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A storm is brewing

  • Published at 12:03 am September 17th, 2019
INDIA-KASHMIR/
File Photo: Kashmiris shout slogans at a protest site after Friday prayers during restrictions, following scrapping of the special constitutional status for Kashmir by the Indian government, in Srinagar September 13, 2019 Reuters

With all eyes on Kashmir, the Indian government faces further issues with Naga militants

As the fallout from India’s decision to revoke the autonomy of Kashmir in early August continues, recent weeks have also seen troubling signs emanating from the oft-forgotten Naga-inhabited regions in the far north-eastern corner of India. 

Peace talks with Nagas pushing for independence, which have been going on for more than two decades, recently entered rocky waters. India’s decision to revoke Article 370 and 35A of the constitution that guaranteed Kashmir’s autonomy has added fuel to an existing sense of unease over the peace process to end India’s longest insurgency.

The Naga demand for independence began when the British first arrived in the 1840s, introducing a limited and partial system of rule. As India’s independence in 1947 loomed, the Nagas feared they would become subsumed within India’s political setup and that their unique local identity and culture would be eroded. This fuelled demands for a Nagaland independent from India, with militants of the Naga National Council (NNC) turning to violence in the mid-1950s. 

Since then, there have been decades of bloodshed, factional feuding, and failed attempts at striking peace deals, including creating the state of Nagaland in 1963 and granting its citizens a series of special privileges under Article 371(A) of India’s constitution. 

The most notorious of these failed attempts at peace was the 1975 Shillong Accord. The short agreement contained very little of substance beyond a commitment to negotiations and was widely perceived as the work of a small faction within the NNC. It prompted the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) to break away from the NNC and take up arms again. 

Despite a major split in 1988 and multiple further breakaways since, NSCN factions continue to play a powerful role in the politics of the region.

Push for peace

The current deadlock concerns talks with the NSCN-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), arguably the most powerful armed group in the region since its formation following the 1988 split. Although the group signed a ceasefire and began talking to New Delhi in 1997, the peace process has been a rocky one. 

Efforts to extend the NSCN-IM ceasefire beyond the state of Nagaland in 2001 led to massive riots in the neighbouring states of Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh. The riots forced a government U-turn in the areas beyond Nagaland, creating a long-term sticking point in the peace talks.

It did receive a shot in the arm in August 2015, when Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in New Delhi signed a framework agreement with the NSCN–IM that intended to establish the blueprint for a final peace agreement. In the four years since, both parties have continuously released optimistic statements suggesting that a final resolution is imminent and that most of the substantive issues have been resolved. But this initial optimism was short-lived. On August 3, NSCN–IM revealed that the last round of talks it had held “did not go well.”

Symbolic issues remain

Even before the election, frustration was growing at the progress of the talks. The main concern among the NSCN-IM negotiators is that the government may not grant the key symbolic concessions which are crucial to the NSCN-IM if it is to be able to tell its constituents that it has secured Naga sovereignty.

On the ground, tit-for-tat moves have led to at least five confrontations in 2019 between NSCN–IM personnel and security forces. NSCN–IM is also suspected by security forces of being behind an ambush on May 21 on a political convoy in Tirap, Arunachal Pradesh in which 11 people, including a prominent local legislator, were killed. Such incidents have increased in recent years, underlining the potential for escalation when the understanding between the government and the NSCN–IM leadership shows signs of frailty.

Further complicating matters, the NSCN-IM, although the most powerful, is by no means the only armed group.

A separate “working committee” of seven other groups is currently holding its own talks with the government, meaning the NSCN-IM will need to reconcile with these factions in any peace deal.

Events in Kashmir intersect directly with the central, symbolic questions that are at the heart of the vexed Naga political issue. Article 371(A) ensures that no parliamentary legislation shall apply if it interferes with customary practices, laws and land ownership patterns, resembling some of the provisions recently withdrawn in Kashmir. 

New Delhi and its interlocutors in the northeast have now set a deadline of October or November for resolving the peace talks, but have much to do to reassure the Nagas on these symbolic issues if they are to capitalize on this critical juncture and end India’s longest insurgency. 

Alex Waterman is Research Fellow in Security, Terrorism, and Insurgency, University of Leeds. A version of this article first appeared in The Conversation UK and has been reprinted by special permission.