THE LAST WORD

Rethinking competition regulation

Given the new opportunity to reform so much we should really concentrate on what we would like those reforms to be. Just throwing out the old lot to replace them with new might not be enough. 

Hamidul Misbah, a competition lawyer, has some interesting points to make. That the Bangladesh Competition Commission was both politically biased -- we can guess who in favour of -- and also not fully competent. 

The BCC had no one who really understood competition in markets nor even, really, economics. Further, it didn't do the necessary studies before taking action. And there's that insistence upon bias in the actions it did take.

Ok, competition law is one of those areas where political bias can be money-making. If those who should have their activities curtailed in the name of greater competition do not have their activities curtailed then they will make more money. If it's politics which decides who doesn't then we have that problem: Politics is determining who makes more money. 

But if we're going to reform the BCC then we should have a clear idea of what we're trying to do as we do that reforming. Yes, obviously clear out those we think were too politically aligned. The next step seems fairly logical too. Given that this is a form of economic regulation we'd like the work to be done by those who know some economics. Are able to both direct and understand the economic research necessary to come to the right decisions. All very sensible. 

But we've also a political choice to make -- what sort of competition are we going to insist upon? What is it that the BCC should be trying to do? 

Currently there are two major schools of thought here. That's after we reject the true maniacs like the socialist, communists, and anarcho-capitalists of course.

It's exactly that political favouritism which is our initial complaint about what has been going on, isn't it?  

There's what has been the base idea these past few decades. If there's harm to consumers then we should do something. Remove that harm to consumers, obviously. The second is a revival of an old idea, that we should be managing against potential harms to consumers. Even, perhaps, using competition law to build the sort of economy we desire. The current Federal Trade Commission of Lina Khan over in the US is a good example of that second idea. 

Now, it's possible to be for or against either of those ideas -- I'm very clearly in favour of guarding only in the case of proven harm to consumers. But given where we are now in Bangladesh, I think the case for that attitude becomes even stronger. 

For if we're now to talk about using this area of law and bureaucratic management to build the economy we want, well, the economy we want is a political ideal, isn't it? Only acting where there is clear and proven damage to consumers is a rigid standard by which action can be taken or not. But as soon as we're talking about political desires then we get back into that world where the politically desirable get better treatment than the others. 

But it's exactly that political favouritism which is our initial complaint about what has been going on, isn't it? So, I would argue that minimalism from the bureaucracy, the BCC, is what is required. Where there's a clear and provable harm to consumer interests then act. Otherwise just continue to monitor until -- or if -- such damage is found.

Of course, this way of thinking betrays my underlying cynicism about governance itself. Yes, it probably is true that if we had someone intelligent, incorruptible, and with our best interests at heart, then giving them more power over the economy could be a good idea. But once there is that power over the economy, then those who do not necessarily have our best interests at heart, are not intelligent or uncorrupt, will seek out that power and often enough gain it. So, better simply not to create such positions of power in the first place. 

Where there's a specific problem that requires a solution, then fair enough. But general powers will always fall subject to those who would twist that “general” to their own interest.  

Tim Worstall is a senior fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London.