May 1971: What did State Department do to avert Indo-Pak war?

The tension between Indira Gandhi and General Yahya Khan was rife throughout May, spreading fear of a major Indo-Pakistan war, with the flow of refugees from East Pakistan increasing to a rate of over 100,000 per day.

The UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, who was touring India in mid-May, concluded that the refugee flow is "monumental" and "the greatest displacement of people in recent times." 

“There were some disturbing indications of India and Pakistan moving closer to the brink of a new war. Neither side really wants a war at this point but they are drifting in this direction,” according to a memorandum of the US National Security Council dated May 25. 

“For the past several weeks mortar barrages and small arms fire have been exchanged frequently across the East Pakistan-India border. The substantial Indian army forces in the area are on high alert and the situation appears very tense in the border areas.”

Some Indian paramilitary forces may even have conducted small-scale operations within East Pakistan.

The memo quoted intelligence reports that said the Indians were taking military preparatory measures such as the dispersal of fighter aircraft in the potential combat area and perhaps the movement of additional combat troops and armour into forward areas. The Pakistani troops were in forward positions along the border. 

It said Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reportedly had ordered her army to prepare a plan for a “rapid take-over of East Pakistan and is said to be particularly interested in an ‘Israeli-type lightening thrust' that would present the world with a fait accompli.”

Refugee crisis 

There was strong and mounting public pressure in India to take direct action against the Pakistanis over the refugee problem. The West Pakistanis for their part were still tending to blame most of their problem in East Pakistan on the Indians, according to the memorandum.

The Indians launched a major diplomatic and public relations campaign to promote domestic and foreign appreciation of the mounting economic, social and political problems posed by the massive continuing influx of more than three million East Pakistani refugees. 

On May 24, at the opening session of Parliament, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi warned that Pakistan must provide "credible guarantees" for the return and future safety of the refugees and that unless the great powers take action to remedy the situation, India will be "constrained to take all measures that might be necessary" to safeguard its own well-being.

Gen Yahya was, however, worried about other issues, among which were India's banning of Pakistani overflights, and “encouragement to infiltrators and anti-state elements,” he said in a letter to US President Richard Nixon the same day.

He said India must exercise restraint and adopt a constructive approach and urged him to help solve the refugee crisis. He said the problem of Pakistan's relations with India was a major factor in the processes leading to the early resumption of normal life and economic reconstruction in East Pakistan.

Actions to reduce danger 

The three underlying causes for the war-like situation were continuing military repression, economic dislocation and lack of political accommodation in East Pakistan; the very heavy flow of Bengali refugees into India which was imposing a mounting economic, social and political burden on India; and Indian training of and cross-border support to Bengali guerrillas, the memo said.

On May 26, Secretary William P Rogers said the possibility of war introduced a new and greater threat to the US interests in South Asia. “We are engaged in a series of actions in regard to both Pakistan and India, designed to reduce the danger of conflict between the two,” he said in a memorandum to President Nixon.

“The threat is likely to remain as long as the East Pakistan conflict remains unresolved.” He feared that in the event of such a conflict, the possibility of Chinese pressure on India along their border, followed by increased Soviet military assistance to India, could not be excluded.

“We agree that President Yahya is not likely to take steps to bring about a political accommodation until he realizes, himself, how essential it is. We cannot force him to this realization and therefore we are not imposing political conditions on our assistance. We believe, however, that we should avoid taking actions which might ease the internal pressures on him to take such steps on his own accord,” Rogers said. 

Steps concerning India

A. Allocated $2.5 million to refugee relief. These funds were used to feed 300,000 refugees and contribute $500,000 to UNHCR.

B. Encouraged and supported UNSYG and UNHCR in organizing international refugee relief programs.

C. Recommended approval of proposal to provide four C-130s for airlift of refugees from Tripura to Assam and of relief supplies from Assam to Tripura.

D. Briefed the Indians on what we are doing to get relief operations started in East Pakistan and to encourage political accommodation.

E. Urged Indians to use restraint in relations with Pakistan; warned them against direct action.

For Pakistan 

A. Pressed the Pakistani government to request the United Nations Secretary-General to coordinate a large program of international relief assistance for the people of East Pakistan.

B. Initiated contingency planning under Interdepartmental Working Group for US contribution to relief program; we contemplate PL-480 food aid, financing of inland water transport charters and support for US voluntary agencies.

C. Urged Yahya to restore peaceful conditions in East Pakistan, to stop repressive action against the Hindu minority and to encourage the return of refugees.

D. Urged Yahya to seek political accommodation with Bengalis, and to make a comprehensive public statement of his plans for this and the restoration of economic normalcy.

E. Arranged to send USDA port specialist to East Pakistan to help assess and recommend regarding alleviation of crucial port congestion, storage and internal distribution problems.

F. Urged Yahya to improve port and inland distribution facilities to permit the distribution of relief and other commodities to the populace.

G. Emphasized to the Pakistani government the need for maintaining restraint toward India in these tense circumstances.