The Bangladesh Medical and Dental Council’s (BMDC) code of professional conduct, etiquette, and ethics explicitly and unequivocally bars doctors from accepting commissions in exchange for referring patients to healthcare facilities.
A referral commission -- often called fee-splitting or “cut practice” -- is a financial arrangement in which a hospital, diagnostic centre, pharmacy, or specialist pays a kickback or a percentage of patient fees to a doctor, broker, or healthcare worker for referring patients to their facility.
The relevant clause in the BMDC code leaves no room for ambiguity:
“A doctor shall not offer to, or accept from, any person or organization (including diagnostic laboratories, hospitals, nursing homes, health centers, beauty centres or similar institutions) any financial or other inducement (including free or subsidized consulting premises or secretarial support) for referral of patients for consultation, investigation or treatment.”
Yet anyone who has sought medical treatment in this country knows how pervasive this practice has become, regardless of what the code says. We are all victims of an unethical system that inflates our medical bills.
In its biennial report (2025-2026), published this past week, Bangladesh Health Watch estimated that these kickbacks exceed Tk5 crore every single day. The report states:
“Based on conservative assumptions regarding patient volumes in major diagnostic centres, the authors estimate that commission payments may amount to approximately [Tk]5.1 crore each day, equivalent to [Tk]1,861 crore annually among the country's largest diagnostic providers alone. Although these estimates require independent validation, they highlight the potentially enormous scale of financial resources diverted through commission-based referral practices.”
Put in plain terms, patients bear a Tk1,861 crore burden every year -- not for medicines, treatments, or consultation fees, but simply to sustain an unethical alliance between doctors and diagnostic labs.
In a country where households finance roughly 73% of total health expenditure out of pocket -- one of the highest rates in the world -- and where a single serious illness can push a poor family into extreme poverty, why is this not a punishable offense?
The mechanism is straightforward: Physicians direct patients to specific pathology labs or imaging centres and pocket a fixed cut -- often 20% to 50% of the test fee -- in return.
Medical ethics codes globally, including those set by the World Medical Association, prohibit fee-splitting because financial incentives can bias clinical judgment, leading to unnecessary tests, repeated diagnostics, and inflated costs.
Despite the BMDC’s clear rules, diagnostic referral commissions remain largely unregulated and are not explicitly criminalized under statutory law, unlike in many other jurisdictions.
Many countries enforce strict statutory bans on healthcare kickbacks. For example, the United States enforces the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, while India’s National Medical Commission explicitly penalizes doctors caught taking referral commissions, including through the suspension of their licenses.
Health sector watchdogs such as Bangladesh Health Watch have repeatedly called for legal amendments to introduce direct criminal and financial penalties for this practice, but to no avail.
Worse still, the practice has recently gained institutional cover, allowing a section of senior public-sector physicians to profit unlawfully. A parliamentary standing committee recently found that Bangladesh Medical University (BMU) -- formerly BSMMU and commonly known as PG Hospital -- allowed specialist doctors to take a 30% commission on the gross income rather than the net profit from diagnostic tests, in violation of government rules.
Following a government audit, Parliament's Public Accounts Committee took up the issue and ordered the university to recover the excess payouts. Under existing rules, if a test generates Tk100 in revenue against Tk90 in costs, BMU specialists are entitled to 30% of the Tk10 profit. Instead, they have been taking 30% of the entire Tk100 proceeds -- a gross violation.
This scandal raises a fundamental question: Why does a 30% commission privilege exist at all when the national medical ethics code strictly prohibits such inducements
While it is unclear exactly when BMU introduced this provision, such revenue-sharing models were established under internal guidelines and Health Ministry frameworks -- typically tied to institutional evening practice -- to incentivize senior specialists to work within public facilities rather than refer patients to outside private clinics.
This raises another critical concern: Does allowing doctors at public hospitals to profit from referral commissions act as de facto encouragement for private practitioners to do the same, regardless of industry ethics and codes?
When public hospitals permit this practice, the government's health administration loses the moral authority to hold private practitioners accountable for accepting referral fees.
Indeed, fee-splitting appears to have become pervasive in recent years. With state-run grassroots health facilities suffering from doctor shortages and absenteeism, patients at the upazila level often have to rely on private hospitals and clinics.
Doctors at these private facilities routinely refer patients for X-rays, imaging, and lab tests to preferred diagnostic centres, profiting from hefty commissions at the expense of low-income rural and semi-urban families.
Patients at the sub-district level remain severely underserved by public medical facilities. The state minister for health's acknowledgement in parliament this past week offers a glaring example: Nearly half of all physician posts at upazila health complexes are vacant (6,288 out of 13,036 positions), alongside 21,656 vacancies among 57,306 class-three healthcare worker and staff posts.
In a fiscal year when the government justifiably boasts of substantially increasing the overall health budget for the first time in years, a pressing question remains: How will this increased outlay actually relieve the burden on poor patients?
Their limited funds continue to be drained by doctors' “cut practices,” inadequate services at understaffed government hospitals, and high treatment and medicine costs.
Reaz Ahmad is Editor, Dhaka Tribune.