Lessons learned from Enron and Satyam

Most of us are aware of the Enron debacle -- one of the most talked about corporate failures in recent times. Enron, once America’s seventh biggest company, filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.

Only days ago, its bonds were downgraded to junk. The Enron crisis also cast serious doubts on the existence of top-rated audit firm Arthur Andersen, and had more to say, generally, about the role of the accounting principles followed by audit firms and corporate business houses.

While the Enron story is now somewhat outdated, the lesson learned from this debacle will stay valid over a long period of time. Just eight years later, Satyam India again posed a serious threat to the “corporate India brand,” which is still haunting corporate India, and more importantly, the way a company should manage its books of accounts. “Satyam,” which means “truth” in Sanskrit, is now being called India’s Enron.

Enron was under tremendous pressure to generate profits, to exceed its peers, to jack up share prices, and to upgrade corporate positioning. These, however, are not unfamiliar practices in the corporate world.

Then what went wrong? It was running too fast, possibly on a thin rope, without building befitting capacity and fundamentals. Such behaviour made Enron compromise on its accounting principles, hide losses, overstate results to investors, and adopt unethical management practices.

For Satyam -- the Indian outsourcing giant -- people were calling them frauds, blemishing the account of its auditor in the process. In his resignation letter, former Satyam chairman B Ramalinga Raju confessed the fictitious build-up of a cash balance worth $1bn.

In the case of Enron, investors did not understand the company’s books because the company shifted many debts to off-balance sheet vehicles, where accepted market practices necessitated debts to be consolidated into the main accounts. It should have also avoided the practice of investing staff retirement funds in company shares.

In the wake of serious concerns regarding Enron’s financial statements, the company revised its financial statements of 1997 to 2000, downward.

However, investors desired that the possible merger with rival company Dynegy would have restored confidence and thus halted the unwinding of Enron’s book. Dynegy took a closer look at Enron’s books, and to the surprise of everyone, decided not to proceed. This made the bankruptcy of Enron inevitable.

It was almost the same case with Satyam, trying to merge with the real estate arm, to draw in confidence. But the corporate adviser Merrill Lynch found a big hole in their reported cash balance artificially inflated operating margins and profit figures, posing serious threat to the integrity of their financials, as well as management practices, despite being a publicly-listed company in India and the US.

The balance sheet gap kept building up because of the artificial profit figures reported over the years. Each year’s marginal gap ballooned over time, and there was no escape from the impending explosion.

As Satyam’s chairman Raju said: “Every attempt made to eliminate the gap failed. As the promoters held a small percentage of equity, the concern was that poor performance would result in a take-over, thereby exposing the gap.”

Apart from Enron fiasco, the whole corporate world was shocked by the shady practices followed by one of the world’s top audit firms, Arthur Andersen.

It was said that for partners and professionals at Arthur Andersen, there was only one way to move up: Figure out new ways to keep Enron happy. More than 100 Andersen staffers were devoted to managing this relationship, which was worth more than $50m a year, enough to keep a leading audit firm far from blowing the whistle.

Several top Enron executives, including its chief accounting officer, had come from Andersen. Andersen even cut a deal to handle some of the “internal” auditing work for Enron, along with vetting its public reports for the trading firm’s audit committee.

All these money-making partnerships made Andersen blind to everything that happened at Enron. The Satyam episode also put its auditor -- Price Waterhouse -- in a lot of embarrassment. It forced them to go for a mass clean-up in the way they do audits, even take some harsh measures concerning their people.

Our readers know that auditors have somehow always been in the uncomfortable position of having to judge the financial integrity of the companies that pay them. However, with the emergence of market economies and intensifying pressure to produce ever-rising earnings and stock prices, the corporate world began to push the accounting boundaries like never before. Auditors were thrown the role of an enabler, more like a business partner, and used to “clear” corporate failures with a “green pen.”

What did we learn from Enron? Hiding debt or financial fundamentals can be suicidal for any company. Satyam also suffered similar consequences and the repercussions of the breach of trust of the investors are still to follow. The Satyam scam is indeed an irony -- especially after Satyam won the “Golden Peacock Global Award for Excellence” in corporate governance for the second time in 2008. It was also rated the “best corporate governance practices” in 2006 and 2007 by Investor Relations Global Rankings.

Questions were raised about the practices of moving financial obligations to off-book vehicles, inflating profits or jacking up share prices. Investors and bankers may learn not to trust companies that report mysteriously spectacular profit growth.

Auditors will be warier of their bosses pressuring to sign dodgy accounts, rating agencies and regulators may be more nervous about companies that do not come clean about their activities. Additionally, regulators will also be cautious before being blown away by the market reputation of a company.

There are cases in Bangladesh which are similar, if not worse, to Enron or Satyam. A jailed business tycoon, in his testimony made during the interim government to law enforcement agencies (on his alleged role in tax avoidance, despite his companies being practically profitable) said he did what his accountants told him to do.

Another businessman, on his alleged role in buying government land or disputed lands at throw-away prices, blamed his legal counsel for advising him to be able to cover up. We came to know of these incidences because they were published in the media. But not all such malpractices get reported.

There is a common understanding that things should get better with the approval of financial reporting act (FRA). Through FRA, people’s or investors’ interests are likely to be protected through the minimum possible disclosure. However, we, as always, would put lot of emphasis on the selection of the right people to play the role of the jury in the financial reporting council. Under no circumstances should political refugees or fraudsters get on to this in the guise of being independent accountants.