OP-ED: America’s defeat masks Afghan voices

The Americans are as usual leaving Afghanistan -- what is historically known to be the “graveyard of empires” -- with a sense of treachery/betrayal, and more so in an utter defeat. Many would no doubt be reminded of Vietnam’s Saigon moment when the US airlifted the embassy staff from the rooftop following defeat. 

The issue is that the US-backed Afghan Ashraf Ghani government lacked legitimacy among  Afghans -- more so in rural districts and provinces outside Kabul. There were also over 100,000 Afghan deaths over two decades of war, mostly killed as a result of relentless bombing raids by US and NATO forces -- yet there is no concern about such systematic mass killings. 

It is the West’s fault for propping up and placing trust on a notoriously corrupt despotic Afghan establishment who were there not to provide security and stability, but to make serious money for their next 14 generations down the line and buy plush properties abroad.

The Afghan public feel they don’t have much to lose or have simply had enough of uncertainty and living in fear. 

Hence, they don’t regret seeing the back of the Ashraf Ghani government as much as they may not fancy the Taliban regime either.

Looking at various Afghan Dari Farsi social media forums and comments -- more so from Afghan friends and my students, some of them being civil servants under the Ghani and Karzai regimes -- what becomes clear is that Afghans aren’t homogenous and are polarized as ever.

However, one can easily gauge the extent of dislike the common Afghans, especially among the rural Afghans who form the majority -- as opposed to English-German educated bourgeoisie class urban Kabul elites -- have for both the US-backed Karzai and Ghani regimes, despite not having much fancy for the retrograde Taliban rule either. 

They view the Taliban as the lesser of the two worst options, not least when facing the overwhelming number of land and property inter-tribal and intra-tribal disputes, with the hope to settle these disputes in the swift fast-tracked Sharia adjudicating courts (as archaic and medievalist as it may sound to many in the West) as set up by the Taliban -- without the fear of Kabul-allied hostile tribal government members killing to settle old scores on land or property disputes, or for not paying the ransom (in their words). 

Afghans, Dari speaking, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashtuns -- Taliban and non-Taliban among them -- have one thing in common to date: Land disputes or treaties -- both inter and intra tribal -- made through tribal or community settlement are generally respected by later-succeeding Afghans, irrespective of whoever comes to power, at least in most cases.

Yet for some reason, there has been opposition from international and Western-backed organizations against land reforms in Afghanistan unless it attracts FDI/foreign investments, even at the expense of tribal and multi-ethnic land sensitivities. 

I’m surprised that so many of us in the West hardly read or understand the inside perspective of people in that region, notably Dari Farsi and Pashto speaking platforms, or comments in forums and more importantly, communicating and exchanging messages with Afghans on the grounds -- the “real human” Afghans outside the urban Kabul bourgeois class bubble. 

There’s a serious divide between 80% of rural Afghans and the remaining 15–20% urbanites. Even within urbanites, there are the Afghan people versus bourgeois class elites, the latter who wouldn’t or couldn’t speak or write Persian Dari or Pashto like natives, let alone interact with the rest of common rural Afghans. 

Many Ghani regime-aligned Afghans (mainly of Dari speaking) also say the blame for the current mess lies squarely with Ashraf Ghani for stubbornly refusing to negotiate with the Taliban to form an inclusive coalition government in the early days when the Taliban were in a much weaker position.

This is proven by the many Afghan civil servants who believe, as is evident from private Facebook and Clubhouse Dari forums, that Ghani failed to heed the Americans’ call in reaching out and accepting the Taliban’s offer to negotiate in the early days, ostensibly under pressure from India at the time, which has ultimately proved to be costly. 

One last thing that also should be factored by the West: Never ever support or sustain leaders in poor developing countries who have dual/foreign nationality/and or foreign residency, as those leaders have another added incentive to not remain loyal to their people and country and would use their foreign residency insurance to siphon off wealth away from the country they been tasked to serve. 

Karzai, Ghani, and their allied key government figures all have foreign passports or permanent residencies abroad. Of course this may not help to eliminate corruption but it would certainly close one significant gap at least. This is based on my experience as a former banker who has worked internationally.

Ismail Y Syed is a former banker who covered South Asia and Middle East regions. He is a native Londoner with a passion for politics and current affairs. A version of this article first appeared on ismailysyed.medium.com. Twitter @IsmailYSyed.