Drawing inspiration from Gabriel García Márquez's novel The Autumn of the Patriarchs (1975), I address the recent surge of military coups in Africa, as termed by President of France Macron as an "epidemic." Over the past three years, Central and West Africa have witnessed eight military coups across six countries: Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger, and Gabon. A new season of patriarchs has returned.
The recent wave of coups follows the civil war in Sudan. On April 11, 2019, the Sudanese military ousted President Omar al-Bashir after four months of violent demonstrations that initially centered on food prices but quickly escalated to calls for his removal. General Omar al-Bashir had held power since 1989. The initial hope of the people turned to despair when, on October 25, 2021, the junta abandoned its promised path to democratic transition and unleashed violence against protesters.
The coup leaders reneged on their pledge to transfer power to a civilian government after two years. Once allies, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and General Mohamed Handan Dagalo, commander of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, are now embroiled into a destructive civil war since mid-April this year, which has displaced four million people from their homes, including 900,000 refugees to neighbouring countries. One-third of Sudan’s 46 million population faces a regular hunger crisis.
The military overthrow of democratically-elected President Mohamed Bazoum of Niger and the installation of a junta under the command of General Abdourahmane Tchiani in late July 2023 was the most recent in a string of coups against democratically elected governments in West Africa. This military coup, the sixth in just two years, bears many similarities to previous coups, including the predictable, almost textbook, statements from military leaders claiming they were acting out of a duty to protect their nation from insecurity, corruption, and economic hardship. In Niger, more than 10 million people (41.8% of the population) were living in extreme poverty in 2021.
The Nigerien junta's justifications for its unconstitutional removal of President Bazoum sound dubious. The military's allegations of insecurity partly stem from its own failure to fulfil its professional duties. What guarantees that it is better prepared for the task of economic management? The military in Niger is part of a society riddled with corruption and lacking institutional guardrails.
While the Niger coup removed an elected president, Gabon's coup ousted an "elected" president, Ali Bongo. I use quotes around "elected" because this coup ended more than 55 years of family rule that began with the recently deposed ruler's father, Omar Bongo. The election held on August 26 was a sham election, lacking international observers and marred by credible accusations of vote rigging in favour of Ali Bongo Ondimba.
The coups in Niger and Gabon differ significantly in terms of public support within their respective countries. In Niger, President Bazoum's government had legitimacy, while in Gabon, people were relieved of nearly six decades of family rule.
Although the military intervention in oil-rich Gabon is presented as a necessary move, the junta's invocation of insecurity, governance failure, and corruption as grounds for the unceremonious removal of Ali Bongo raises questions.
Several commentators, civil society members, and the main opposition party in Gabon are wondering why, if the main intention of the coup leaders in Gabon is to rectify injustice and fraudulent election results, they do not recount the results and transfer power to the opposition leader who likely won the elections? Or, at the very least, why not form a national government with competent civilian leaders?
The Gabon coup shares parallels with the September 5, 2021 coup in Guinea, when Colonel Mamady Doumbouya led a revolt against President Alpha Condé, who had won a dubious election for his third term in office. When the opposition protested, Alpha Condé unleashed a fierce crackdown. Like Gabon's coup, the coup in Guinea was initially welcomed by a large part of the population. However, it didn't take long for the people of Guinea to realize that Doumbouya was not exactly a liberator, and his intentions were to remain in power, rendering his promises of a democratic transition hollow.
In the late 1950s and 60s, following military coups in several post-colonial societies in Africa and Asia, a new field of study emerged to examine civil-military relations. An influential book titled The Man on Horseback by Samuel E. Finer in 1962 argued that in disorganized societies lacking discipline and order, the military's organizational superiority could be an advantage.
However, this theory doesn't hold water in the African context. African scholar late Ali Mazrui argued that in most African countries, the army was "under-professionalized," and in many cases, the military was factionalized along ethnic lines, which impeded professional solidarity.
Military rule, therefore, is not a better option than civilian rule, and in many cases, even when the military elite reinvent themselves as civilian rulers, the country's poverty situation does not improve, fuelling political instability and creating conditions for another coup. Sadly, this vicious circle is unlikely to end soon.
Habibul Haque Khondker is a sociology professor at Zayed University, Abu Dhabi who previously taught at the National University of Singapore.