The lynching of Dipu Chandra Das last month bears the grim stamp of what can happen to the rule of law if cases of blasphemy are allowed to reach tinderbox proportions.
Charged with making inflammatory comments against Islam during an organizational meeting in the factory, the 27-year-old textile worker, father of a three-year-old child, was beaten, lynched from a tree, and then burned alive.
Investigations carried out by the law enforcement officials afterwards, however, failed to uncover any tangible proof that any actual blasphemy had occurred.
The fact, however, that one life was lost, not within the due course of the law, but through mass violence, remains intractable.
Following an occurrence of this nature, questions keep cropping up in relation to whether Bangladesh needs a specific blasphemy law.
The premise upon which this question is based is that in the absence of this legislation, there is a void in the law.
The fact is that Bangladesh already has a comprehensive body of laws on issues pertaining to an act that is offensive to religion, hatred against religion, and communal violence.
The problem is not one of absence, but shortcomings in implementation.
The Penal Code of 1860, still in effect in Bangladesh, includes a list of sections dedicated to the punishment of offenses involving religious insult. Sections 295 to 298 penal laws against damaging or destroying religious places, or acts to outrage religious feelings, to disturb a religious assembly, and actions or words to wound religious sentiment.
The Penal Code 1860, Section 295A, introduced by an Act of 1927, punishes malicious acts, whether spoken, written, or depicted through paintings or drawings, that are intended to insult religious beliefs. Section 153A of the Penal Code criminalizes speech or actions that sow enmity or hatred between different religious or social groups.
In the broader context, these provisions effectively cover what people commonly refer to as “blasphemy.” To argue, therefore, that no law exists to deal with any form of religious offense does not really have much legal standing.
Newer digital laws extend the state's authority beyond the scope of the Penal Code. Section 26 of the Cyber Security Ordinance, 2025, for example, prohibits posting or disseminating religious or communal hate speech online to cause violence, unrest, disruption, or to encourage criminal action. The penalties include up to two years in prison, fines up to ten lakh taka, or both. Earlier, the Digital Security Act, 2018, carried similar aims with even harsher penalties.
Taken together, these statutes demonstrate that Bangladesh has already taken decisive steps to regulate speech that is religiously sensitive, particularly online.
Yet, with this sound legal framework, violence linked to accusations of blasphemy occurs at an alarming rate.
What is striking is that formal sentences for insult to religion remain relatively uncommon, while punishment outside the law -- arson, vandalism, assaults, even murders -- have become normalized.
This disconnect is a symptom of a more perilous collapse of faith in the rule of law. Where accusations provoke instant violence, the law ceases to be viewed as a solution and becomes an afterthought.
The incident involving Dipu Chandra Das illustrates this point. The factory authorities are suspected of having given the victim to the angry mob, and videos on social media platforms reveal that the mob chanted religious slogans during the lynching. These are not acts of religious devotion, but attacks on the state of governance.
The Constitution of Bangladesh provides clear guidelines in this respect. Article 41 states that every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate religion subject to law, public order, and morality. Religion in Bangladesh must be balanced in this manner.
The right to practice religion doesn’t mean that violence will be incited by people who practice religion. Nor does it mean that individuals can become judge, jury, and executioner in applying the ‘religious law.’
It is supposedly a much clearer and tougher blasphemy law that would help prevent instances of violence. However, experience suggests that in many countries, blasphemy laws have been criticized for being too vague in their application, discriminatory in enforcement, and disproportionately harsh against minorities and opposition groups.
It is likely that in many cases, those making blasphemy accusations would be encouraged by the knowledge that merely making an accusation could be disastrous.
It is important to remember that international human rights standards make a distinction between protecting someone from violence and making incitement to enmity based on belief illegal.
While criminalizing criticism and perceived insult to religion is not required, states must outlaw inciting hatred based on religion as an act that encourages discrimination and violence.
Bangladesh does not require a new blasphemy legislation. It requires improved application of current legislation and prompt prosecution of mob violence offenders.
It needs accountability within organizations that have failed to protect blasphemers, and a political pledge that accusations of blasphemy, whether true or false, will never result in vigilantism.
What we are seeing now is just rejection or abuse of the law, increasing fear rather than providing justice.
Apurba Mogumder is an Apprentice Lawyer, District and Session Judge Court, Dhaka.