What's behind Suu Kyi's partial pardon?

In order to observe the Buddhist Lent, the Myanmar Junta has partially pardoned Aung San Suu Kyi, the former civilian leader and head of the "National League for Democracy (NLD)" party. This amnesty results in a six-year reduction of Suu Kyi's 33-year prison sentence. The pardons were a follow-up to Monday's declaration that the military government is extending the state of emergency for a further six months. The fourth post-coup prolongation will further postpone a staged election that would open the door to a restoration to democratic administration. 

Since February 1, 2021, when the military ousted her administration and took control, Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained. She has since been accused of 19 offenses, including sedition, corruption, breaking coronavirus quarantines, and importing and holding walkie-talkies unlawfully.

She still faces 14 counts notwithstanding the dismissal of five of them. 

It would be absurd to assume that the junta's partial amnesty represents a serious desire to reach a peaceful settlement with the organizations it has designated as "terrorists" and sworn to violently suppress. It is probably best to see this, like the military's account of Aung San Suu Kyi's meeting with Don Pramudwinai earlier this month, in which it claimed that she disavowed the anti-junta resistance and the National Unity Government, as an effort to take advantage of Aung San Suu Kyi's strong symbolic status in order to win over the public and relieve mounting international pressure. 

Another plausible explanation is "encouraging Suu Kyi for negotiation talks." Remember that Aung San Suu Kyi's standing in the eyes of the world was seriously tarnished by her alleged involvement in the military's vicious assaults on the Rohingya population in western Myanmar. It is therefore not improbable that the Junta gives her considerable leeway in order to urge her for discussion, benefit from her influence, and seek an end to the armed opposition against the rule. 

Third, the development can be viewed as a strategy to divert attention from the continuation of the emergency declaration, which violates the country's constitution. Additionally, following the proclamation of the prolongation of the emergency, Myanmar's "National Defense and Security Council (NDSC)" came to the conclusion that "the army does not exercise enough control to stage the polls and has failed to subdue widespread opposition to military rule." 

Long-standing military efforts have been made to exploit Aung San Suu Kyi's totemic prominence both at home and abroad. The fact is that the NLD leader's willingness to back the military-led reform process in the early 2010s was one of the key factors in Western countries' eventual decision to go along and withdraw the economic sanctions and investment prohibitions that they had placed since the 1990s. 

“Cynics, the ignorant, the gullible, and various vested interests in military rule in Myanmar will loudly exclaim this news as a positive development signifying real change,” economist Sean Turnell, a former economic advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi wrote. It is not. "The allegations Suu Kyi was found guilty of are ludicrous, and the legal procedures used to punish her were a farce. Junta is trying a classic public relations trick by shortening her prison sentences in the hopes that a worn-out and disinterested world will fall for it. The junta's inability to defeat the opposition to its authority has made it weaker, and even the tremendous brutality it has employed hasn't helped to firmly establish power."

Scot Marciel, a former US ambassador to Myanmar, referred to the partial pardon as "a transparent tactical ploy" in a tweet he posted yesterday. He also noted that any genuine compromise would require at the very least an immediate end to the violence. One would assume that the majority of active Western authorities share this opinion.

However, the gesture might not be meant just for Western audiences, as former British ambassador Derek Tonkin pointed out on Twitter. The major goal of this charade, however, is to win friends among the neighbors in the region and get admission to the ASEAN councils, the author noted. "Now that they're safe, they can ignore Western sanctions.

The moment has come for China, the UN, the West, and ASEAN to intensify their efforts to address the nation's growing issues. China, India, Thailand, and other nearby nations, as well as the rest of the region, are at risk from the escalating instability in Myanmar. Since the coup, there has been a significant increase in refugees, insurgency, arms smuggling, organized crime, trafficking, money laundering, online scams, illegal drug production, and illicit trade, all of which pose a threat to the entire region. No one in the area can avoid Myanmar's problems. 

It's time to put more pressure on the dictatorship, not lessen it, and back the democratic opposition if ASEAN and the rest of the world want to see stability and peace returned to Myanmar.

Nur-Mohammad Sheikh is a security affairs analyst.