
Recent deportations in the United States, for instance, have worsened labour shortages and increased inflation. Nations wary of migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees (and otherwise “other”) regularly tout “economics and security” as primary motivations for expediting the deportation of such individuals. Similarly, within Bangladesh -- be it the current interim government or the previous administration -- the justification for wanting to lessen the “Rohingya burden” has been the notion that refugees pose mounting, domestic economic and security threats.
While expedited repatriation and resettlement to third-party nations has been looked to as a panacea to the Rohingya condition, it is likely that this will -- just as it has thus far -- take time to develop a safe pathway, especially due to the deteriorating state of militarized Myanmar. Because of the protracted nature of the situation, neglecting potential domestic solutions short-changes not only the refugees but also Bangladesh’s own health.
What sort of potential domestic solutions should be evaluated?
Reviewing the 2021 proposal by the World Bank more carefully, Bangladesh’s denial is unsurprising. Some of the expectations of host nations proposed in the Refugee Policy Reform Framework -- beyond refugee access to host national schools -- included autonomous movement for refugees and refugee-like people, labour market and healthcare access, and land, housing, and property rights. It is apparent, then, how such a comprehensive continuum of proposed policy reform was seen as a gateway to permanent integration for refugees. Moreover, Bangladesh itself is already beleaguered by many unemployed domestic graduates and rapidly increasing populations in urban areas.
A stronger approach befitting the current status of the Rohingya and a “new Bangladesh” would be to enact consolidated, comprehensive reform in a domain that can best preserve efficacy and longevity of future repatriation outcomes. That very well may be education. According to independent synthesis reports on refugee education, the returns on investing in education are far-reaching, and can significantly reduce “early marriage, child labour, and military recruitment by armed groups” -- all factors disproportionately impacting refugees in the camps.
Few dispute the above metrics and conceptualized importance of education, but how the actual scene has played out for the Rohingya in Bangladesh in past years is an interesting case deserving further examination. Due to the comparatively acute nature of shortages like food, housing, and healthcare for the refugees, education reform has been perceived as secondary and supplementary. The cumulative effects of this have been profoundly devastating -- for both the Rohingya and Bangladesh -- beyond a mere erosion of literacy.
Although many contend that educational opportunity has already been delivered to the Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, the short-term in-camp measures which have been developed by the likes of Unicef offer no higher education, are unaccredited and uncertified, and lack in standardized quality. Rohingya-led community schools also have faced closures, stringent policing, and suffer the aforementioned issues of the learning centres. Continuing to pursue these failing parallel systems of education post-2025 will not be effective in establishing Rohingya autonomy and contribute to successful perennial repatriation outcomes.
The best path to certifiable, quality, higher education is refugee access to national education systems through secure and economically sustainable means. Though it will require collaboration across civil society, education, and government actors, piloting this pathway is possible. It has successfully been done in other developing host nations. Through government partnership with UNHCR, for example, refugee students from Sudan have been able to enroll in the Chadian national education system effectively and safely. Education in Bangladeshi schools (compared to in-camp measures and opportunities outside of Bangladesh) also would facilitate a smoother return to Myanmar for the refugees due to portable credentials, acquisition of civic skills, and Burmese-language components.
Undeniably, tensions have historically run high between Bangladeshi locals in Cox’s Bazar and the Rohingya refugees. Though the Rohingya are not permitted to work or study in Bangladesh, there have been claims of refugees competing for labour at lower wages and misrepresenting their identity to gain admission to local universities. The Rohingya have been unjustly driven from their homeland on the basis that they are “illegal Bengalis,” so it is the refugees’ ideal to seek proper education channels without compromising their Burmese identity. Piloting a phased, secure implementation of access to Bangladesh national schools would establish a legal, regulated channel that could quell local tensions. Counter to prevailing belief, there is also evidence that this form of educational integration is beneficial for both refugees and native students.
The attitude toward refugees in Bangladesh remains largely antagonistic which has contributed to a bureaucratic stagnancy in any domestic refugee reform that might be perceived as concessional to refugees and incendiary to nationals. The previous administration of Bangladesh rejected proposals from civil society, IGOs, and other government bodies to move forward with national education access for refugees, forcing the development of good-faith but sub-par education operations which exist in the camps today.
Humanistic appeals regarding the refugees have held little weight, as the response from a fatigued Bangladesh is that they have done “enough.” As we have narrated here, however, there does exist a feasible pathway for refugee access to national education which aligns with the collective repatriation goal and ultimately also caters to Bangladesh’s interests.
Proponents on behalf of Bangladesh and the refugees alike, across all sectors of society, are ready to work with the government on this path. Many of these parties recognize the unique position of Bangladesh and are committed to aiding in the development, funding, and implementation of mutually beneficial reform. It only becomes possible, however, if the interim and upcoming administrations are intentional: Willing to truly distinguish themselves not by the fear of the previous administration, but by the courage and democratic principles marking Bangladesh’s new dawn.
RoVena is an NGO and nonprofit dedicated to education for refugees. Rohingya Student Network (RSN) is a community-based nonprofit dedicated to empowering the Rohingya community.