Violence in the name of politics

The idea of an academic institution or a college building or a university campus being something outside the general milieu of society is a romantic notion that has strong currency among socio-economic elites (many of whom like to call themselves the “middle-class”) of West Bengal.

Therein lies the shock value of the murder of a student by fellow-students in a college campus during college-hours when the principal is in his office. This is “allegedly” what happened in Sabang Sajanikanta Mahavidyaloy on August 8, when Krishnaprasad Jana, a second year student of the college, was killed by iron rod-wielding goons who also double up as students of the same college and again, “allegedly,” members of the Trinamool Chhatra Parishad (TMCP), the student organisation associated with West Bengal’s ruling Trinamool Congress.

The speed with which the chief minister (who also doubles up as home minister and hence, is responsible for law and order) gave a clean-chit to the TMCP even before investigations had ended (or seriously started), is a strong hint to the rest of us about the truth-value of the allegations.

This wasn’t the first death of a student activist during the TMC regime. The death in police custody of SFI activist Sudipto Gupta was a high-profile case from 2013. But death is only one end in the spectrum of political violence. Of late, West Bengal has been “in the news” about a spate of violent incidents.

The TMC government plays them down, especially when some complicity of some TMC functionary is alleged. This is not surprising -- that has been standard practice in West Bengal for decades. The notion “visibility” of violence, especially of the political kind, is a complex phenomenon. The first question is, who makes it visible?

Largely, the media does, since the opposition parties in West Bengal have all but abdicated. Hence TMC’s fulminations against certain sectors of the media and its amateurish attempts at creating thinly-veiled pro-TMC media outlets (largely funded by chit-fund money). Ever since Mamata has refused to budge on the land acquisition question, she has lost the adulation of media houses that used to portray her as the fiery change-maker.

Secondly, who does the violence and how many degrees of separation exist between the goon and the leader? The larger the separation, lesser is the culpability of the party. During the Left Front regime, political violence was quite wide-spread and I am not only talking about the closing years when the Singur killings, and the Nandigram and Netai massacres took place. But CPI(M) leaders, at whichever level, largely managed to keep its goons from being serious political aspirants and hence becoming the visible face of the party.

A centralised authority and co-ordination helped this. In the TMC, the CPIM’s artificial difference between the bhodrolok mask and ruffian face, has evaporated in many places. Political violence has always been a very small fraction of all violence that happens in the West Bengal. The more explicit is the connection of the violence with the ruling party, greater is the news value.

The typical TMC middle-rung leader has less entrenched social capital than an erstwhile CPI(M) leader of a similar rank. This relative lack of training in obfuscation, of not being able to maintain “correct” documents, shows. TMC cannot draw upon the cultural capital and the sophistry of the CPI(M). That doesn’t make the actions of TMC’s goons any less criminal. However, in this context of unprecedented violence, it may be remembered that National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data in the TMC years does not show a spike in rate of violent crimes compared to the CPI(M) years. That rate is actually slightly lesser than the pan-Indian average.

All political violence is also political action, however condemnable. Offensive political violence is typically employed with political gain in mind. Violence employed in the name of politics has always been an integral part of the Indian establishment. Its full “law and order” wrath is reserved only for specific kinds of political violence -- those employed explicitly in the name of secession, class, and minority religions.

Otherwise, political violence is assumed to be one of the dominant modes of grassroots political contestation. In fact, political violence, when employed by the ruling party (and I am not speaking of internal feuds here), is typically the most direct proof of an organised and entrenched political opposition. A decrease in rate of inter-party political violence, as has been the case in West Bengal under TMC rule, is a sign of a crumbling opposition organisation.

This is also attributed to allegations that the TMC has co-opted large sections of those who constituted CPI(M)’s firepower. Clashes are widely seen as a sign of contest, with the ruling groups needing to push more violently as the opposition can stand some ground.

This was largely true during many years of CPI(M)’s regime. The high-esteemed human rights group Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) lists more than 7,000 instances of political killings including all sides during the CPI(M)’s rule. This was only a partial list that didn’t include the closing years of the Left Front, infamous preciously for political violence.

The idea of a historically less violent Bengal, engaging non-violently with progressive values is an idea that is not borne out by reality. West Bengal’s separated twin, Bangladesh, has a very similar culture of endemic political violence, including many fatally violent clashes involving student activists. The primacy of violence as a political weapon is the surest sign of a lack of democratic political contestation at the grassroots. This too has a long past but it’s still instructive to understand the nature of West Bengal’s two major powers on this question.

Mamata Banerjee’s political origin lies in the ethos of West Bengal mid-1970s Chhatra Parishad (the name of Indira Congress’s student wing NSUI in West Bengal) and Youth Congress. In West Bengal, these two organisations had strong-armed democracy busting written into the core of their DNA.

This time also included the Emergency. They dominated college and university campuses during the Emergency by snuffing out almost all opposition. Student Union elections became days of one-sided terror that simply needed to display its unsheathed sword in order to be effective. When the CPI(M) led Left Front took-over, its student wing, the SFI, soon learnt the “democratic” trick of making sure candidates don’t file their nomination papers or getting them disqualified by committees of teachers and officials, who were invariably loyal to the CPI(M) and hence, shamelessly partial to the SFI.

This started the great decades of “uncontested wins” of SFI with the SFI giving “revolutionary greetings” to the student community, who hardly ever turned up to colleges on election day, from a mixture of fear, apathy, and the pointlessness of voting in an election with a single contender. Thus, the space to develop the culture of non-violent democratic political contestation got severely eroded. This erosion has long-term consequences, as is evident now in West Bengal.

From Partition to the beginning of the Congress-era suppression of the Naxalbari uprising, left-wing student organisations dominated democratically contested and elected student unions, but with not an insignificant number of democratically contested and elected Congres site student unions too. Many influential teachers, professors, and college principals were known to harbour anti-ruling party views, but they retained the positions of influence. So, not all eras are the same. It is not necessarily the same old story. However, this is not the time from where the image of a progressive West Bengal emerges.

For decades, West Bengal has been economically stagnant. That makes its unemployment crisis very acute. There may be some honesty in politics, and not all party workers are there to personally gain, but one cannot deny the overwhelming backdrop. There are youths, many, many of them, who are unemployed or under-employed, who jostle to curry favour with a leader of some influence.

The leader then uses them in exchange for some morsels of whatever favour he can give back, in return for these hired bodies. The proliferation of criminal (in the real-estate sector) and quasi-criminal (“protectors” of street hawkers) extortion rackets are mere symptoms of a larger disease that is infecting the political class, making it look more and more like a pyramid with complex patronage links.

It really doesn’t matter much whether the tip of the pyramid is covered by a humble white dhoti or a humble white cotton sari. What matters is how those garments and their power to signify frugality is used to cover heinous crimes. The APDR report mentions thousands on victims of political killing. No points for guessing who primarily were the victims when the reds ruled. The situation has reversed. The want and unemployment fuelled patronage structures have not changed.