Threatened by the pain of war, the civilian population of Syria continues to pass its days and nights amidst horror and uncertainty.
Strategic analyst Alia Chugtai has indicated, after careful research, that since March 2011, fighting has killed an estimated 465,000 Syrians, wounded one million more, and forced about 12 million people -- or half the country’s pre-war population -- from their homes.
At present, intense bombing is continuing in the towns of Douma, Misraba, and Harasta near the front lines. About 400,000 people have been living in these areas, desperate, in the midst of starvation and squalor.
The main cities under government control at this point of time are: Aleppo, Latakia, Tartus, Hama, Homs, Damascus, Palmyra, and Abu Kamal. After the battle for Raqqa, IS remains in control of the area near Abu Kamal, surrounded by government forces westward and Kurdish forces in the east.
Elsewhere, in northern Syria, pro-Assad fighters have been sent to the Kurdish enclave of Afrin to confront an offensive by Turkish troops and allied Syrian rebels.
Other groups fighting in Syria include Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Iran-backed Hezbollah, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units. They control: Afrin, Raqqa, Qamishli, and Hasakah. There is also the Free Syrian Army, a loose conglomeration of armed brigades formed in 2011 by defectors from the Syrian army and civilians aiming to topple President Bashar al-Assad. Since the battle of Aleppo, this group has remained in control of limited areas.
Other groups fighting in Syria include Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Iran-backed Hezbollah, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units.
This ongoing turmoil has made one factor common for the neighbouring region of Europe. The repercussions of Syria’s war now extends beyond the country’s borders and has hardened public opinion on migration and led to a tectonic shift in politics. This has become evident in the rise of populism and xenophobia in France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and the Netherlands. Arab Spring and its consequences in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and elsewhere have changed the world.
The anger in Italy, crippled by an anemic economy and perennial political paralysis, was reflected in its latest general election on March 4. Its leader, Matteo Salvini, has advocated forcibly rounding up and sending hundreds of thousands of foreigners back to their home countries. He is also opposed to any attempt to save those in the Mediterranean trying to reach Italian shores.
Strategic analysts have been following the unravelling of Syria and the neighbouring region very carefully. Some of them are admitting that President Assad might be gradually winning the civil war in Syria. They are, however, also pointing out that even if he eventually gains control, he will be presiding over a broken country.
Where it all started
Changes in this evolving scenario appear to have started in 2015 with Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary guards Quds Force going to Moscow. His discussions in Russia led to greater involvement in the conflict by Russia. The tide of Syria’s conflict began to change, gradually but remorselessly, in the regime’s favour.
It appears that Russia’s motivating factor was the anxiety that Assad might be overthrown, and that Syria, long an ally of Moscow, would become a failed state, another Yemen. Kremlin defense strategists calculated that a combination of Russian air power and Iranian militia on the ground could reverse the course of the war.
Even if Assad manages to eventually gain control of most of Syria, he will have to preside over a broken country
Such a decisive show of strength would be in direct contrast to the existing US ambivalence toward the moderate rebel groups who had approached the US for help.
Over the last few months, we have seen how the Russian air force has targetted moderate rebel groups supported by the US and the Gulf countries fighting Assad. In late 2015, Russian planes were often flying nearly 100 sorties a day.
As expected, the US and human rights groups accused Moscow of indiscriminate bombing of civilian infrastructure, especially hospitals. However, the joint operations slowly turned the situation towards Assad. Gradual success has also encouraged several thousand Hezbollah militia, as well as Iranian Quds fighters, joining the Syrian army to begin to roll back rebel gains in the north and northwest.
Possessing few weapons that could take out planes or tanks, the rebels began to lose ground. The Assad regime also appears to have benefitted from divisions and in-fighting among rebel groups.
The world in general and the stake-holders in the Middle East in particular have been monitoring the Geneva peace process with growing despair. While successive calls for ceasefires have failed, regime forces and their allies have embarked on a new strategy.
The regime has moved its focus away from IS and the Kurds and focused solely on the spine of Syria -- north from Damascus to Homs and Hama. This has been accompanied by intense aerial bombardment of the northwestern province of Idlib. Such changed strategic dynamics on the part of Assad also allowed the Syrian army by mid-2017, fortified by Russian-supplied hardware and supported by Hezbollah and Iranian fighters, to close in and recapture eastern Aleppo.
Assad and the Russians have also turned their attention to IS-held areas such as Deir Ezzor, not least because they are oil-rich. Putin also appears to have persuaded Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to create “deconfliction zones” -- which refer to areas that can be treated with lower priority until Assad can muster the resources to attack them.
It is true that the US, France, and Britain have in the recent past carried out unilateral missile attacks on some areas where Syria is supposed to have stored chemical weapons. However, this has apparently not created the desired result for the anti-Assad stakeholders. There has also been some confusion as to whether any such weapons were actually stored there. The US tried to make a point, but Assad seems to have weathered the storm.
The political opposition to Assad has continued to fume and vent their anger from exile. However, they virtually do not have any armed wing inside Syria. Bashar al-Assad apparently has the upper hand right now. It is also clear that the West might disagree with him, but they do not have any viable alternative to his rule that could garner broad international support.
However, there is also the other side of the coin. Even if Assad manages to eventually gain control of most of Syria, he will have to preside over a broken country, whose reconstruction could cost at least $150 billion or even more. In these troubled times, it is also more than likely that international donors and investors will refrain from coming forward to give aid to Syria until a credible political settlement is worked out.
Only one thing is true. After seven years of conflict in Syria, all that we have is a toxic legacy of extremism, distrust, and abject poverty.
Muhammad Zamir, a former ambassador, is an analyst specialized in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance, can be reached at [email protected].
