The news that Sajeeb Wazed Joy has hired a pricey lobbying firm to help plead his mother’s case in Washington has attracted a significant amount of online interest among Bangladeshi watchers. Of particular note, Sajeeb chose to engage a firm known for its connections to Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump, presumably to gain an inside advantage if the latter returns to office following the November elections.
This is not the first time Sajeeb has reportedly hired lobbyists in Washington, nor is it the first time that others have done so to advance their interests in the United States. For many of us, the reported price tag of $200,000 for six month’s work has raised eyebrows. In fairness, a search of lobbying records shows that this is still a relatively modest sum to pay for the services of DC lobbyists.
The news of this latest lobbyist hire reminded me of my own interaction with “Beltway Bandits” working on behalf of Bangladesh in the past. Notably, during my time working as Bangladesh Desk Officer in the State Department in the late 1990s, Dhaka engaged at least two lobbying firms to advocate on its behalf.
One firm focused on obtaining duty free/quota free access for ready made garments. The other focused on convincing the US to extradite the alleged killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who had sought refuge in the United States.
Both lobbying firms employed former US Members of Congress on their behalf. This experience led me to form some opinions on the lobbying profession as well as the value of these efforts.
No doubt, the lobbying firms are able to provide access to senior officials in the US Executive Branch and Congress. Senior political appointees would readily accept a phone call or a meeting request from the lobbyists. This did allow the clients to make their case in front of a senior official. So, if the measure of success of a lobbyist is whether they can arrange a meeting, then it can be argued that lobbying works.
Looking deeper, however, I think it is an open question whether lobbying succeeds in influencing policy. In neither of the cases cited above did the lobbyists succeed in altering US policy. Bangladesh did not receive preferential market access nor did the US agree at the time to extradite the individuals in question. The lobbying efforts generated a good deal of work for those responsible for preparing for the meetings, but they did not achieve the desired ends.
Looking more broadly, I am not sure any of the money spent on Washington lobbying for Bangladesh in subsequent years has delivered the desired results.
The government should focus on building a team at its embassy in Washington capable of best advancing Bangladesh’s interests
Nevertheless, many foreign governments are convinced (at times by the lobbyists marketing their services) that the only way to succeed in Washington is with the help of a K Street firm. My own view is that this is not the case -- at least not for countries like Bangladesh.
Instead, the same services provided by lobbying firms can (and should) be performed by these countries’ embassies in Washington. If you look at the filings on the Department of Justice website which outline the work performed by lobbyists you will see meetings, phone calls, and e-mails. There is nothing magical about the services performed by lobbyists.
That said, the recently hired lobbyists noted above will be hard at work to justify their fees by trying to influence US policy towards Bangladesh. They will be knocking on doors at the State Department and other Cabinet agencies and walking the halls of Congress. They will be sending fact sheets to policy makers, think tanks, and journalists, and trying to shape a narrative. No doubt, they sense an opportunity if a future Trump Administration takes a fresh look at US policy in South Asia.
I am certain that there are currently discussions among the interim government and its supporters about whether they need to “fight fire with fire” and hire a lobbyist of their own. My own advice would be that before taking this step, the government should focus on building a team at its embassy in Washington capable of best advancing Bangladesh’s interests.
There is currently a great deal of good will for Bangladesh in the United States, to include in the Administration and Congress. The same holds true for the broader policy community and the Bangladeshi diaspora. To my mind, investing resources in a strong team at the embassy, led by an energetic ambassador who sees their role as first and foremost a communicator who can enlist the support of the community and other friends of Bangladesh, would pay greater dividends than simply writing checks to lobbyists.
Jon Danilowicz is an Independent Foreign Policy Analyst and Retired Senior Foreign Service Officer.