The short press conference held by former prime minister Sheikh Hasina in the Indian capital, Delhi, was supposed to be “irrelevant.” The opposite happened.
On the one hand, Hasina’s speech and brief question-and-answer session received extensive international media coverage. On the other, the Bangladesh government reacted strongly, protesting the conference held on August 5. Meanwhile, the Indian government distanced itself from the event, saying it had no involvement.
Although the Indian government tried to distance itself from Hasina’s speech, the incident has further strained relations between the two countries before they had a chance to recover. Whether there were any real signs of an improvement in relations even before Hasina’s speech, however, remains debatable. Indian High Commissioner to Bangladesh Dinesh Trivedi has reportedly been waiting for more than a month for a courtesy meeting with Prime Minister Tarique Rahman.
Bangladesh’s strong demand to India was that Hasina be prevented from making political statements. India, however, apparently decided not to deprive its protected guest of her freedom of speech, despite concerns that doing so could negatively affect bilateral relations.
Perhaps, from India’s perspective, bilateral relations did not have much room to deteriorate further. After coming to power, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman did not take any major steps to improve relations with Delhi. Relations had reached a low during the Yunus-led interim government and remained strained during Tarique Rahman’s first six months in office.
By allowing Hasina to hold a press conference despite Bangladesh’s strong objections, Delhi may have sought to convey to Dhaka that it remains interested in improving relations with Bangladesh, but not at the cost of abandoning Hasina.
Bangladesh’s response, meanwhile, came through a press release rather than a diplomatic note summoning the Indian high commissioner. Press releases are primarily intended for domestic audiences. However, such a statement was also necessary to counter the extensive international coverage of Hasina’s remarks. There is little doubt that Delhi will also assess Dhaka’s position based on that response.
BRICS handshake
It is difficult to say how far the repercussions of the incident will go or how long they will last.
Bangladesh’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed said Delhi would have to decide what kind of relationship it wants with Dhaka in the coming days. In reality, however, Bangladesh may have to make the first move.
The next summit of BRICS — comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — is due to be held in Delhi in a month. As the host country, India has invited Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to the summit’s outreach programme.
Even before Hasina’s speech, some were advising Tarique Rahman not to travel to Delhi. Following the speech, that advice could turn into a demand.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, invited Tarique Rahman to visit India with his family in February. Tarique Rahman did not accept the invitation for a bilateral state visit and instead travelled to China. There is little doubt that India took note of that decision.
The question now is what Tarique Rahman will do in the aftermath of Hasina’s speech. Bangladesh cannot simply say that “India has to decide.” At the very least, the BRICS invitation will have to be answered within the next two or three weeks.
The language used by the government in its reaction has also placed Dhaka in a difficult position, leaving limited room to change course. If Tarique Rahman accepts the invitation, he could face pressure from hardliners within his own party. If he declines, Bangladesh’s diplomacy could be viewed as immature in the international arena.
‘Ownership’ of the July Movement
While there are domestic political reasons for the government’s strong reaction to Hasina’s speech, it is important to demonstrate diplomatic maturity in the larger national interest.
At the same time, it would not be surprising if Indian policymakers take steps to cool tensions by reassessing the situation.
Bangladesh’s new government, not yet six months old, had hoped to strengthen its claim to the political legacy of the “July Movement” by marking the second anniversary of Sheikh Hasina’s fall amid the 2024 protests. BNP policymakers were likely viewing the anniversary as an opportunity to establish party chairman and Prime Minister Tarique Rahman as a leading figure of the movement.
But Hasina, thousands of kilometres away in Delhi, has complicated those plans.
A few days before August 5, reports emerged that Hasina would address foreign journalists at the Foreign Correspondents Club (FCC) in Delhi. Speculation immediately followed: Would she appear in person, by video or through an audio link? Would she simply deliver a speech, or would there be a question-and-answer session?
It was clear that the Bangladesh government would not welcome any event involving Hasina on August 5.
Prime Minister’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Humayun Kabir reportedly asked Indian High Commissioner Dinesh Trivedi to prevent Hasina’s event, warning that her speech could have a negative impact on bilateral relations. His remarks were subsequently promoted on social media as a “strong message.”
The Indian government sought to distance itself from the FCC event, saying the club is a private institution and that the government has no authority to interfere in its professional activities.
Observers in Bangladesh were unconvinced, and perhaps for good reason.
It is true that the Indian government does not control the FCC’s activities and that the club does not require government permission to hold its events. But it is also true that the Indian government could have sought to postpone the event on grounds of law and order or national interest had it wanted to do so.
Instead, it allowed the event to proceed, sending a message to the Bangladeshi government.
Murder vs impunity
Hasina did not simply attend the event on August 5 and deliver a speech. She effectively turned it into a mini-press conference, answering several questions from journalists present.
There was little new in her remarks. She had already said in a Reuters interview a few weeks earlier that she intended to return to Bangladesh in December.
The Delhi event reinforced her position that she had no contact with the Bangladesh government and intended to return home regardless of what the government did.
However, listening to Hasina and her son Sajeeb Wazed’s remarks, it appeared that they had taken the position that as long as those responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Awami League workers and supporters and around 50 police officers during the 2024 violence were given “immunity,” they would also demand immunity for those responsible for the deaths of protesters during the July-August movement.
The Yunus government granted immunity through an ordinance for crimes committed in connection with the movement, which was subsequently approved by the new parliament.
“The day this immunity is withdrawn, the day those responsible for the killing of police officers and Awami League leaders and activists are arrested, the Awami League will also apologise and express regret,” Sajeeb Wazed said in response to a question about whether the Awami League would apologise for killings committed during the 2024 movement.
At the same time, they spoke of reconciliation, resolving disputes and establishing peace. But no clear explanation was offered as to how reconciliation could be achieved politically while maintaining a hard-line position on the victims of the violence.
Why is Sheikh Hasina not a ‘fugitive’ in India?
The current Bangladesh government regards former prime minister Sheikh Hasina as a “fugitive accused.” It is therefore angry that India allowed her to hold a press conference in Delhi.
But how does India view Hasina?
A comment by a former Indian diplomat offers some insight.
Former Indian high commissioner to Bangladesh Riva Ganguly Das told German broadcaster Deutsche Welle: “Sheikh Hasina came to India as a former prime minister. She did not run away; she did not come at midnight; she did not come in disguise; she was given to India by her country’s military for her safety.”
The account is not entirely without basis.
On August 5, 2024, a Bangladesh Army transport aircraft flew Hasina from Tejgaon Military Airport to the Indian Air Force’s Hindon base near Delhi. An investigative report by a Dhaka newspaper said a team of Special Security Force personnel assigned to Hasina’s security was also aboard the aircraft.
Dhaka-Delhi relations were among the many casualties of the fall of Hasina’s Awami League government amid widespread protests two years ago.
Relations deteriorated further during the 18 months of the interim government led by Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus. There was some hope that relations would improve after the BNP won the February election, but that process has yet to gain momentum.
The question is: Who is more interested in improving relations? Which country can afford to turn its back on the other?
The simple answer is that both countries could, but neither would be wise to do so.
Beyond Hasina, Bangladesh and India have a long list of important bilateral issues that require close relations and regular dialogue.
If Hasina’s presence in Delhi is indeed a serious concern for Dhaka, she herself has proposed a possible solution: She has said she will return to Bangladesh in December.
The Bangladesh government should allow her to return and ensure that she is treated according to the law — including detention, trial, appeals and bail, where applicable.
The government itself has repeatedly demonstrated that Sheikh Hasina remains relevant to Bangladeshi politics. If all cases against her are resolved through due legal processes, perhaps the country’s politics can begin moving towards normalisation and stability.
Sabir Mustafa, former head of BBC Bangla, is currently working as a freelance journalist and podcaster. Email: sabir.mustafa@gmail.com