Many Ukrainians would tend to agree with structural realists that the international system is anarchic. There is no higher authority sitting above the states whom you can fall back to, if you are in trouble. One can not be certain that you would not end up living in a state which is militarily powerful with malignant intention. In this international system, if you are weak and small, there are others who can take advantage of you. Therefore, achieving a degree of power of various ranges is imperative for small states, especially for their security.
Ukraine is just a prisoner of geography -- the great expanse of flatland in the Northern European Plain from where Russia was repeatedly attacked in history, and Ukraine is part of that plain. Thus, Putin is also imprisoned to retain influence over Ukraine. Ukraine also made some strategic mistakes by completely relying on the West, especially about their limitations and commitments.
The kind of autonomy small states can enjoy in decision making against a hegemonic power was also miscalculated by the Ukraine leadership. At the level of leadership, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine is naïve compared to Putin. President Putin has been seasoned by dealing with Western leadership in the last 10 years, where he proved to be a strategic opportunist even being presented with a tactical situation.
Ukraine is a kind of minimal state, having deep trouble in dealing with corruption. Violation of human rights, oppression of minorities, restricted freedom of speech, oligarchy, financial scams, and democratic deficits are some of the indicators. Instead of dealing with these issues, becoming part of NATO appeared politically rewarding for the Ukrainian leadership. When internal cohesion is at stake due to bad governance, external security buttressing (becoming part of NATO) seemed nonsensical.
There is a Western hangover in conflicts after Balkan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya. Strategic fatigue is very prominent in the West, and selling democracy in exchange of violence also did not bring credibility.
Russia is a declining power with a bad temper. The Ukraine move towards NATO was unacceptable for vital security reasons. Zelenskyy pushed Putin to pick between economic debacle or strategic peril. Putin has taken a calculated risk (which I intend to share in another discussion) by accepting economic war from the West. In this conundrum, China is reaping the most benefit, her strategic centre of gravity, the energy security, is getting secured with potential cheap energy supply from Russia.
The other beneficiary is the defense industrial complex.
In this anarchic international system of structural realism, Iran pursues minimal realism where smaller countries can defy the expectation of powerful countries by dint of their societal cohesion, institutional strength, and cultural stamina, to mention a few.
The West tried to breach between Shia and Sunni, between regions within Iran, but cohesion stood fast. Culturally, history says Persians are one of the finest negotiators in the world. Ukraine does not have such strengths to defy Russia. In Israel, speaking “truth to the power” is part of the culture. One can not get away with corruption. The other issue is that Israel never makes mistakes in picking up merits. I leave it to the readers’ discretion to judge Ukraine against these standards.
When Lee Kuan took over Singapore, his number one national agenda was economic emancipation, development, and better life for people. But Lee Kuan was developing a strong and credible defense force at the same time. People questioned this contradiction. Lee Kuan answered, if Singapore (a very small state) would have a credible defense force, it would be left alone and if left alone, then it could go ahead with one agenda.
In August 2017, Bangladesh was not left alone by Myanmar (we had to take about a million Rohingya). The other question Lee Kuan often faced was how had he turned a fishing village into Singapore? His answer was: “I spent considerable time selecting the right people for the right job.”
The lessons
Small states have limits of autonomy in decision-making about matters relating to geopolitics. Taking military risk based on promises from others may be suicidal. Opportunity of “militant diplomacy” by playing both ends against the centre was missed.
Zelenskyy could have reaped benefits from both Russia and West at present and could still keep the option open for the “European choice” at a later time (Myanmar in 2017, taking advantage of its geostrategic location, played this kind of “militant diplomacy” that even after causing such a human catastrophe, the two opposing regional powers stood by the side of Myanmar).
Power asymmetry is a reality and part of the international system but the hegemon has the option to choose between cooperation or conflict. However, small states can influence that choice by developing a cohesive society, strengthening its intuitions, introducing good governance, a culture of speaking truth to the power in the society, picking up merits, and by developing a credible deterrence force.
Yet, the million-dollar question is, are all small states and their governments willing to do these?
Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman is a Lt General, rcds, ndc, afwc, psc, PhD (Retd).