Dismissing debate over the verdict, the International Crimes Tribunal said Monday military personal as well as civilians could be charged for “superior responsibility.”
In the verdict against the former Jamaat chief the tribunal said the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act was not passed to prosecute military officials only. Referring to Section 3(1), the tribunal said it has jurisdiction to try and punish any individual or group of individuals irrespective of his or her status as a civilian or military personal.
In the formal charges, the prosecution said Ghulam Azam was liable for his “superior responsibility” during the Liberation War of 1971.
While placing arguments prosecutor Tureen Afroz said the word “commander” referred to military personnel while “superior officer” meant a person who holds a superior position of an organisation.
On the other hand, the defence counsel argued that Ghulam Azam was a civilian and so, he could not hold the status of a “superior officer”. The words “commander” and “superior officer” in the subsection referred to military personnel. If the government intended to try civilians, it should have kept only the word “superior” when it amended the act in 2009, said the defence.
Section 4(2) of the act says: “Any commander or superior officer who orders, permits, acquiesces or takes part in the commission of any of the crimes specified in Section 3 [genocide, crimes against humanity] or is connected with any plans and activities involving the commission of such crimes or who fails or omits to discharge his or her duty to maintain discipline, or to control or supervise the actions of the persons under his or her command or his or her subordinates, whereby such persons or subordinates or any of them commits any such crimes, or who fails to take necessary measures to prevent the commission of such crimes, is guilty of such crimes.”
In verdict, the tribunal said: “If we read special sections 4(2) and 5(2) together, then we will see unlike Section 4(2), the Section 5(2) does not use the word ‘officer’. If the intention of the legislators was to simply emphasis on the word ‘officer’ in Section 4(2) for a special meaning, there must have been a reiteration of the word ‘officer’ in Section 5(2) as well. The word ‘officer’ was not used in Section 5(2) which clearly indicates that the use of the word ‘officer’ in Section 4(2) is mere incidental having no significance.”