It began with a roar that echoed through the monsoon air—a collective cry for dignity, justice, and change.
One year ago today, Bangladesh awoke not just to mass mobilization, but to the birth of a political reckoning.
Across city streets and village squares, the people's uprising dismantled a status quo held together by fear, corruption, and silence.
Expectations soared: justice would be swift, reforms bold, and governance reborn in transparency.
Yet one year later, the promises of the revolution remain suspended between hope and heartbreak.
From courtrooms to currency markets, the nation grapples with the debris of its transformation.
Thousands remain entangled in fabricated charges tied to the July murder cases, buried under legal chaos and extortion claims.
Economic turmoil deepens, elections stall, and mob violence resurfaces with worrying regularity.
And while the interim government led by Chief Adviser Prof Muhammad Yunus boasts pockets of achievement, the road to accountability and reform has proved perilous, uneven, and—at times—paralyzed. Although all the reform commissions submitted their reports, the visible reform has yet to start.
Yunus vowed to “uphold… the constitution” and usher in “democracy, justice, human rights” for all.
A year later, however, many promises remain unfulfilled, and the country’s reality is starkly different from initial hopes.
Justice deferred, hope distorted
When the masses rose, justice was not just a demand—it was a cornerstone of their defiance. One year on, the promise remains largely unfulfilled.
The July murder cases, filed in the immediate aftermath of the uprising, have come to represent everything the revolution stood against: systemic abuse, fabricated charges, and the commercialization of justice.
Regarding the July trial, lawyer and human rights activist ZI Khan Panna told Dhaka Tribune: “The trial needs to be done for the 1971 genocide first.”
Panna remarked that the government is intentionally bringing 1971 face-to-face with 2024.
Rights groups and internal legal reviews suggest that thousands were implicated in these cases under politically motivated or harassing charges—amounting to breach of human rights.
Many detainees and their families allege that law enforcement officers extracted money in exchange for bail recommendations and charge-sheet manipulations.
Families also complain that extortion gangs have exploited these cases, demanding money to drop charges.
These claims, still under investigation, have compounded public outrage and deepened mistrust in institutions meant to safeguard citizens.
“The guilty must be punished for the July massacre,” Panna said, “but what came before is even more important—it must follow a proper sequence.”
"Cases are being filed with a large number of defendants, and arrests are taking place on a massive scale,” he remarked.
Despite repeated pledges from CA Prof Yunus for sweeping legal reform, progress remains limited.
Key commitments such as the creation of a neutral case review board, digitization of police records, and decriminalization of political protest have yet to materialize.
Judicial backlogs persist, with over 80% of July-related cases still pending trial, contributing to a climate of prolonged legal uncertainty.
Civil liberties—once promised as the revolution’s first gift—now teeter on a tightrope.
The public discourse is increasingly cautious—shaped not by freedom, but by fear.
Economy and foreign aid
Before the uprising, Bangladesh’s economy was already strained by global shocks. Inflation reached 11.66% - a 12-year high - in 2024, and foreign reserves fell sharply.
In July last year, Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves declined to $20.49 billion as per the International Monetary Fund's (IMF).
In contrast, foreign exchange reserves crossed $30 billion in June this year. It slightly fell to $29.53 billion in July after payment to the Asian Clearing Union (ACU).
Bangladesh paid a record $4.09 billion in foreign debt since the interim government took charge.
Yunus inherited sluggish growth and youth unemployment at record levels.
Economists note that “growth benefits were uneven” and “youth unemployment shows no sign of abating” under the old regime, putting pressure on the new government.
In the first year, domestic inflation briefly climbed into double digits (around 10–12%) before moderating; many households feel the pinch of rising prices.
To its credit, the interim government has secured substantial external support.
The World Bank’s South Asia VP Johannes Zutt visited Dhaka in July 2025 and reaffirmed a $3+ billion aid package, praising “critical reforms” being undertaken.
The UN and multilateral donors have signaled continued backing for development projects and climate resilience.
These commitments helped stabilize the currency and keep development programs afloat.
Former diplomat M Humayun Kabir said: “The economy was in a really bad shape during the Awami League government.”
“As the World Bank and IMF are providing support now, this government has been able to showcase it as a success,” he added.
Kabir stressed the tariff negotiation with the United States as another key achievement of the interim government.
But domestic finances remain fragile.
The World Bank warns Bangladesh must implement bold fiscal and regulatory reforms to sustain growth.
Public debt has grown, and subsidies have ballooned amid populist pressures.
The IMF had approved an emergency loan for $4.7 billion in mid-2024, but further programs hinge on credible reform plans.
Bangladesh could emerge stronger economically if Yunus’s government delivers the promised anti-corruption and budgetary reforms—but so far, those are mostly on paper, and ordinary citizens are still grappling with high costs and slow job growth.
Social unrest and security
Despite the change in government, law and order remain a major concern.
The uprising was among the bloodiest in decades: angry students and citizens torched police stations and battled security forces across cities.
Human Rights Watch notes that “mob violence, political attacks… and hostility to women’s rights and minorities” have all surged in the past year.
Several of Hasina’s harshest security laws have eased, but other tools—like arbitrary detention—have persisted.
For example, during the uprising, police reportedly had orders to “shoot to kill” protestors, and some officers with records of abusing suspects are still in key posts.
The use of such military hardware against student protesters shocked many; rights groups later condemned the shoot-to-kill orders given to security forces.
In practice, visible violence has abated in Dhaka proper, but vigilante-style attacks have flared elsewhere.
The government’s restraint on overt brutality is seen as a positive shift from the past, but local activists warn that freed-up hardline factions—some released from jail—now roam with impunity.
The social fabric is still frayed.
The uprising’s end did not bring immediate harmony: Bangladesh now faces a tough balancing act between restoring public order and respecting democratic freedoms.
Rights experts say the security forces have lost much of their credibility—so much so that even routine law enforcement is now caught between mistrust and fear.
Bangladesh was hard to govern even under Hasina—she held power through fear.
Now, in a vacuum, order remains elusive, and armed mobs still terrorize the vulnerable.
Political reforms and elections
A central demand of the uprising was the promise of truly fair elections after systemic reforms.
Officially, the interim government pledged national elections by February 2026.
Yunus established 11 reform commissions—on the constitution, election laws, police, judiciary, anti-corruption, media, administration, etc.—and set an ambitious timeline.
However, political deadlock has slowed the process.
Panna said: “The change came for the sake of changing voting rights. This government has come and failed four times to hold elections. Until now, what was the election date? Nothing. Any caretaker government would normally hold elections within three months.”
Dr Imtiaz Ahmed, executive director of the Centre for Alternatives Bangladesh, told the Dhaka Tribune that the incoming interim government's primary mandate is to strengthen Bangladesh’s democracy through reforms.
No major party has agreed on a reform package.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—now led by Khaleda Zia’s son Tarique Rahman—initially demanded elections by December, warning of unrest if delayed.
Yunus initially balked, citing the need to bolster institutions first, but by mid-2026 he signaled flexibility.
After a London meeting with BNP leaders, he agreed to consider a February 2026 vote “if sufficient progress” is made on reforms.
Panna also stressed that the election date should be announced without further delay.
Crucially, the Awami League has been excluded from this electoral planning.
The Election Commission suspended Awami League’s registration and banned its activities under anti-terrorism laws, essentially sidelining the party that represents roughly 35% of the electorate.
Yunus’s government argues this is legal, since the Awami League’s top leaders were indicted in various cases. Critics counter that without AL in the process, any vote will lack legitimacy.
The framework for elections remains unsettled.
The caretaker regime has created the mechanisms for change—commissions and consultative bodies—but so far has not delivered any institutional overhauls that many protesters expected.
Diplomacy
On the world stage, Yunus’s government has played a delicate hand.
Initially, it won plaudits: US diplomats publicly “welcomed” the new interim team and said they stood ready to help Bangladesh’s democratic transition.
China’s government also offered warm support, with Premier Li Qiang telling Yunus that Beijing would “provide full support” for Bangladesh’s development.
The UN stepped in to investigate last summer’s violence and pledged to assist with police and electoral reforms.
Diplomat Humayun Kabir remarked that the achievements in foreign policy since the monsoon revolution have both an upside and a downside.
He said: “The achievement is that after the uprising, this government has been able to project this reality to the outside world. Because of that, we have been able to avoid various kinds of dangers, such as framing Bangladesh negatively in the international community. This was possible due to the Chief Adviser’s personality.”
Yunus himself traveled internationally, attending Davos in early 2025 to secure investment pledges and sympathy, touting Bangladesh’s potential if its institutions were cleansed.
Yet relations have also been strained.
India’s reaction has been mixed: Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulated Yunus and reiterated Delhi’s commitment to Bangladesh’s progress, but in practice New Delhi has quietly rebuffed requests to extradite Hasina from her exile.
This has fed into a sharp nationalist backlash in Bangladesh, where many accuse India of meddling.
The United States, after an initially positive welcome, grew impatient: in April 2025 the Trump administration announced a 37% “reciprocal tariff” on Bangladeshi textiles, demanding tangible human-rights improvements.
Yunus publicly protested the move, but Washington has shown it expects more than words.
Donors like the World Bank and IMF have otherwise reaffirmed support, tying future aid to benchmarks such as anti-corruption and judicial independence.
Foreign partners remain engaged but watchful. Bangladesh’s traditional allies want stability and reform; China and others see a business opportunity. But the era of easy goodwill for Bangladesh’s government has waned—international funders now quietly demand results, not just rhetoric.
Kabir said: “In foreign policy, we could not achieve national coordination. The foreign ministry was not able to shape policy. If they could, it could have been a good example for the future and would have been beneficial for national security.”
Achievements
Despite the turmoil, the caretaker administration has not only encountered failures.
Overt state repression has decreased: the notorious enforced disappearances and politically motivated killings of past years appear to have stopped under Yunus.
Major press clampdowns have eased. Many independent outlets reopened after an initial ban.
The interim team has introduced new voices into governance. Notably, it included several student activists and technocrats in its 14-member cabinet—a level of inclusion unprecedented in the country’s history.
The International Crisis Group even called the Yunus cabinet “the most inclusive Bangladesh has ever seen.”
The economy has held up better than feared.
Growth of about 4% has continued, and large-scale investor projects (e.g., for power plants and roads) are back on track.
The World Bank praised ongoing reforms to public finance and thanked Bangladesh for mobilizing private investment opportunities.
Another success was debt relief and donor coordination: with clear leadership, multilateral aid that had been stalled was unlocked.
On the human side, many Bangladeshis feel less fear under Yunus.
Perhaps most symbolically, Bangladesh has taken centre stage internationally under Yunus: it hosted a UN conference on Rohingya refugees in mid-2025 and was elected a member of the UN Human Rights Council—indications that its global reputation has improved.
While institutional change is slow, the interim government has at least stabilized the ship, weathering violent storms without capsizing it.
Dr Ahmed said: “When international investors see that Bangladesh cannot fix an election date and cannot demonstrate stability, they choose to wait. They are waiting for something permanent, since an interim government is, by nature, temporary.”
“Internationally, there is a desire to see stability in Bangladesh through elections. That is why we have to wait,” he added.
A year on, the uprising has delivered mixed results. Justice for the July killings remains stalled, legal reforms unfinished, and fair elections delayed. The economy has steadied with foreign aid, but everyday hardship persists, while mob violence and political uncertainty continue to threaten stability.
Yet there are visible gains: overt repression has eased, press freedom has widened, and Bangladesh’s global standing has improved under Prof Yunus. The road ahead remains uncertain, but the nation’s hopes—and doubts—are still alive.