By the beginning of the 1970s, the idealism of Nehru-Nasser-Tito in the wake of the end of European empires had given away to “military or authoritarian rules” in most of the newly independent world. Most of these governments had little sympathy for the cause of Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, by this time, the Cold War had “ceased to be a simple bipolar contest,” with many of the US allies chartering their own agenda in the developing world, while the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China faced each other across the longest land border in the world. Against that international backdrop, Raghavan argues that “there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of an independent Bangladesh in 1971.”
I must confess that this thesis is intuitively quite appealing. As Yuval Noah Harari notes in his blockbuster book, Sapiens: a Brief History of Humankind:
“Every point in history is a crossroads. ... Historians can speculate, but not provide any definitive answer … constraints leave ample room for surprising developments, which do not seem bound by any deterministic laws.”
But does Raghavan actually make a persuasive case that “the creation of Bangladesh was the product of conjuncture and contingency, choice and chance?”
He didn’t have the option of original interviews that Sisson and Rose had. Nor did he have anything like the White House tapes. Relying mainly on Indian and Western archival sources as well as analyzing the existing literature, Raghavan does point to a few possible forks in the road where a different path might have been taken.
But not all of these alternatives appear equally plausible. Take, for example, the claim that “…if Bhutto had not worked with the military regime ... a united Pakistan could have been preserved.” While this may be true in a narrow sense, surely this is a bit of a non-starter, as we surmise from Sisson and Rose that Bhutto’s gambit all along was to egg the army on to a war in the East at the end of which he would rule the West.
A more compelling argument, echoing Bass, might be that if the Americans “had used … economic leverage … Yahya … would have been forced to negotiate with Mujib.” Could the Americans really have influenced Pakistani actions though?
In the first dozen years of this century, under two very different presidents with very different foreign policy philosophies, America invaded an Arab country without the support of most of its allies and killed its dictator, then reluctantly bombed another Arab country at the urging of its allies and armed the rebels that killed its dictator, and did nothing while a popular uprising against yet another dictator in another Arab country descended into one of the worst wars of this young century. It is not at all clear that the US power made any difference for the better for the people of Iraq, Libya, and Syria. How can we be so confident that a forceful American stance would have been better for the people of Bangladesh?
Put differently, even if we agree that Kissinger and Nixon pursued a flawed and failed policy in 1971, it doesn’t necessarily and automatically mean that US action would have made a difference in the then East Pakistan. To make that case requires an analysis of East Pakistani and Bangladeshi politics, identifying the pro-American politicians and factions in Dhaka, and their realistic chances of wielding power.
As it happens, we do know the foreign minister in the Bangladeshi government-in-exile, Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, made overtures to the Americans. Mostaq was reputed to have represented the pro-West faction of the Awami League before the war. And as late as the 1970 election, the League was characterized by the Western media as the major pro-Western party in either wing of Pakistan.
Jyoti Rahman is a reader. He writes about what he reads at www.jrahman.substack.com.