MONTH OF VICTORY

December 5, 1971: Pak troops being hard-pressed in the East

On December 2 in 1971, the White House received a letter from Pakistani military ruler General AM Yahya Khan seeking urgent military assistance for “a final attempt to avert impending catastrophe” caused by Indian troop mobilization on its east and west fronts.

The following day, Pakistan launched air strikes on 11 airfields in north-western India, known as “Operation Chengiz Khan”, prompting India to retaliate.

The Liberation War of Bangladesh culminated during this time, with guerrillas taking over towns close to Dhaka with the help of Indian troops. The US knew that Pakistan could only hold out for two to three weeks after being attacked from two sides. 

On December 4, CIA official Richard Helms briefed Henry Kissinger, US President Richard Nixon's assistant for national security affairs, about a combined India-Mukti Bahini offensive in East Pakistan and the beginning stages of fighting along the border between India and West Pakistan. 

“Pakistani troops were being hard pressed in the east, but there was little beyond artillery exchanges in the west,” Helms told Kissinger, who headed a high-profile Washington Special Actions Group Meeting in the White House Situation Room.

Kissinger said that the Pakistani army in the East had been destroyed and in the West would run out of gas and oil in another two to three weeks, “because the oil storage capacity in Karachi has been destroyed”. 

He stressed that it was important to prevent India's attack on the Pakistan army. “We are afraid that if nothing is done to stop it, East Pakistan will become a Bhutan and West Pakistan will become a Nepal. And India with Soviet help would be free to turn its energies elsewhere.”

The meeting also discussed the bilateral agreement of 1959, signed by the US and Pakistan. Article 1 stipulated that in case of aggression against Pakistan, the United States would "take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon" in order to assist Pakistan at its request.

Earlier, Gen Yahya sought Nixon's nod to invoke Article I of the Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation signed on March 5, 1959 and met his request for military assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

The meeting held on the morning of December 4 was convened to devise ways to save Pakistan from a humiliating defeat at any cost.

It agreed on a number of issues: the official Indian statement on the "no-holds-barred" offensive in East Pakistan and the comparable Pak statements should be reflected in the US statement at the UN the same day; and the CIA would prepare an hour-by-hour account of events, along with whatever conclusions they could draw within two days. 

Kissinger said that the bland letter calling for the UN Security Council meeting, proposed by the Japanese and others, was satisfactory because it also covered US concerns.

The meeting decided that the US would seek to speak first at the SC meeting, after India and Pakistan; would introduce its resolution without co-sponsors if necessary; and would go along with general language on political accommodation but would not accept specific language concerning the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

USAID was asked to prepare a paper on exactly what the US had done in cutting off economic assistance to India and what to say publicly when the actions became known. The paper should include the reason why we have not taken the same action for Pakistan, although this would not be made public immediately.

Kissinger said if the Indians had announced a full-scale invasion, this would have to be reflected in the US statement at the UN.

In his statement to the United Nations Security Council on December 4, Ambassador George HW Bush introduced a resolution that called for the cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of armed forces by India and Pakistan from each other's territory, and encouraged both countries to avail themselves of the Secretary-General's offer to use his good offices to promote a settlement. 

The same day the CIA prepared a chronology of the air strikes of December 3 in response to a request. The covering memorandum concluded that it was difficult to determine conclusively which country initiated hostilities, but the weight of evidence tended to support Indian claims that Pakistan struck first in the west with air strikes. 

At the Security Council, the Indians and Soviets were going to delay long enough so a resolution could not be passed, Kissinger said. 

“If it was, the Soviets would veto it. The UN will be impotent. So the Security Council is just a paper exercise – it will get the Post and Times off our backs. And the Libs will be happy that we turned it over to the UN. The damage won't show up for a few years. At the moment, we retrench around the world, this proves that countries can get away with brutality,” Kissinger added.