The July 2024 movement that lasted six weeks and brought down an oppressive and corrupt government that ran the country over fifteen years was hailed by many as a revolution. Yet, it was not exactly a revolution although it had some elements of a revolution such as mass participation and overthrow of an existing government. Other key elements like ideological motivation such as political ideas or structural transformation were missing while the movement was forging ahead.
In fairness it can be said that since the movement turned into a singular goal of overthrow of the then leader and her government, those ideas never surfaced until later after an interim government took over and the government undertook an agenda of some structural reforms. This part is a work in progress, but one cannot say the interim government is a revolutionary government by any definition. It is a transient entity which has to turn over the governance of the country to an elected government some time soon.
When we ask the question “what is next,” it has to be framed in the context of what happened in the last 12 months. We have to understand, why a seemingly student-led movement for a demand that relates to students alone led to a massive popular movement, what were popular expectations from that movement, why political parties got embroiled in the movement, and why the movement now seems to be diluted from high hopes of transforming our politics and institutions to mere business as usual.
We also have to understand if we had placed too much hope in the group that spearheaded the movement to bring changes to our politics and society, keeping the old order fundamentally unchanged. We also have to understand whether our people have the patience or willingness to wait several years for fundamental changes to our politics and institutions that can turn the country in a new direction. And if so, who should do it?
A major upshot of the July student movement was the overthrow of an unpopular government. Was it a by product of the student movement, or overthrow of the government was the original driver of the movement? It is incredible that a rather innocuous demand for removal of quota from civil service appointment would morph into a national movement. It was incredible that a solitary demand (when it started) for removal of quota system would expand to about nine demands in a brief period and finally be consolidated to one demand for resignation of the government.
It was also extraordinary that this single demand would get such traction all over the country and cause so many deaths as the government went all out to quell the protests. This became a mass movement comparable with that in 1971 that ultimately brought the fury and wrath of the Pakistan junta on protesting Bangladeshis leading to war for liberation. The major difference was that the 1971 war was a culmination of years of political struggle of the Bengalis for a greater share in the governance of Pakistan, which later turned into a fight for independence. The July movement was masked as a student movement but in reality, it was a movement for the overthrow of an unpopular government and its leader. The political struggle of East Pakistan leaders in the sixties was not a masked movement for independence.
It became a fight for independence when the Pakistan Junta denied all efforts for a political settlement. It was an exceptionally long and difficult process. But like the July 2024 movement the fight for independence in 1971 was not a revolution. It had a limited target of winning independence for then East Pakistan.
The spirit of 1971 was one of unity across the entire political spectrum of then East Pakistan; it was one of rare unity with one goal. The spirit of the July movement did not become one of national unity until it became a mass movement with one demand, either due to political myopia of the government or due to shrewd maneuvering of the group that nurtured the movement. Even then the involvement of political parties in the movement came late because of their unawareness of the emerging popularity of the student-led movement. Therefore, comparisons between our political movement of 1969-71 and July 2024 are very tenuous.
It is in the background of what led to the July movement and how a student movement morphed into a mass uprising, that too without a visible nationwide leader, we have to consider the question of “what happens next.” Since what happens next covers the universe, I will limit my discussions to two parts: Political and economic.
In the political part, the most important issue to ponder is elections. For all we know the interim government, after much hand-wringing, has decided that elections for the next parliament will be held in February 2026. This was a midway compromise between the head of the interim government and the second largest party in Bangladesh, BNP, which had been demanding elections by end 2025 rather than by June 2026 which was the interim government’s plan.
This decision did not entirely displease other hopefuls in the elections such as Jamat-e-Islam. But it mightily displeased the new crop of political entrants, the activist students, who have formed their own party, National Citizens Party (NCP). They oppose this date since in their view elections without basic structural reforms, and a new constitution, would put the country back to where it was. This, in their view, will trash the achievement of the July movement (a revolution in their terminology), and therefore, it is unacceptable.
So, currently there is this tug of war between parties that want to hold the elections as early as possible and those who want no elections until reforms are made in all six areas including the Constitution (for which recommendations have been made). So, the first question is will elections be held next in February as declared by the head of the interim government? Or will there be another round of protests and counter protests on this issue bringing a stalemate in the country’s politics? It will require a strong resolve and firm leadership for the interim government to implement its plan for elections as declared.
Assuming that the government succeeds in coalescing the disparate forces together to agree on the proposed elections, what happens next? Assuming also that these elections are relatively unrestrained in that people vote freely, no single party may come out to have a majority in the next parliament to form a government. The party with a plurality of seats higher than others will be a natural leader which will seek partnership with other parties or parties willing to do so. In other words, we will have a coalition government, which may take on the challenges, economic, social, and political, that have befuddled all governments before. But in the past a single party and an autocratic leader also faced these challenges. Their way of handling it in a crowd of sycophants was easy since people’s voices did not count. For the new government meeting the challenges will not be a cakewalk.
With a coalition of disparate forces in a government tackling opposition both within and outside the government will be a formidable task. It is likely that the newly-formed youth party, which may not succeed much to garner parliamentary seats, but their ability to mobilize mass appeal on popular issues will continue to pose challenges to the new government. Along with them the religious parties, which have gained substantial ground in Bangladesh, will continue to affect the Bangladesh political scene and shake the government every time any legislation they do not approve of.
On the economic front the picture, although not of gloom, is not very optimistic either. Two pillars of Bangladesh’s foreign reserves are foreign remittances and RMG exports. Foreign remittances increased by 25% this year ($30 billion) mainly due to remittance through official channels as hundi operators, a majority of whom were politically patronized, ceased operation after the fall of Hasina government. RMG exports also picked up speed after the initial shock of early 2024 disturbances. But these sources will face new challenges in the coming years as tariffs by the US will impact exports to that country.
Also, immigration challenges for new workers to the Middle East and Europe will reduce growth in workers remittances. In the short term, these challenges may not reduce earnings from these sources. But as time passes the government will need to pay serious attention to rectify the Banking sector, attracting foreign investment, diversifying exports, and skills training for export of labor to other countries.
All of these discussions hinge on one hypothesis, which is holding elections and passing the baton to an elected government by the current interim government. Announcement of an election schedule I expect will be the next task of the interim government. But given some ominous signs of inter-party conflicts, particularly between the new political party NCP and BNP, non-cooperation or new conditions for elections held out by NCP, there is apprehension that the election schedule may be disrupted.
So, for now what’s next for me is an assured election schedule within the announced time frame, and a free and fair election by participation of all. What happens after the election is only a scenario of challenges that a newly elected government may face. At this time, the question of “what is next” is an election that we all want.
We have seen the power of people to overthrow a government; the reality so far has not been very encouraging. People can do so much, but they need proper guidance and leadership. We can only hope that this leadership will emanate from the elections that everyone eagerly waits for.
Ziauddin Choudhury has worked in the higher civil service of Bangladesh early in his career, and later for the World Bank in the US.