Of lieutenant generals and secretaries general

The relatively unheralded deaths of two global statesmen within weeks of each other this year lends a curious, and yet ironic, human face to the perpetual dichotomy between peace-makers and warriors, politicians and soldiers, prejudice and pride. Yet, what underlines their respective moments in life is their role in one of the most ancient rituals of human conflict: Genocide.

A prince amongst warriors in the both literal and figurative sense, Yaqub Khan made a fateful decision in the spring of 1971 that his code of honour as a gentleman and an officer did not allow him to do what his superiors demanded. Rather than use his guns and tanks on his theretofore own unarmed compatriots, the scion of the Rampur royalty gave up his uniform and, with it, the ambition for which he was, till then, almost destined: Chief of staff of the Pakistan Army.

It was an ambition for which he had trained, sacrificed, and bled through three wars, in one of which he actually faced, on the other side of a Himalayan ridge, a battalion led by his own brother. The officer who didn’t shirk from his duty against his own sibling in 1948 considered it equally his duty not to become part of a genocide in the making, no matter how far up the orders came from.

Thus ended a military career so close to the ultimate pinnacle, but a prize denied by the call of honour. Decades later, the Sahibzada would become a successful foreign minister, UN mediator, and university president whose fluency in the languages of Shakespeare, Tagore, Ghalib, and Goethe made him a sought-after sage for those seeking to understand the world at its most instinctual.

But the consummate soldier who served admirably in the deserts of North Africa, the peaks of the Himalayas, and the plains of the Punjab, would never become the chief of army staff, a position which would, eventually, go to the man who succeeded him in Dhaka and orchestrated the genocide with which Yaqub Khan refused to sully his uniform.

At the telling moment of his career, Dr Boutros-Ghali was also faced with an agonising decision on how to handle genocide. At the pinnacle of his profession in the Egyptian foreign ministry, Boutros-Ghali was the first Arab to be chosen to become the secretary general of the United Nations, the ultimate gift the global community has to bestow upon a diplomat.

The international sanctions on the dissolving rumps of former Yugoslavia were in place and allowed foreign intervention only under the most pressing of circumstances when both NATO and the UN secretary general agreed to such a measure. By 1993, it was obvious to all except the professional international bureaucrats in New York and Brussels, that, rather than a fight between merely several ethnicities, the conflict in Bosnia was a one-sided extermination campaign by the fully-armed Serbians (who had inherited Yugoslavia’s massive military) against the multi-religious, multi-ethnic, pluralist Bosnian society.

Concentration camps, rape camps, and targeted bombings of markets, museums, and universities left no doubt that this was a genocide in the making. Even a hesitant President Clinton and NATO commanders wanted to do something to stop the genocide; Dr Boutros-Ghali refused his authorisation month after month, as the killings, rapes, and brutalisation continued.

The UN secretary general’s excuse? He didn’t want to make things any worse! Fortunately, the United States Congress had had enough of such appeasement, and over President Clinton’s initial disapproval and howls of protests by the UN bureaucrats, passed legislation that cut off the UN secretary general’s veto option on the use of American forces in the Balkans, and eventually American airstrikes and military advice helped stop the genocide as Bosnians were able to protect what little was left of their once thriving multi-cultural society.

The man most responsible for getting Boutros-Ghali’s thumb off of the Bosnians was the US Senate’s majority leader Bob Dole, a WWII veteran like Yaqub Khan, who had seen and known first-hand what genocide looked like; he knew what Dr Boutros-Ghali failed to acknowledge: There was a genocide going on in Bosnia.

Wars are never pleasant affairs, and professional warriors know so far better than career bureaucrats. What sets chivalrous and prudent warriors apart from their bureaucratic fellowmen is that the former realise when it is a folly to unleash force and when it is necessary to do so.

Many bureaucrats and politicians like Boutros-Ghali looked at war with the bizarrely detached outlook of academics, either cheering lustily for any war or shirking away like cowards from it in all circumstances. In the case of Boutros-Ghali, his conceit was paid for by the tens of thousands whose graves dot places like Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Mostar.

Shakespeare said that “the evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones.” The shattered lives of those who survived the Bosnian genocide is a testament to Boutros Boutros-Ghali; in the case of General Yaqub Khan, news of his death elicited a perfunctory condolence from a few politicians in his country and then it was off to the dazzle of the professional cricket league again.