Will CIA admit its ugly truths?

George Tenet, who presided over the CIA when terrorist suspects were waterboarded and subjected to other forms of brutal “enhanced interrogation,” has set himself a near-impossible task. He is leading an effort to discredit an impending Senate committee report expected to lay out a case that the intelligence agency tortured suspects and then misled Congress, the White House and the public about its detention and interrogation program.

Tenet, working with other senior officials who ran the CIA in the years after September 11, is said to be trying to develop a “strategy” to counter the findings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s 6,300-page report that was five years in the making.

But how do you strategise against the truth? It is now well-established that the CIA ran several “black sites” in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia where al Qaeda suspects were subjected to forms of harsh interrogation that were banned as “torture” by President Barack Obama after he took office in 2009.

The “enhanced interrogation” techniques included waterboarding; making prisoners stand naked in a cell kept around 50 degrees and dousing them with cold water, and forcing suspects to stand shackled for hours in painful “stress positions.” By all accounts, however, the Senate report will detail how some interrogation methods were far worse than these previously revealed techniques. Tenet’s efforts to refute the coming report look like classic spycraft. In espionage tradition, spies, if caught, are trained to deny everything - no matter how overwhelming the evidence against them.

CIA Director John Brennan, for example, at first vigorously denied that the agency had hacked into the computers used by the Senate Intelligence Committee to compile its voluminous report. “Let me assure you,” Brennan told the senators in March, “the CIA was in no way spying on [the Senate committee].” On Thursday, however, Brennan was forced to admit that five CIA officers - including two lawyers - had done just that.

Yet his original denial followed storied espionage tradition. When FBI agents surrounded CIA officer Aldrich Ames in 1994 and arrested him for spying for Russia, his first words were: “There must be some mistake.”

For years, Kim Philby, the notorious British spy, repeatedly denied his secret role as a mole for Moscow while serving as a high-placed official in the British intelligence service throughout the postwar years. He kept up his denials right up until he finally fled to the Soviet Union in 1963.

The culture of denial still pervades the CIA, and likely most intelligence agencies. Tenet will likely now argue, as he has in the past, that the harsh interrogations “saved lives” and “disrupted plots.” However, the Senate report may seriously question this view. Senator Diane Feinstein (D-Calif.), who heads the Senate committee, has said the harsh interrogations did not, for example, lead to the most important intelligence success - the capture and death of Osama bin Laden.

Yet other intelligence veterans insist that establishing a rapport with suspects works better than torture - in part because prisoners subjected to painful techniques may tell their tormenters anything, including false information, to get them to stop.