Some two and a half millennia ago, Thucydides quipped, "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must." His History of the Peloponnesian Wars views the relations between nations as a zero-sum game. In contrast, today, the vast corpus of international relations (IR) studies sees it to the contrary.
Since its inception, India's foreign policy stance has always envisioned India as a nation with global prominence. From Nehru’s leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement to Vajpayee’s “Operation Shakti,” the point has often been civilizational, albeit each with different connotations. This has taken a more robust turn under Narendra Modi.
In May 2014, just after his swearing-in, Modi proclaimed “Neighbourhood-First Policy” as his foreign policy priority. Simultaneously, his new foreign policy charter included the ‘Act East’ policy that sought to integrate the Indian economy with Southeast Asia better. Creating the “Modi Doctrine,” that augured well for both India and the region.
Bangladesh remains a vital partner if India is to achieve it successfully.
India's grand strategy under Modi indubitably entails desires for regional hegemony and global superpower ambitions. With the fifth largest economy in the world, soon to be third, a substantial demographic surplus, burgeoning industrial might, China’s diplomatic travails, and a host of other global developments, India does look primed to achieve the prominence it seeks.
However, a tiny fly in the ointment could be the ideological bent shaping Modi's foreign policy actions. Early in his reign, it was apparent that patience was not one of his foreign policy virtues. And when patience subsides, the ideological view of IR as a win-win game transforms instantaneously into a zero-sum one.
Soon after Modi’s inauguration, tensions with Pakistan led Modi to threaten assistance to secessionist leaders from Balochistan and even scrap their 1960 agreement, which had remained intact despite the India-Pakistan wars since. Nonetheless, with its loaded history, relations with Pakistan are hardly a fair judge of Modi's patience in foreign policy.
Ajit Doval, Indian National Security Adviser since 2014, a mainstay of Modi’s foreign policy brain trust, whose most recent Dhaka visit is still shrouded in mystery, has averred on multiple occasions that Bangladesh is “India’s most important neighbour.” Modi has made multiple visits to Dhaka and hosted Sheikh Hasina numerous times in Delhi, signing countless bilateral agreements in these years. He even described the Modi-Hasina relationship as heralding a “Sonali Adhyay,” or “Golden Era.” As such, it certainly bears scrutiny on how Bangladesh is actually treated under the Modi Doctrine.
Is it a zero-sum or a win-win relationship?
Modi’s foreign policy’s “3C Mantra” suggests that commerce, culture, and connectivity are its primary objectives. The latter is a no-brainer for Bangladesh, given the two share 54 rivers and a 4,096km border. However, one of the highlights of Modi's 2014 election manifesto was the issue of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. By most counts, a bugaboo employed to rouse voter passions, and one that led in 2018 to form the National Register of Citizens, which deprived four million Bengali-origin Muslims of their Indian citizenship.
On the four thousand plus km border we share, the Indian Border Security Forces (BSF) enforce what experts have called a “shoot to kill policy.” Between 2013 and 2019, the BSF killed at least 215 Bangladeshi citizens, and the numbers show no signs of abating. Many of these are also connected with the estimated 1.5 million cows, worth more than $500 million, that are smuggled into Bangladesh annually through presumed BSF collusion.
During this putative “Golden Era,” numerous new rail connections and new waterways transports have been established. At the same time, remedies for any reasonable water-sharing agreement for Teesta remain a pipe dream. Permanent access to Chattogram and Mongla sea ports has also been granted to India in 2023 to use, giving Indian cargo access to Bangladesh and vice versa. In the same period, however, China built 12 highways, 21 bridges, and 27 power and energy projects in Bangladesh.
All the transport links established between India and Bangladesh are meant to focus primarily on the first of the 3Cs, commerce. But its benefits have been markedly one-sided, doing much more for India than for Bangladesh. India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner after China. In 2023, the bilateral trade volume between the two countries was worth $16 billion. Yet, there was a negative trade imbalance of about $14 billion. Due to a dollar deficit suffered by the Bangladesh exchequer, the two countries decided on transactions using the Indian rupee. Still, Bangladesh can only perform rupee transactions of about $2 billion, the amount it gets from its annual exports to India.
With every query into the relationship, the zero-sum nature of the game played so far becomes unequivocally clear. The reasons for this might be manifold, including the lack of patience suffered by Modi's foreign policy instruments, the lack of diplomatic wherewithal of the Awami League government, the lack of foresight by all parties involved, etc.
Nonetheless, these are not insuperable impasses.
Commerce and connectivity could lead to a win-win if India considered a bilateral free trade agreement with Bangladesh. Most Indian imports to Bangladesh are raw materials for its export-based and agricultural industries; removing all tariff barriers could increase Bangladesh’s GDP by 0.13% in the short run and 0.11% in the long run and increase Bangladesh’s exports by up to 3.1%. It could also open the markets of Indian eastern provinces to trade with Bangladesh, giving a much-needed economic boost to those provinces. At the sub-regional level, Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal, as one group, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar as another, could construct new economic corridors, creating endless possibilities for regional development.
It is a pity that the potential for the region to flourish with its richness of resources under the auspices of the Modi Doctrine is lost due to a lack of foresight and forthright action. While Bangladesh could be a regional hub of commerce through which all South Asia thrives, it is increasingly becoming the spoils of conglomerates like the Adani Group. It remains to be seen if the Modi Doctrine stays the path of zero-sum, in which everyone loses in the long run, or steers toward win-win options.
Bobby Hajjaj, academic, and founding chairman of the registered political party Nationalist Democratic Movement-NDM.