The past two decades have witnessed the EU being lectured to by different British prime ministers -- Theresa May’s speech at Lancaster House on January 17 was similar in approach. She did not hesitate to target the EU’s failings while dwelling on the connotations of the forthcoming Brexit negotiations. There were, however, ambiguities that left many wondering how the whole process would be implemented.
Subsequent statements emanating from London have tried to underline that Brexit might not be very popular within the EU paradigm, but it was being expected that the process would eventually result in “a new and equal partnership between an independent, self-governing, global Britain and our friends and allies in the EU.”
In this context, May suggested that the UK was looking forward to a “new, comprehensive, bold, and ambitious free trade agreement” with its previous partners within the EU. This premise was based on the axiom that what is good for Britain is also suitable for the EU -- which might be a bit away from the truth.
Britain is apparently hoping for an eventual agreement that would allow British banks and businesses “the freest possible trade in goods and services,” “the maximum freedom to trade and operate,” and “the greatest possible access” to the EU’s large market. Such market ambitions do not appear to hold particular appeal for economists in Germany.
Consequently, there have been strong reactions to Theresa May’s views, particularly within the German government -- keen on preserving solidarity among the 27 EU Member States.
Analysts have expressed caution about UK and indicated that, after Brexit, Britain must understand that it will have to enter into future deals on the basis of joint interests.
Some have commented that German views on Brexit also might have been accentuated through the advent of US President Trump, his receiving the prime minister and the presumed likelihood that the UK would give more attention to furthering its trade interests with the US
One reason for this German caution and displeasure appears to stem from the view that Britain has gradually become preoccupied with its own national interests and moved away in the recent past from being an integral part within the spectrum of EU affairs.
Some have commented that German views on Brexit also might have been accentuated through the advent of US President Trump, his receiving the British prime minister (the first foreign leader after his swearing-in), and the presumed likelihood that the UK would give more attention to furthering its trade interests with the US rather than helping build the European pillar of Western security that would help contain the evolving uncertainties arising out of the quagmire in the Middle East and North Africa.
Financial analysts are correctly pointing out that after Brexit it is unlikely that Britain will have privileged access to the EU’s internal market.
Matters will also assume greater complexity because agreement will have to be reached between Britain and the EU over a new regulatory system that will be applicable with reference to health and safety standards and their rules of origin procedures.
It is clear that Britain is hinting at a new format: Some sort of partial membership of the customs union.
This will, however, complicate the scenario with regard to the EU’s established common commercial policy and external tariffs format.
EU institutions in Brussels have been evaluating very carefully the possible costs of Brexit. They are also trying to assess if Britain will eventually propose any measure that might ease a future financial settlement equation pertaining to the EU annual budget. No such suggestion has been floated up till now.
Such a sensitive situation stands to be further exacerbated against the backdrop of Theresa May’s use of the warning that, if the UK is thwarted because of the Article 50 process, then it might “change the basis of Britain’s economic model” and even consider erecting protectionist barriers against mainland Europe and also engage in tax alternatives and deregulation measures against the interests of its erstwhile partners.
There is also another issue that will require careful resolution: That of the role of the European Court of Justice (CJEU). It is true that after Brexit the CJEU will cease to have direct jurisdiction in the UK, but it would be simplistic to think that the UK could then ignore the Luxembourg judges altogether.
The court will continue to have the last word through its decisions on the rights of UK citizens resident in EU states, UK businesses established there. It will also be a party in the arbitration of any trade dispute between the UK and the EU27.
At this point of time, the British prime minister benefitting from a perceived lack of opposition from the British Labour Party has become one of the UK’s most powerful prime ministers despite her sitting on a small majority.
Nevertheless, it will not be an easy street for Theresa May as she confronts the demands for a second Scottish independence poll from Scotland’s equally steely nationalist First Minister Nicola Sturgeon who has been insisting on Scotland’s right to retain some kind of EU association.
Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador and Chief Information Commissioner of the Information Commission, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance, can be reached at muhammadzamir0@gmail.com.