When the Egyptian army trucks recently rolled towards the Rafah border, they carried a message on the side: “A gift from the Egyptian people.” Five hundred tonnes of aid were sent to the Gaza Strip on the orders of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, as dozens of Palestinians from Gaza passed in the opposite direction for much-needed medical treatment in Egyptian hospitals.
For some, it looked like a reaffirmation of Egypt’s historic pan-Arabist commitment to the Palestinian cause. But amid Israel’s current military operation in Gaza, wrangling over a possible ceasefire deal and growing anti-Hamas sentiments back in Egypt, some have doubted that commitment. Although Egypt noticeably turned against Hamas after the overthrow of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the strained relationship has simmered for decades, Zack Gold, an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project, told Al Jazeera.
“Beginning in February 2013, the Egyptian government took a hard turn, framing the tunnels between Sinai and Gaza - and by extension Gaza - as a national security threat,” Gold explained. “The policy changes and associated military actions happened quite suddenly, but they built on suspicion that the Salafi-jihadi attackers that killed 16 Egyptian soldiers [in Rafah] in August 2012 came from, or were at least aided by operatives in, Gaza.”
The alleged connections between Hamas, violence in Sinai and armed groups such as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis have never been verified. Some analysts say Hamas allows Gaza-based Salafist groups to collaborate with Sinai fighters, allegedly giving groups the green-light to train them, subject to conditions such as taking their operations outside Gaza.
Hamas has repeatedly and adamantly denied interfering in Egyptian internal affairs. However, Egyptian security officials maintain Hamas has a more hands-on approach, helping to coordinate attacks on Egyptian soil. The view that Hamas, which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, helped to destabilise Egypt grew after Morsi’s ouster - along with incitement against Palestinians.
“The anti-Hamas and anti-Palestinian sentiment certainly further developed after Morsi’s ouster, with Hamas being seen as an arm of the Brotherhood and being accused of numerous attacks and plots throughout Egypt,” Gold said. “However, it should be remembered that the ‘Gaza threatens Egypt’ rhetoric began during Morsi’s rule, at a time of general xenophobia throughout the country.”
Oroub el-Abed, an academic, says tensions date back to the 1978 assassination of Egyptian Culture Minister Youssef el-Sebai, allegedly by Palestinian extremists. President Anwar Sadat subsequently passed administrative regulations 47 and 48, determining that regulations treating Palestinians as nationals should be revoked. Palestinians’ ability to work or receive an education in Egypt were particularly affected. That same year, the Camp David Accords were signed between Israel and Egypt.
“According to the politics run by the state ever since the late 1970s, Palestinians are made to seem either like terrorists or as an unthankful group,” Abed told Al Jazeera. “The space for sympathy with the Palestinians, particularly for those living in Egypt, has really been toned down since then.”
H A Hellyer, a nonresident fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said while the Egyptian population is still generally pro-Palestinian, anti-Muslim-Brotherhood sentiment has complicated the relationship. “The Palestinian cause is not a subject of dispute among the broad population; Egyptians are generally very pro-Palestinian in that regard, and quite antipathetic to Israel,” Hellyer told Al Jazeera. “But the fact that Gaza is partially governed by Hamas has caused at least some portions of the Egyptian intelligentsia to pause.”