In previous articles on this matter, I have argued that Bangladesh will never get any water in the dry season from the Teesta River. The Indian government has been stalling for years as there is no solution. All they can do is to say “soon.” How long is “soon??
The reason is simple enough -- the Indian farmers are taking the water from the rivers in the dry season for irrigation and there is no one who is able to stop them from doing so.
In addition, urban water demands are also growing and towns may pump water from the river to their treatment plants.
In South Asia, there is no effective control over water rights for small farmers.
In Bangladesh, surface water irrigation projects are generally unsuccessful as agreed limits over extraction volumes prove very difficult to implement.
The same problem now exists on the Padma. The river flow is low in the dry season and much of the time, India is unable to provide the agreed dry season water flow as the water has been removed by the Indian farmers for irrigation before it reaches the Farakka Barrage.
This condition shapes all the issues of water sharing with India. The Indian government does not have the administrative power to block the Indian farmers' use of water in the rivers that flow over into Bangladesh.
All the meetings in the world will never solve this problem. The Bangladesh government may claim rights to the waters and the Indian government may even agree to those rights, but nothing will ever be done to implement such rights. Who is going to take the water away from lakhs of Indian farmers?
Currently, the Chinese are preparing a plan to store the wet season water flow in the Teesta River and distribute it during the dry season. The contours of the land are not very favourable to a dam or barrage, so there may be major excavation of the river bed needed.
As negotiation to obtain dry season flows will not be successful and structures to hold water may not be feasible, I suggest a third approach. It is based on the idea that the Indians have a moral and perhaps legal responsibility to deliver dry season water to Bangladesh via the Teesta River.
I understand that they have made some such commitments. At present there is a lot of Teesta water that comes into Bangladesh in the wet season. It is uncontrolled and floods the valley, spreads out, and ultimately much goes underground, recharging the acquirers. Farmers pump this water up to the surface in the dry season to cultivate their crops.
The proposed project here has three parts:
- Construct holes and reshape the land to increase the volume of wet season water, recharging the aquifers. I do not know how much can be achieved but it may be feasible to raise the water table level.
- Construct a series of tube-wells driven by electrical pumps that will deliver water in the dry season to irrigate the fields. Currently, most pumps are fueled by diesel. This irrigation system might be driven by electricity generated by a solar facility, with the grid available for backup. The design of the pumping and distribution of the ground water should eliminate the water lords and provide for fairer distribution of water.
- The cost of the water is measured by the construction cost of wells and a solar system plus cost of operation and maintenance including pumping by farmers. A small part would be charged to the farmer but the greater part would be charged to the Indian government on the basis of a negotiated agreement. The Indian government has failed to meet its obligations to provide flow in the Teesta during the dry season. The financial charge is to recover the cost of providing this water that the Indian government has failed to provide at the needed time. Building a solar plant is not a necessary part of the projects. The concept of charging the Indians for water promised but not delivered can be followed, whatever the method of pumping the water.
The logic is: I have a right to something to which you have agreed. You fail to carry out your part of the agreement. I carry out your part and send you a bill for what it cost. Paying the bill is your way of accepting your responsibility.
Many people will say this approach would not work. But this is the only way that Bangladesh farmers will ever have a reliable supply of dry season water supplied by the Indians. It also provides a model that could be used for other water sharing agreements. India has shown no real interest in solving these problems since the successful negotiations on the Farakka Barrage Treaty.
The suggested approach provides a way to manage the water sharing conflicts. We assume India recognizes Bangladesh's rights to a share of the water in both rainy and dry seasons. Historically, rainy season flows are plentiful, but whether this continues depends on the extent of climate change, of glacier melting, shifts in rainfall patterns etc.
But for the next 10 years, rainy season flows will probably be at acceptable levels. Dry season flows are declining but efficient extraction of groundwater can offset this decline.
In brief, India has no control of the dry season flows of most of the rivers entering Bangladesh and this is particularly true of the Teesta. Indian government control over the water declines as the farmers take more and more water from the rivers.
Bangladesh should get India to acknowledge their inability to supply dry season water and grant Bangladesh's rights to such water. Bangladesh can then reach an agreed charge for the cost of pumping the groundwater. Perhaps India will recognize their responsibilities and make a deal.