Bangladesh’s relationship with China will expand and mature in 2022. China has proved itself a powerful friend of Bangladesh. The difficulties with China are obvious to everyone: India and the United States have deteriorating relations with China. The Prime Minister’s policy is to have friendly relationships with everyone.
So far, this policy has been successfully implemented but as relationships among the three powers deteriorate, this equal treatment becomes more difficult. It appears the United States will escalate the conflict with China, making Bangladesh’s neutral position more complicated.
China’s objectives in Bangladesh are, I believe, three-fold:
One is to be a good neighbour and to build up relations with Bangladesh, a large and important Asian country, through economic and person-to-person relations.
Second, is to work with Bangladesh to build up land-based transport systems, as part of the long run Chinese program of escaping the Straits of Malacca trap in which they find themselves. The United States Navy effectively controls passage of maritime traffic through the Malacca Straits. This is the route used by China’s imports of oil and gas as well as general cargo.
Third, Chinese policy is to weaken India, ensure Chinese dominance of Central Asia, and assume control over the origins of the great Asian rivers. A close relationship between China and Bangladesh makes India’s geopolitical position in South Asia more difficult.
Bangladesh’s nearness to the Siliguri corridor and its location as the only alternate path to India’s North-east states drags Bangladesh squarely into the middle of this key strategic danger point.
China is clearly a nation of enormous importance; the largest economy in Asia and the most important trading partner with every Asian country.
Further, China is developing a style of governing that downgrades the importance of individual rights and emphasizes the responsibilities of each person to the state and, in China’s case, to the Communist Party of China, the representative of the Chinese people. Leadership selected by election is believed by the Chinese Government to be inefficient in the central process of growing the economy and providing a fair distribution of the benefits of progress.
The elites of many Asian countries have come to a similar view, based on the difficulties of governing rapidly-growing economies without a sterner government. The Chinese seem very serious in developing this approach.
The economic relations with China reveal a very large trade and current account surplus with Bangladesh: In 2020/21, the current deficit was $15.4 billion. This was largely made up by the trade deficit of $15.0bn (exports from Bangladesh to China $0.67bn and Chinese exports to Bangladesh $15.66bn).
The official estimates are wrong in two respects: (1) There is a large amount of under-invoicing of imports. We estimate this effect as $7.8bn. (2) The balance of payments does not reflect the payments to some Chinese workers and businesses that flow through the hundi system. We estimate this at $1.5bn.
The true current account deficit for China is then about $25bn. The inflow of capital in 2020/21 was $4.7bn. (All of these numbers are from the Bangladesh Bank’s report on the balance of payments with China for 2020/21. Estimate of under-invoicing from pre-shipment inspection companies. Information on outward remittance flow from data supplied from interviews).
The Chinese economy benefits tremendously from this current account deficit. Equally, this reduces the Bangladesh economy by about $23bn. The return capital inflow is substantial, about 20% of this lost output.
Although Chinese tariffs are zero for most products, exports from Bangladesh are less than $1bn. China has done little to encourage such exports. There is an effort to attract Chinese investment to manufacture for export to the US to avoid US sanctions on Chinese companies. So far this is limited.
In 2022 the Bangladesh authorities would be well advised to negotiate hard with the Chinese to increase Bangladesh exports to China. In addition, the Chinese authorities should be asked to help with stopping the under-invoicing. This behaviour is definitely against WTO rules. This would increase Bangladesh tax revenues by about $4bn.
China’s foreign assistance is large and responsive to the objectives and selection of the Bangladesh authorities. The language differences limit the amount of people-to-people contact or education and health services exchange. But this will slowly increase.
Implementation of the Chinese foreign assistance projects faces the same difficulties as other donor countries. However, the Chinese go about overcoming the problems and not blame the Bangladesh government. For example, in the power sector, the Chinese are tackling the most difficult problem of improving the distribution and transmission system -- a brave undertaking that probably provides the highest rate of return of any public sector investment project in Bangladesh.
The foreign exchange needed to cover the $20bn Chinese surplus on the balance of payments is paid for from remittances, capital inflows from ADB and World Bank not linked to imports, and the trade surpluses that Bangladesh earns from the United States and the EU.
The Chinese armed forces have a long-term close relationship with Bangladesh. Planning in the Bangladesh army is focused on opposing Indian attack (where else would an attack come from?) so there is a built-in scepticism about the Indian military.
China has not been really supportive in assisting Bangladesh with the Rohingya problem and has provided little support to the costs Bangladesh incurs in managing these million refugees. This should change, but it is unlikely.
So long as there is no open war between China and the United States over Taiwan, or with India and China over the common border, relations between China and Bangladesh will develop smoothly. If there is open conflict, it is uncertain how this would impact Bangladesh. It is an issue that needs the attention of the national security elements of the government to consider what might happen and how Bangladesh responds. There are no good choices.
Forrest Cookson is an economist who has served as the first president of AmCham and has been a consultant for the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. This article is the second of four and is an expansion of an article “Prospects for Bangladesh 2022” published in the AmCham Journal October – December 2021.