Legend has it that Egypt does not witness significant events in the summer. Most of the country’s uprisings throughout history have taken place in the winter. Nevertheless, the final hours preceding the demonstrations on June 30 said this year was an exception. The date marks one year from the president’s coming to power, so it was chosen by the opposition as the date for demonstrations against him, his government and his party.
Although it was difficult to predict what could have happened on June 30, several reasons lead to the expectation that large masses of angry people will be participating in the demonstrations planned. The day was expected to be the spark for a blaze of continuing protests similar to those faced by Mubarak and his regime in January 2011, after 30 years of his rule.
A visit to one of the long car queues outside a gas station were an indicator of the level of wrath the Muslim Brotherhood faced; it had not happened since their rise to power. For weeks, Egypt has been facing one of the longest and worst fuel shortages in its history. The main roads in Cairo and other governorates have been almost totally blocked by queues of cars waiting for gas. Add to that the power cuts for long hours, due to the fuel crisis affecting power generation sites, for which the prime minister saw no solution but to ask citizens to refrain from using air conditioners to mitigate pressure on the electricity grid.
While gas queues represented one of the most significant instigators for the expected June 30 demonstrations, they are not the only reason.
In fact Egypt ranks first globally as the country with the highest number of protests taking place in the first half of 2013. According to the International Development Centre, the number has reached 5,544 protests up to June, 7% of which have been due to labour rights breaches and a deterioration in basic services and utilities. 18% of these demonstrations were in Cairo, followed by the Alexandria, Sharqiya and Gharbeya governorates. The rest of the Delta governorates, Upper Egypt and the border regions were not far behind in their protests.
Economic indicators are not in better shape. The national budget was affirmed only days ago, showing a deficit exceeding $27bn. Moreover, the external debt increased from $34bn in the end of June 2012 to over $42bn, as a result of President Mohamed Morsi’s borrowing sprees over the past months. Internal debt increased by about $14bn during the first six months of Morsi’s rule, causing a rise in total internal debt to over $191bn by January 2013.
The above has resulted in a sharp decrease in Morsi’s popularity, from 70% in the fall of last year to 28% this summer – according to a publication of Arab American Institute, founded by noted author James Zogby, based on a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Not only did the June 30 demonstrations come in light of a deteriorating economic situation, they also arrived at a time of complete political clogging, which started with the notorious Constitutional Declaration crisis last December, causing a collapse in opposition-regime relations. Currently the main demand in the protests is the stepping down of Morsi from power, with early presidential elections over a transitional phase, which would include the redrafting of the Constitution followed by a referendum to approve it.
Calls for the June 30 demonstrations were initiated as part of a campaign by a small group of activists going by the name Tamarod (rebel). The campaign aimed to collect 15m signatures to withdraw confidence from President Morsi. Soon after, several parties and opposition movements joined in to collect signatures. Following that, ordinary citizens started collecting signatures from colleagues, relatives, and neighbours, then delivering them to the campaign’s headquarters and its delegates. Though the process of collecting signatures to withdraw confidence from the elected president was more of a symbolic gesture rather than a plausible legal or constitutional step, it was enough to send clear messages in more than one direction.
First, it gave the people a clear impression of the increasing rage in society. The campaign made the anger tangible, obviously expressed in the scene of citizens collecting signatures on the streets of different Egyptian governorates. Such anger could be easily measured by the number of signatures collected, which was being announced from time to time by Tamarod. Second, the campaign succeeded in giving the opposition an opportunity to mobilise against Morsi. This is especially in light of the gradual retraction in the popularity of the National Salvation Front (NSF) – which represents a number of opposition parties under the leadership of prominent figures such as Mohamed El Baradei and Hamdeen Sabahi – following the wave of protests against the (un)Constitutional Declaration last December. Moreover, the campaign sent a strong message to the Muslim Brotherhood and its political islamist allies that the level of rage is probably more than what they expected.
The Brotherhood’s response has been to rally its followers in demonstrations supporting Morsi, bringing to mind Gaddafi and Assad’s staged support demonstrations. In addition, Al Gama’a Al Islameya, one of the more fundamentalist groups on the political Islam scene, launched a counter campaign to collect signatures in support of the President. Other extremist groups hinted at the potential use of violence against Morsi’s opposition in the event that the latter attempt to bring him down, in flashback to a legacy of islamist violence against the state during the ‘80s and the ‘90s – their justification being the “protection of [constitutional] legitimacy.”
This state of heightened polarisation between the regime and its opposition was most evident in the clashes over the past few weeks between supporter and opposition demonstrations in the different governorates, resulting in seven deaths and hundreds of injuries. A range of weapons, from blades to firearms, have been used by both parties, and there have been casualties on both sides. Furthermore, a number of Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) premises were torched.
These events triggered a statement by Minister of Defence Abdel Fattah Al Seesi before a number of military officers and conscripts, where he said: “the military forces will not remain silent before the descent of the nation into a conflict that would be hard to control… Over the lapsed period, the military has avoided interference in the political scene. However, our moral and national responsibility towards the people of Egypt compels us to follow what is going on, and hope that Egypt is not slipping into the tunnel of internal conflict or combat.”
Al Seesi reiterated: “the army is fully responsible for the protection of the will of the people, and it will not allow any trespasses. In addition, it will not allow the intimidation of the Egyptian people.”
Al Seesi’s statement gave a strong indication that the military is not far away from the conflict. This triggered different parties to attempt to quickly win the army over. Following Al Seesi’s statement, an NSF figure commented: “The NSF is against any assumption of power by the military. However, it approves the military’s taking over for a short period, whereby it is to be responsible for the protection of citizens and state institutions, as well as dismantling the current clash between political parties.”
Meanwhile, President Morsi held a closed meeting with the Minister of Defence following the latter’s statement, in what appeared to be an attempt to clarify what Al Seesi meant by his statement. In a speech last Wednesday, which was given by Morsi in anticipation of the June 30 demonstrations, he heaped praise on the military for its professionalism and patriotism, in addition to its “protection of legitimacy.” This has been considered by some as a response to the opposition’s apparent attempts to win over the military.
Also in anticipation of June 30, the army had been redeployed to secure sensitive locations and national institutions across Egyptian cities. This gave the military greater control over the streets, similar to the scene of the army in the streets of Cairo after 28 January 2011, when police forces collapsed in front of protestors and fully withdrew to be replaced by the military forces.
The popularity of the army has significantly increased among citizens, despite the rigorous criticism the military faced in the middle of last year before the presidential elections regarding the route the transitional period took under the supervision of the Secured Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which included bloody confrontations with protestors. However, under new leadership, the armed forces have successfully presented itself in a different light. Under young, presumably uncorrupted leadership free of the old league’s heritage, they have avoided – at least in appearances – direct interference in state politics. In light of the heightened rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood, there is increased popularity of the military as a force capable of protecting the nation from total collapse. It has become common to see direct and clear calls in newspaper articles and TV programs for the military to intervene “to save the country.”
At the moment, the military plays a significant role in the current conflict. Both the Brotherhood and the opposition have so far treated the army as the force to be reckoned with in the conflict. This is further strengthened by the close relations the military enjoys with the United States. Since the signing of the peace accord between Egypt and Israel in 1979, the US secured the armament and training of Egyptian army officials. Notably, US military aid to Egypt has not been touched, whereas civil aid has been reduced more than once. This continuous relationship has led to strong communication between the military institution in Egypt and the American administration in Washington.
In that sense, the army’s bailing out on Mubarak was not far from the alteration of the American administration’s stance towards him.
This relationship is what some in Egypt are betting on. A number of the leaders and organisers of the June 30 demonstrations have repeatedly asked participating protesters to refrain from chanting against the military or the police, and to focus instead on chants that are in opposition of the President and the Muslim Brotherhood. This triggered extensive debate among political activists, a large number of whom are against any reliance on military forces or dealing with them an ally.
No one in Cairo could have predicted what was going to happen on June 30, or afterwards. However, everybody believed that something big is bound to happen. The shadow of civil combat on a wide range looms in the dark.
There is a possibility that the army will abandon Morsi in the event that the demonstrations are widespread and remain for a long enough period of time. Military intervention becomes inevitable if the country is dragged into a state of violence and chaos as a result of fighting between supporters and opposition, especially since the Islamists seem to be dealing with June 30 as an existential battle. Most fear that if they are ousted from power, given the feeling of hostility and rejection towards the Islamists at the moment, they may never be allowed to assume power again. In addition, there is the possibility of them being turned into a target for prosecution, in other words it can be termed as harassment. The history of the Islamist movement is heavy with memories of prosecution, vivid enough to make them go to extremes in any expected scenario.
June 30 can possibly change the face of Egypt. The fall of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood would constitute a harsh blow to the political Islam project, not only in Egypt, but in the Middle East and the world. Furthermore, civil combat in Egypt is bound to have a significant effect on the Middle East as well.
On the other hand, the resolution of this conflict might be postponed for another round.
Dina elHusseiny is a Cairo-based freelance journalist and translator and Mostofa Mohie is an online journalist for Egypt's Arabic daily Al Masry Al Youm.