On September 11, Chief Advisor Muhammad Yunus announced the formation of commissions for reforms in six crucial areas of national life: The electoral system, police administration, judiciary, anti-corruption framework, public administration, and the Constitution. Do we need yet another commission? The answer is: Tes, we do -- specifically, one dedicated to the environment.
If the shadow of authoritarianism has loomed over Bangladesh’s political, cultural, and economic spheres over the past 15 years or so, its impact has been even more profound on the country’s natural environment. The issue of the environment in revolutionary Bangladesh is critical, as it shapes the political, economic, and existential fabric of the nation.
The degradation of Bangladesh’s environment has been driven largely by a political system that favours certain individuals, groups, and oligarchic interests with state connections. Pollution, the shrinking and destruction of rivers and other water bodies, and environmental damage are primarily the result of these politically connected actors. Riverbank erosion caused by the reckless extraction of sand, flooding, and waterlogging due to the rising beds of rivers, canals, and wetlands caused by encroachment and construction, deforestation, landslides, hill erosion, and air pollution are all directly linked to political patronage. This environmental degradation costs Bangladesh at least 17% of its GDP each year.
As we discuss state reforms in other areas, Bangladesh must also address how to effectively dismantle the structural ties between the state and the eco-fascists who have driven the country’s environment to the brink.
Since the formation of the interim government, some environmental issues have been acknowledged, such as the need for better tracking of rivers and a drive against polythene use. While important, these measures are not on par with the revolutionary aspirations of the current political moment -- they’ve surfaced before, with little result.
Bangladesh needs a comprehensive environmental plan. For instance, simply counting rivers isn’t enough. What are Bangladesh’s key environmental performance indicators for its rivers? Once the counting is done (or based on what we already know), how many rivers will be restored, what oxygen levels will be targeted, and to what extent will fish and other aquatic life be repopulated? And within what timeframe? These are the deeper questions a changing Bangladesh demands.
Externally, Bangladesh’s environmental relations must also be rethought. In a charged political climate, we often hear statements such as "we’ve been silent for too long, but no more" or "we will look India in the eye." But is it reasonable to expect a little raised voice will compel India to dismantle all its structures on transboundary rivers, rationally operate the Farakka Barrage, or provide all the data necessary to protect Bangladesh from drought and flooding caused by India’s actions?
Bangladesh must strike a well-thought-out middle ground. When the time comes for Bangladesh to discuss transboundary environmental issues, what exactly will the Bangladesh government talk about? If India or multilateral bodies ask, for example, how much stormwater the rivers and wetlands of Bangladesh can tolerate when their dams or sluice gates are opened, does Bangladesh have specific answers? How much are the nation’s riverbeds rising, and how much have its haors and beels shrunk, losing spatial extent? Why are they losing depth and velocity?
Bangladesh needs accurate data to measure both domestic and external factors to negotiate effectively with India -- is Bangladesh ready for this?
Advisor Rizwana Hasan suggested that the government should ask India to notify Bangladesh in advance about rain and floodwaters. However, given India’s track record, there’s no guarantee they’ll comply every time. Could Bangladesh reach out to globally recognized satellite service providers for this purpose? Has there been any discussion on this? There are also calls for India to provide information on structures built on international rivers on its side. But much of this information can be found through research, especially via reports from global activist organizations, multilateral bodies and Indian newspapers and ministry reports. Why wait for formal meetings with Indian counterparts, the outcomes of which may not be conclusive?
What about donor-driven environmental projects? Norway, the Netherlands, and the World Bank, among others, have already pledged support for Bangladesh’s environment. This is promising news. However, to benefit from such support, shouldn’t Bangladesh evaluate the performance of donor-driven projects since at least 1989, when the Flood Action Plan was introduced? What about the Delta Plan 2100, which was proposed without consultation with domestic stakeholders? Does the government intend to review it? What is the future of the Sundarbans, with power-plants and other structures dotting its vital lines? Why was the river Jamuna threatened to be straitjacketed under the previous government? How would Bangladesh deal with these major questions in the future?
Bangladesh’s environmental challenges are, in fact, far more complex than those faced by other commissions. The environmental question involves not only conceptual clarity but also field-level complexities, multiple stakeholders, and existential realities. To revive the ecological vitality upon which Bangladesh’s survival -- its biodiversity, food security, public health, and economic competitiveness -- depends, the interim government must conduct a comprehensive assessment of domestic, transregional, and global environmental challenges. For this, a commission comprising both national and international experts is essential.
Iftekhar Iqbal is an environmental historian based at Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei.