There is no joy in noting that Sri Lanka has substantial economic problems. As previously noted, the mistakes have been made and the effects are going to happen. What is possible is to note what will reduce, to the minimum possible, the ill effects. It's also possible to take two teaching moments from the debacle.
The first of those little lessons is that small groups -- whether these are of teenagers, politicians, or fools, to the extent the groups differ -- are profoundly subject to groupthink. An idea becomes established, and then without that reference to or influence from those outside the group, the error spirals on to catastrophe. In Sri Lanka, it was that almost family group around the President, but that's just a by the by. Any small group can, probably will, fall prey to the same problem. The belief was that saying that things should be so would make them so. The exchange rate, interest rates, methods of farming, and so on. By imposing, from the centre, the mistaken ideas of what these should be, the disaster was created.
The first teachable moment, therefore, being not to allow power to concentrate enough that groupthink can become such a problem. The ultimate devolution of power is of course a market economy without central intervention -- so, that's the best way to avoid error being embedded. There's also the added joy that a market economy has its own inbuilt feedback to punish error – people go bust and remove themselves from the economic table.
As to what should be done now, well, in one sense that's easy – stop making the errors. Free the exchange rate, allow folk to farm as they wish, release the incorrect controls that is. In another, it's difficult because this will certainly cause transitional pain. But there's no avoiding that for the errors have already been committed. There's pain going to come, the only questions are how much and for how long? Less and for less time seems like a good aim of any plan, and that will be achieved by simply removing all of those constraints.
It's even true that the sort of rules that we think are important to a civilized life should be reduced or lifted at the same time. For they are costs -- ones that in normal times we'll happily bear, but in a crisis they're unaffordable. The manner that the central controls have screwed up the market means a retreat to a very red in tooth and claw free market economy to my mind.
We often do agree that really free market capitalism is the most efficient economic structure, even as it's often not very fair. But in extremis we need efficiency; fairness is a luxury that has to be put aside for the moment.
Another way of making this same point is that, as it's government foolishness over economic policy which has created the problems, the solution will be to have no -- rather than just different -- government economic policies for a bit. After all, there's no guarantee that whatever they think of next will be any more useful than the past foolishness, is there?
The second lesson is to understand that good government economic policy can improve matters a bit. Sure, doing absolutely the right thing can improve GDP growth from 5 to 7% a year -- say. Or, in an advanced and mature economy, from 2 to 3% -- also, say. But as we can see here, bad government economic policy can drop an entire country into penury in mere months. It might well be true that allowing the government enough power over the economy to gain that marginal extra amount raises the risk of the disaster to unacceptable levels.
Of course, being a minarchist myself, I would say that. But if you happen to be rather more political than I am, then consider this. It might be true that if your people, those fine, clever, and upright folk you support, were to have that extra power over the economy, then things would improve, a bit. But when the cycle turns, as it always does, and the other bunch of unscrupulous ruffians take over, then disaster will follow. It might be better not to allow anyone to have the power.
As Ben Bernanke, who used to be Chair of the Federal Reserve said “However, careful economic analysis does have one important benefit, which is that it can help kill ideas that are completely logically inconsistent or wildly at variance with the data. This insight covers at least 90% of proposed economic policies.”
The problem with groupthink is that those 90% don't get killed off; the problem with giving government significant economic power is that one or other set of them on the turning carousel of power will institute at least some of those 90%. Sri Lanka's a nice reminder of both of those contentions and my further contention would be that economic power in the hands of government is simply too risky. After all, there's only that one in ten chance that they'll alight on a policy that's even useful let alone optimal.
Tim Worstall is a senior fellow at the Adam Smith Institute in London