Hefazat-e-Islam was back in the headlines this month, announcing it would reoccupy Shapla Chattar on November 23. Aside from rekindling its 13-point agenda, the organisation intended to protest the detention of its leaders as well as government efforts to control Hefazat’s only source of authority – the country’s Deobandi (Qawmi) madrasas.
Despite their shared ideology, Bangladesh’s Deobandi madrasas – some 10,000 in number – are a divided group with loyalties spread across five rival boards. Among these boards, Befaqul Madaris al Arabia Bangladesh claims to represent Deobandi madrasas across the country, while Ittehad-ul-Madaris, Azad Deeni Iddara-e-Talim Bangladesh, Tanzeem-ul-Madaris, and a fifth board in Gopalganj wield influence over madrasas in Chittagong, Sylhet, North Bengal, and South Bengal, respectively.
Occupying a landscape well beyond the state’s control, ambitious and prominent clerics have traditionally used these boards to outdo one another in a zero-sum contest for authority. The latest tool in the government’s madrasa policy – the proposed Qawmi Madrasa Education Authority Bill – threatens to tilt the balance of power in this intra-Deobandi arena.
But the success of any government in redrawing this landscape and reforming Qawmi madrasas will depend on the specific contents of the bill. There are four conceivable versions of this bill, each with its associated winners and losers.
The first possible version of the bill subjects Qawmi madrasas to the same control that currently applies to the country’s Alia madrasas. A central government-run board staffed by bureaucrats will supervise Qawmi madasas’ educational affairs, standardising their syllabi, publishing their non-religious textbooks, awarding government-recognised degrees to their students, and possibly even appointing (directly or indirectly) their teachers and non-teaching staff.
On paper, this option would seem to favour the government, which earns considerable influence over a sector in which it currently has none. In practice, however, this bill can never become a law.
Clerics associated with each Deobandi board insist that a Qawmi board can and should only be run by Qawmi men. Though they want the government to recognise their students’ degrees, these clerics are unwilling to offer much in return.
As a representative of Ittehad-ul Madaris puts it: “We will accept the government’s recommendations but we should have the final say regarding which recommendations we decide to implement.”
Whether or not it triggers the “civil war” Shah Ahmad Shafi predicts, this version of the bill will certainly cause Deobandis of all stripes to shed their differences and unite against its implementation.
Despite its inevitable failure, there is a good chance Sheikh Hasina’s government might still go ahead with this version of the bill. The previous BNP-led government tried unsuccessfully to create a government-run Qawmi board shortly before the last elections. The present government may try to match the BNP’s symbolic efforts by extending to Qawmi clerics the same unfeasible offer.
The second version of the bill sees the creation of a central government-recognised but Qawmi-run board. This version inevitably favours Befaqul Madaris since it is the only Qawmi board with a national presence.
In this scenario, madrasas currently affiliated with regional boards will migrate towards Befaqul Madaris in order to benefit from its government-recognised curriculum and degree. By promoting Befaqul Madaris at the expense of its regional rivals, this version of the bill thus eliminates all intra-Deobandi competition.
Guided by minimal government input, Befaqul Madaris is free to decide how it runs its madrasas, without any incentive to innovate towards outperforming other Deobandi competitors.
Version three of the bill involves the devolution of powers to government-recognised but Qawmi-run boards at the regional level. Though it would involve some level of central oversight, this version allows regional boards to retain influence over madrasas within their respective jurisdictions.
This arrangement has a precedent in the mainstream education system where a separate board is responsible for conducting examinations at the intermediate and secondary levels in each of Bangladesh’s divisions.
Since Befaqul Madaris has a nationwide presence, this version would likely limit its powers to Dhaka division, forcing it to surrender its affiliates in other divisions to its regional counterparts. Befaqul Madaris, with its expansionist agenda, will most certainly veto this bill and deploy its 3,600 affiliates towards non- cooperation.
The fourth version of the bill is the most innovative and has the best chance of success in the long term. Instead of establishing a Qawmi board (run by the government or by Qawmi clerics), this version adopts a student-centric approach.
The government simply recognises the degree certificates issued by Befaqul Madaris and its regional rivals, on the condition that they introduce secular subjects on their own terms and at a reasonable pace.
Since it requires the government to give Qawmi madrasas what they want without asking much in return, one may dismiss this hands-off option as foolish or naïve. One may further argue that it makes little sense to recognise the degrees of students who are by all accounts unemployable.
In the long run, however, this version has a compelling upside. By withdrawing itself from the scene, the government gives rival Qawmi boards the confidence and security to compete amongst themselves. Since these boards have few disagreements and differences in the religious domain, this competition will play out most visibly in the area of secular education. The larger madrasas in each board have already begun differentiating themselves by teaching English, mathematics, and computers.
With the right incentives and support from the government, it should not be long before these measures trickle down to the level of their affiliates.
Moreover, as the government can no longer be blamed for its reluctance to recognise students’ degrees, and employers are under no obligation to hire students just because their degrees are government recognised, the burden of providing quality education and translating the student’s degree into employability shifts to the clerics.
While it cannot guarantee an end to Hefazat’s public demonstrations, this version of the bill ensures that the organisation’s rival constituents are engaged in healthy competition while the balance of power tilts in favour of their students.